It’s about the stupidest thing anyone could claim in defense of an unlawful detention and search, but Waterbury, CT police office Nicholas Andrzejewski did it anyway. He actually told a court (twice!) that someone respecting every single law applicable to them at the point of this unwelcome interaction was at least reasonable suspicion for a search, if not actual probable cause.

Here’s how this started, taken from the Second Circuit Appeals Court’s rejection [PDF] of the officer’s attempt to walk away from this civil rights suit:

At approximately 8:43 p.m. on November 12, 2018, Basel Soukaneh stopped his car with the engine running on the side of a street in Waterbury, Connecticut. Soukaneh’s iPhone GPS, located in a holder mounted to the car’s dashboard, was frozen, and he stopped his car to fix it. The area “was dark and [known as] a high crime area well known for prostitution, drug transactions and other criminal activity.”

Ah. The old boilerplate. These assertions about dark, high crime, drug area, blah blah blah presumably autofill whenever a cop starts a sentence explaining their reasonable suspicions on their incident report. It’s so overused and so devoid of actual facts that it’s become a parody of itself. Here’s Scott Greenfield’s take on this part of the officer’s narrative:

Was there articulable suspicion that a crime was being committed because Souhaneh stopped his car on the street? It was dark, as nights tend to be. It was in a high crime area, as is every area in pretty much any city anywhere. And yet, the court saw no problem with Andrzejewski demanding his license, for doing exactly what drivers are instructed to do by pulling over rather than driving while their attention is focused elsewhere. 

Any reasonable person will read this and realize that this self-proclaimed reasonable cop’s narrative has at least a couple of strikes against it. And that’s well before Officer Andrzejewski decided to convert this truly unnecessary non-stop into a full blown invasion of the interior of Soukaneh’s car and a constantly escalating series of rights violations.

Within seconds after Soukaneh stopped his car, Officer Nicholas Andrzejewski approached the vehicle, knocked on the driver’s side window, and according to Soukaneh, loudly demanded Soukaneh’s driver’s license. The interior vehicle light was on, so although the area was dark, Andrzejewski could see the activity inside of the car when he approached the window. As Soukaneh complied and handed his license over, he also provided Andrzejewski with a facially valid firearms permit. While doing so, Soukaneh also disclosed to Andrzejewski that, per the permit, he was in lawful possession of a pistol that was located in the driver’s side door compartment.

That this is being recounted in a court decision means the officer didn’t just take a look at the permit and wish Soukaneh a good evening. No, it went the other way. And it’s the sort of thing you need to shove directly in the eyeballs of every bootlicking person, police union rep, politician, and law enforcement official who claims police brutality only exists because people “don’t comply” and should just stop “breaking the law.” All laws were followed. Soukaneh did better than simply comply, he volunteered information. And this is what he got for being a model law-abiding citizen.

Following that exchange, Andrzejewski ordered Soukaneh out of the vehicle. According to Soukaneh’s description, Andrzejewski then violently “dragged [him] out of the car,” pushed him to the ground, yelled and screamed at him, handcuffed him, and pat-searched his person, recovering neither a weapon nor contraband. Andrzejewski then “shoved [Soukaneh] into the rear area of [Andrzejewski’s police] cruiser,” and left Soukaneh “bent over and partially on the floor of the vehicle.” Soukaneh remained “in that position, facing down and unable to see, until another police officer came along several minutes later and helped him sit up.”

Once the other officer repositioned Soukaneh in the cruiser, Soukaneh saw Andrzejewski search his “entire car, both front and rear,” as well as the car’s trunk. After the search, Andrzejewski returned to the cruiser and kept Soukaneh handcuffed and detained in it for an additional half hour, during which time “a group of seven to ten police officers gathered.” Id. At one point, Andrzejewski began writing on his onboard computer and turned to a fellow officer who had arrived at the scene and asked, “What should I write him up for?” The other officer laughed and the sergeant, who had also since arrived, told Andrzejewski what to write.

Unsurprisingly, the lower court rejected the officer’s request for immunity, pointing out that while the initial encounter may have been justified, nothing that followed that (pulling Soukaneh from the car, handcuffing him, searching his vehicle, detaining him for another half-hour while trying to figure out what to cite him with) was supported by probable cause.

The Second Circuit comes to the same conclusion. Simply being made aware Soukaneh possessed an item millions of Americans also own legally is not probable cause for anything the officer did past that point.

On the facts before us, Andrzejewski does not provide an articulable reason why he, or any
other reasonable officer, could conclude that there was probable cause to believe that Soukaneh possessed his firearm unlawfully in violation of Section 29-38(a). To find otherwise would consign those validly carrying firearms pursuant to a license to automatic detention because it would effectively presume that gun permits are invalid until proven valid, or that lawfully owned guns are per se contraband until proven otherwise. Such a finding would effectively render armed individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights meaningless when they are lawfully carrying firearms.

The same goes for the officer’s attempt to invoke qualified immunity by claiming no case on point would have made him aware he was not allowed to so thoroughly and lengthily violate this person’s rights. The Second Circuit says it’s not even sure why it’s spending so much time discussing this because it’s blatantly clear what happened here isn’t permissible under the Fourth Amendment.

This is not a close case, about which reasonable officers could differ. The law as it stood at the time of the events in question left no doubt that a person in possession of a firearm and a facially valid permit for that firearm had a clearly established right to be free from the kind of forcible and prolonged detention to which Soukaneh was subjected, absent any objective reason to suspect that the permit was forged or otherwise invalid.

That covers the forcible removal of Soukaneh from his car, his handcuffing, the search of his car, and his extended detention while the officer tried to come up with something to justify his actions after the fact.

It goes back to the lower court. But I imagine it will only be there briefly before Soukaneh is offered a settlement. Hopefully, that settlement will come hand-in-hand with the firing of Officer Andrzejewski. If this is the one time he got caught, just imagine what he’s gotten away with.

Here’s yet more anecdotal evidence demonstrating why we’re be better off routing mental health calls to mental health professionals, rather than to people who tend to respond to things they can’t immediately control with violence. The good news is more cities are experimenting with multiple options for 911 response. The better news is that those experiments have been successful.

The bad news is everything else. Most cities aren’t willing to do this. And because they’re unwilling to explore their options, more people suffering mental health crises are going to end up dead. That’s what happened to Roy Scott, a Las Vegas resident who was “helped” to death by Las Vegas police officers Kyle Smith and Theodore Huntsman.

Here’s another story that’s all too familiar here in the United States, as recounted at the opening of the Ninth Circuit Appeals Court decision [PDF]:

Early in the morning on March 3, 2019, Roy Scott called the police for help. But he did not get it. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Officers Kyle Smith and Theodore Huntsman came to the scene. Scott was unarmed and in mental distress. Though he complied with the officers’ orders and was not suspected of a crime, Smith and Huntsman initiated physical contact, forced Scott to the ground, and used bodyweight force to restrain him. Shortly after, Scott lost consciousness and he was later pronounced dead.

The one-two punch of “called for help”/”but he did not get it” makes it clear the officers’ response to the situation was objectively terrible, at least in the Appeal Court’s eyes. The phrase “initiated physical contact” gives a hint of what’s to follow in the narrative: an unwarranted deployment of force against an unarmed person who was already experiencing distress long before these officers decided to end his life.

The district court nailed it on the first pass, denying qualified immunity to both officers. The officers appealed, but are greeted with more of the same at the next judiciary level.

The first two paragraphs recounting the violent incident in greater detail contain some pretty chilling facts. First, the evidence shows both officers clearly understood they were dealing with someone in mental distress, rather than some sort of dangerous criminal.

Scott was distressed and hallucinating when Officers Smith and Huntsman arrived at his apartment. After Smith and Huntsman knocked and identified themselves, Scott yelled to the officers to “break the door down” claiming that there were people inside his house. The officers did not break the door in because they did not hear anyone inside the apartment. Instead, they continued to knock and order Scott to come to the door. About two minutes after first knocking on the door, Smith told Huntsman, “this is a 421A for sure,” using the department code to indicate he believed Scott was mentally ill. Huntsman then called through the door: “Sir, have you been diagnosed with any mental diseases?” After Scott did not come to the door, Smith asked dispatch to call Scott back to ask him to come to the door, noting again that Scott appeared to be mentally ill. Smith then said to Huntsman: “I ain’t going in there. That’s too sketchy.” Huntsman agreed, “That dude’s wacky.” Peering into Scott’s window, Huntsman asked Smith if he could see the “crazed look in [Scott’s] eye.” They could not see anyone else in Scott’s apartment.

While it’s obviously possible for someone to both be in mental distress and pose a safety threat to others, the first fact that matters is that both officers affirmed (in their own body cam recordings) that they believed they were dealing with a mental health issues, rather than actual criminal activity.

The next paragraph contains a pretty damning fact — one that is a leading indicator that police violence, misconduct, or rights violations will be the most likely outcome of any encounter.

When Scott did not open the door, Smith called their sergeant, turning off his body worn camera. On Huntsman’s camera, Smith can be heard telling their sergeant that Scott sounds mentally ill. After ending the call, Smith told Huntsman that their sergeant said that “at the end of the day we can’t do anything if we don’t hear any reason to have an exigent circumstance.” Smith also explained that their Sergeant suggested they try again to get Scott to come to the door.

Never a good sign. Fortunately for Scott’s survivors, the other officer continued recording and captured the rest of Roy Scott’s killing. Scott finally answered the door carrying a metal pipe — one that he immediately dropped when the officers asked him to. They asked if he had any other weapons. Scott handed them a knife he had in pocket — handle-first — and said “I am sorry.” The officers pushed him up against a wall, shining a flashlight in his face. Scott asked to be put in the cop car, telling officers he had schizophrenia and that the light was bothering him. This request was ignored. The officers told Scott, “We are out here to help you.”

They didn’t.

At first, the officers held Scott’s arms at his sides while he was lying on his back. In this position, Scott screamed, struggled, and pled with the officers to leave him alone for over two minutes. The officers then eventually rolled Scott onto his stomach, repeatedly ordering Scott to “stop.” With Scott on his stomach and with his hands restrained behind his back, Huntsman put his bodyweight on Scott’s back and neck for about one to two minutes. At the same time Smith put his weight on Scott’s legs, restraining his lower body. Scott’s pleas turned increasingly incoherent and breathless as Huntsman applied his bodyweight. After handcuffing him, the officers attempted to roll Scott on his side, as he continued to incoherently cry out that he wanted to be left alone. When they rolled Scott over, his face was bloody from contact with the ground. Scott stopped yelling and thrashing around after a few minutes. Scott did not respond when Smith and Huntsman tried to wake or revive him. Shortly after, when the paramedics arrived, Scott was still unresponsive. Scott was pronounced dead after paramedics removed him from the scene. Plaintiffs’ expert found that Scott had died from restraint asphyxia.

From there, the fact-finding is simple, especially since it was recorded. While the officers presented their one-sided argument for qualified immunity, the appeals court shuts this attempt down. First of all, the facts are on the side of the non-moving party’s assertions at this point. Second, the body cam footage takes care of most of the questions of fact and what’s left to be decided should be done in front of a jury.

The officers’ attempt to portray Scott as a threat falls flattest, in terms of appellate arguments. The officers claimed Scott was a threat because he was carrying two weapons — a metal pipe and a knife. The court reminds the officers that one had been dropped and the other voluntarily handed to officers well before the officers decided to take Scott to the ground and restrain him to death.

The law was clearly established when the officers ended Scott’s life. And the precedent is almost directly on point.

The similarities between this case and Drummond are striking. Scott was not suspected of a crime. Instead, he was taken into custody because of his mental health. Though they were presented with an individual experiencing a mental health crisis and presenting no obvious danger to others, Smith and Huntsman crushed Scott’s back and neck to subdue him while handcuffing him. Scott also cried out with increasing distress and incoherence as the officers’ force escalated. Reasonable officers would have known that their force was not reasonable and that it created a serious risk of asphyxiating Scott.

When the law is clearly established and any facts that might help the officers push their version of the events still in dispute (not including those caught on camera, which are indisputable), qualified immunity is not an option. This will return to the lower court to be argued in front of a jury, assuming the city of Los Angeles doesn’t decide to settle first. No matter how this ends up being resolved, the city and the PD would be wise to look into alternative response options for mental health calls. It’s pretty clear police officers can’t — or won’t — handle these calls responsibly.

We didn’t really need more precedent assuring us our rights don’t mean anything at the borders, but we got it anyway.

Within 100 miles of any US border (and that includes international airports), courts have generally ruled that rights are optional. If they seem to be getting in the way of “securing” the border, they have to go. And that’s why intrusive device searches have increased steadily in recent years, despite the Supreme Court’s 2014 Riley decision. That ruling said warrants were required to search cell phones because cell phones, unlike someone’s trunk or pants pockets, contained a wealth of personal and private information previously unseen in the history of the nation.

Given the rationale for the warrant requirement, you’d think courts would extend it to cover the nation’s borders. But no court has. When it comes to border searches, Riley simply doesn’t apply.

Not every court has reached this conclusion. A federal judge in the 2nd Circuit said Riley applied at the border. But that ruling was never ratified at the appellate level, so it hardly changes things in the Second Circuit.

The Ninth Circuit Appeals Court — which covers the largest amount of southern border (which is where pretty much all the intrusion takes place) — did place some restraints on warrantless border device searches, limiting them to searches for “contraband.” How much that changed anything is unknown, but it was a small step further than any other circuit has been willing to go.

The circuit with the second largest amount of border territory (the Fifth Circuit) hasn’t had any qualms about eradicating the Fourth Amendment at border crossings. An unequivocal “no warrants needed” was handed down by that circuit late last summer.

The Seventh Circuit Appeals Court recently revisited this issue. Its earlier ruling on the issue was pretty much a punt. The court decided it didn’t need to deliver any ruling on the issue at that point because it could use the “good faith” release valve to sidestep anything approaching precedent.

The primary positions staked out by the parties could not be more starkly contrasted. The defendant argues that nothing less than a warrant authorizes a search of electronic devices at the border. The government asserts that it may conduct these searches without any particularized suspicion at all. In the end, though, we need not adopt either of these positions, and indeed may avoid entirely the thorny issue of the appropriate level of suspicion required. Instead, we affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress because these agents acted in good faith when they searched the devices with reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime was being committed, at a time when no court had ever required more than reasonable suspicion for any search at the border.

That’s how it went in April 2019. Here’s how it’s going now:

The “longstanding recognition that searches at our borders without probable cause and without a warrant are nonetheless ‘reasonable’ has a history as old as the Fourth Amendment itself.” United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977). That history leads us to join the uniform view of our sister circuits to hold that searches of electronics at the border—like any other border search—do not require a warrant or probable cause, and that the kind of routine, manual search of the phone initially performed here requires no individualized suspicion. We affirm.

That’s from the opening of the appeals court decision [PDF], one that portrays a CBP agent’s trawl through a traveler’s phone as a “routine, manual search,” which included demanding (and obtaining) a passcode, digging through images stored on the phone, and unlocking (with the provided passcode) another application where more images of child sexual abuse were discovered.

The traveler (and the person seeking to suppress the evidence discovered on his phone) is Marcos Mendez, a US citizen who had previous arrests for solicitation of a child and CSAM possession. So, he was already on the CBP radar. That being said, it’s a bit chilling to realize this is what the CBP thinks is an indicator of child sexual abuse — something the Seventh Circuit tacitly endorses by placing it in the decision without further comment:

Mendez also fit the profile for child-pornography offenders: a single adult male traveling alone.

Well… OK, then. The supposed connective tissue was the fact that Mendez traveled alone to Ecuador, which is apparently just as suspicious because… well… rank speculation, I guess?

[M]endez was returning from Ecuador, which CBP officers classified as a potential child trafficking source country.

Couldn’t literally any country be considered a “potential child trafficking source country?” I mean, we’re just talking potential here. It’s not other countries, which are known destinations for people seeking to engage in sex with minors. All this says is that Ecuador, like every other country in the world, has minors in its population and those minors have the potential to be trafficked for sex.

Anyway, the Seventh Circuit isn’t going to let itself get bogged down by questionable assertions about suspicion asserted by our valiant border officers. Instead, it’s just going to get down to business aligning itself with every other circuit by going on (permanent) record with a free pass on constitutional violations anywhere people might enter or exit the United States.

And, in doing so, the court says things the Supreme Court didn’t say about the Riley decision, even as it uses a very selective direct quote. According to the Seventh Circuit, Riley doesn’t apply at the borders because the incident underlying that historic decision did not occur at the border.

Riley involved the search incident to arrest exception and “carefully tailored its analysis to that context.” Wood, 16 F.4th at 533. What is unreasonable after arrest may be perfectly reasonable at customs, as Riley itself anticipated. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 401–02 (“[O]ther case-specific exceptions may still justify a warrantless search of a particular phone.”)

But the Seventh Circuit’s blanket exception for border searches ignores a crucial part of the very decision it quotes:

“[O]ther case-specific exceptions…”

This ruling has nothing to say about specifics. While it’s certainly true a known sex offender will receive greater scrutiny when entering or exiting the country, the ruling here applies this line of thought to everyone crossing borders, whether or not any reasonable suspicion exists to justify the seizure and search of someone’s phone.

There’s evidence here this search was likely justified under the lower level of constitutional protections at our nation’s borders, but the Seventh Circuit looks at a case-specific exception and makes it a blanket exception by refusing to undo precedent that says federal officers can pretty much do whatever they want, so long as it happens within 100 miles of any border crossing.

So, it’s not a great ruling or even a good one. It just is. And because no appellate circuit has been willing to upset this free-for-all at the border by instituting a warrant requirement, every other appellate circuit thinks it’s OK to ignore the greater message of the Riley decision (that being that almost any search of a person’s phone is intrusive) in favor of just keeping their heads down and allowing the status to remain quo.

“Odor of marijuana” still remains — even in an era of widespread legalization — a favorite method of justifying warrantless searches. It’s an odor, so it can’t be caught on camera, which are becoming far more prevalent, whether they’re mounted to cop cars, pinned to officers’ chests, or carried by passersby.

Any claim an odor was detected pits the officer’s word against the criminal defendant’s. Even though this is a nation where innocence is supposed to be presumed, the reality of the criminal justice system is that everyone from the cops to the court to the jury tend to view people only accused of crimes as guilty.

But this equation changed a bit as states and cities continued to legalize weed possession. Once that happened, the claim that the “odor” of marijuana had been “detected” only meant the cops had managed to detect the odor of a legal substance. The same thing for their dogs. Drug dogs are considered the piece de resistance in warrantless roadside searches — an odor “detected” by a four-legged police officer that’s completely incapable of being cross-examined during a jury trial.

As legalization spreads, courts have responded. There have been handful of decisions handed down that clearly indicate what the future holds: cops and dog cops that smell weed where weed is legal don’t have much legal footing when it comes to warrantless searches. Observing something legal has never been — and will never be — justification for a search, much less reasonable suspicion to extend a stop.

The present has yet to arrive in the Seventh Circuit. Detecting the odor of a legal substance is still considered to be a permission slip for a warrantless search. And that’s only because there’s one weird stipulation in the law governing legal marijuana possession in Illinois.

In this case, a traffic stop led to the “detection” of the odor of marijuana. That led to the driver fleeing the traffic stop and dropping a gun he was carrying. And that led to felon-in-possession charges for Prentiss Jackson, who has just seen his motion to suppress this evidence rejected by the Seventh Circuit Appeals Court.

Here’s how this all started, as recounted in the appeals court decision [PDF]:

The officer smelled the odor of unburnt marijuana emanating from the car. He knew the odor came from inside the car, as he had not smelled it before he approached the vehicle. During their conversation about the license and registration, the officer told Jackson he smelled “a little bit of weed” and asked if Jackson and the passenger had been smoking. Jackson said he had, but that was earlier in the day, and he had not smoked inside the car.

Through the officer’s training, he knew the most common signs of impairment for driving under the influence were the odor of marijuana or alcohol and speech issues. He was also taught to look for traffic violations. Concerned that Jackson might be driving under the influence because of the head and taillight violation, the odor of marijuana, and Jackson’s admission that he had smoked earlier, the officer asked Jackson whether he was “safe to drive home.” Jackson said he was. His speech was not slurred during the interaction, and his responses were appropriate.

Now, I’m not a federal judge. (And probably shouldn’t be one, for several reasons.) But I think I would have immediately called bullshit here. According to the officer’s own statements, his “training” led him to believe things like unburnt marijuana and unlit headlights/taillights are indicators of “driving under the influence.” I would have asked for the officer to dig deep into the reserves of his “training” to explain these assertions. The only one that fits is Jackson’s admission he had smoked “earlier.” And, even with that admission, Jackson cleared the impairment test.

The officer, however, insisted he had probable cause to engage in a warrantless search of the car, based exclusively on his detection of the odor of “unburnt” marijuana. The officer told Jackson he was going to cite him for weed possession (not for the amount, but for how it was stored in the car). He also told the passenger he would make an arrest if Jackson did not “agree” to a “probable cause search.”

Jackson moved to the back of his car as ordered by the officer. Shortly before the patdown began, Jackson fled, dropping a handgun he was not legally allowed to possess.

Jackson challenged the search in his motion to suppress, arguing that marijuana legalization meant an assertion that the odor of a (legal) drug had been detected by an officer meant nothing in terms of probable cause for a warrantless search. The lower court rejected Jackson’s argument. The Seventh Circuit Appeals Court agrees with the trial court.

First, the court says marijuana, while legal in Illinois, is still illegal under federal law. And the suspicion a federal law has been broken (even if it can’t be enforced locally) is still enough to justify further questions and further exploration of a car.

Furthermore, state requirements for transporting legal marijuana in personal vehicles were not met by Jackson’s baggies of personal use weed.

[T]he [Illinois] Vehicle Code […] clearly states that when cannabis is transported in a private vehicle, the cannabis must be stored in a sealed, odor-proof container—in other words, the cannabis should be undetectable by smell by a police officer.”

That’s a really weird stipulation. It basically tells residents that in order to legally transport drugs they must act like drug smugglers. And, while I haven’t seen a case raising this issue yet, one can be sure people have been criminally charged for following the law because officers believe efforts made to prevent officers from detecting drugs is, at the very least, reasonable suspicion to extend a stop or, better yet, probable cause to engage in a warrantless search.

And this is likely why that particular stipulation (which I haven’t seen in other places where weed is legal) was included in this law: it doesn’t remove one of the handiest excuses to perform a warrantless search — the “odor of marijuana.”

The smell of unburnt marijuana outside a sealed container independently supplied probable cause and thus supported the direction for Jackson to step out of the car for the search.

That’s pretty handy… at least for cops. It allows them to “detect” the odor of a legal substance in order to treat it as contraband. And they need to do little more than claim in court they smelled it — something that’s impossible to disprove. Illinois has managed to do the seemingly impossible: it has legalized a substance while allowing law enforcement officers to treat it as illegal. That’s quite the trick. And because of that, it’s still perfectly legal to pretend legal substances are contraband when it comes to traffic stops in Illinois.

Every cop with a dog swears it can detect all sorts of contraband. Literally swears. In court. On the stand.

But are drug dogs miraculous wonders of law enforcement due to their training? Or is it due to the domesticated dog’s innate desire to please, especially when it knows it will be rewarded for doing the thing? Or is it simply responding to cues delivered by its handler, some of which may be subconscious?

Well, it’s probably a combination of all these things. Training does get dogs to respond to certain scents. But the training also turns them into an extension of their handler. And then the dog wants what the cop wants: a reason to perform a warrantless search. Both handler and dog are rewarded in their own way. The dog gets a treat. And the cop gets to perform a trick that allows the officer to bypass the Fourth Amendment. (There’s a reason cops hate actually scientific testing of officers and drug dogs, because once the pair is separated, tons of false positives and negatives tend to be generated.)

For a long time, courts were mostly receptive to the assertions made by officers handling drug dogs. If they said in court that the dog “alerted,” the court generally couldn’t find a good reason to consider this testimony flawed.

But now there are cameras in cop cars and cameras on cops’ chests and cameras in the phones pretty much every driver and passenger possesses. Consequently, these assertions about “alerting” are receiving more scrutiny, as are the dogs themselves, who have shown their ability to reliably detect contraband isn’t all that different than allowing cops to flip a coin to determine whether or not they can pursue a warrantless search.

This case, brought to us by FourthAmendment.com, has a court calling bullshit on a supposed “alert.” A pretextual traffic stop that resulted in the discovery of an illegally possessed weapon relied on a search of a car — a search supposedly prompted by the cop dog on the scene.

The defendant, David Edmonds, was hit with a felony in possession charge following this search. He moved to suppress the evidence, claiming the search of his car wasn’t supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the latter of which is the minimum that officers need to search a vehicle on public roads.

On the way to this warrantless search, the dashcam video submitted as evidence by the government appears to show a bunch of cops breaking traffic laws en route to violating the Fourth Amendment. From the decision [PDF]:

It was daylight. A white sedan traveling on Fifth Street crossed Broadway in front of Trooper Gabriel, proceeding from the trooper’s right to his left. The first unobstructed view of the sedan appears about six seconds into the video. The sedan’s windows are tinted. On the dashcam footage, nothing is visible inside the car. The car is in view for about four seconds before it travels out of the camera’s range.

A pickup truck followed behind the sedan on Fifth Street also traveling in front of Trooper Gabriel. Trooper Gabriel testified at the hearing that the truck was driven by a law enforcement officer. After the truck passed, Trooper Gabriel ran the red light on Broadway and turned left on Fifth Street following the path of the truck and the sedan, cutting off another car going through the intersection. Trooper Gabriel testified on cross-examination that the car he cut off was driven by another law enforcement officer who he had warned by radio.

The area of Fifth Street is a residential area. Trooper Gabriel picked up speed on Fifth Street. He passed a sign stating that the speed limit is 25. He appeared to be traveling well above that. He testified at the hearing that he was traveling about 40-45 miles per hour.

At this point, there were at least three state troopers, driving three different vehicles in pursuit of a white sedan that had not been observed breaking any traffic laws. Trooper Gabriel, however, had not only run a red light, but was driving 20 mph over the posted speed limit.

If this was a pursuit, there was no indication of that. There is nothing on the record that indicates sirens or lights had been activated, which meant all the officers involved were endangering other drivers for the sole purpose of catching up to a car whose driver hadn’t actually broken any laws himself.

The mayhem continued:

The pickup truck traveling behind the sedan pulled over to the side of the road, and Trooper Gabriel passed it. Trooper Gabriel testified on cross examination that the truck was also a law enforcement officer who he had radioed ahead to pull over. At that point, nothing was between the sedan and Trooper Gabriel, who was still speeding down the residential road. As Trooper Gabriel’s vehicle approached closer, the sedan veered slightly to the right toward the curb and stopped on Fifth Street at an intersection with another street. Trooper Gabriel stopped behind the sedan.

Somehow, every car on the road other than the one this trooper was pursuing was another cop. What a coincidence! I’m surprised the court didn’t demand testimony from all the other alleged “officers” Trooper Gabriel endangered while focused on this white sedan.

Trooper Gabriel followed up his lawbreaking and endangerment of other drivers (some who might have been cops!) by doing whatever the fuck this is:

Trooper Gabriel yelled to the sedan driver to turn the car off. The driver, who was defendant Edmonds, stuck his head slightly out of the driver’s side window, looked back at Trooper Gabriel and apparently asked why he was being asked to turn the car off. Trooper Gabriel stated, “because you just whipped over like crazy.” He again instructed Edmonds to turn the car off. Edmonds apparently again asked why, and Trooper Gabriel responded, “Because I said so.”

About 13 seconds after Trooper Gabriel first instructed Edmonds to turn the car off, Edmonds’ brake lights went off. Trooper Gabriel instructed Edmonds multiple times to get out of the car. About eight seconds after Trooper Gabriel first instructed him to, Edmonds got out of the car. Trooper Gabriel instructed Edmonds to walk toward him. Edmonds complied. Another trooper appears on camera at this point walking toward Edmonds’ car.

Those quoted paragraphs immediately follow the previous quoted paragraphs. All of this was captured by the trooper’s dashcam. The court: “the sedan veered slightly to the right.” Trooper Gabriel: “You whipped like crazy.” Hmm.

Already off to a bad start, but apparently surrounded by other troopers with nothing better to do but violate traffic laws en route to performing a traffic stop, Trooper Gabriel then proceeded to claim he “caught” Edmonds “with no seat belt” and again reiterated his claim (one not supported by his dashcam footage) that Edmonds has “freakin’ just like dipped over.” Let’s go back to the court’s earlier depiction of the dashcam recording to see what it has to say about Trooper Gabriel’s assertion that he saw the man driving without a seat belt.

The first unobstructed view of the sedan appears about six seconds into the video. The sedan’s windows are tinted. On the dashcam footage, nothing is visible inside the car.

Folks, this man is a liar. He lied about seeing the seat belt (or lack thereof) and he lied about the whipping/dipping he claimed to have witnessed.

Having apparently traveled as far he could on this particular line of bullshit, the trooper began insinuating that the thing HE DEFINITELY HAD NOT WITNESSED were indicative of a nervous driver seeking to avoid a traffic stop and/or cover up their possession of contraband.

Since the trooper really had nothing to work with here, he decided to bring in a dog to give him the probable cause he couldn’t possibly hope to obtain on his own. Trooper Gabriel took the dog from his vehicle and walked it around Edmond’s car.

This is what happened:

The dog, whose name is Dragon, appears to follow Trooper Gabriel’s hand. When Trooper Gabriel places his hand in the open driver’s side window, the dog jumps onto the driver’s side door and sticks his head in the window.

Trooper Gabriel then led Dragon all the way around the vehicle until the trooper and the dog returned to the driver’s side door again. At the driver’s side door, Trooper Gabriel told Dragon, “I’m not going to give you your ball . . . You’re going to have to . . . .” Trooper Gabriel then walked back to the state police vehicle, with Dragon leading the way. Trooper Gabriel returned to Edmonds and explained that Dragon does “a passive alert on a vehicle.” Trooper Gabriel stated, “That means he will either sit, or stare, or freeze if he has an indication that there is an odor of narcotics in the vehicle.” Trooper Gabriel stated that Dragon is “right on your driver’s side door handle.”

Edmonds stated, “I didn’t see him do nothing. . . what do they do?” Trooper Gabriel responded, “I just told you.”

Oh, so it’s a new type of alert: the one where the dog doesn’t do much, even when encouraged to do something, anything by its handler. My dog smelled drugs, said the lying state trooper.

Here’s what actually happened:

The officers then searched Edmonds’ car. They found no narcotics…

But they found a gun! And Edmonds was not allowed to have one. The trooper lucked into this discovery by lying about what he had observed prior to the stop, and what the dog had actually done when it performed its sniff.

As for all the whipping and dipping, this is what the court observed thanks to the dashcam footage supplied by the government:

As to his driving, Edmonds’ pulling off to the side of the road seemed a rational response for a driver when a marked law enforcement vehicle is approaching the driver’s vehicle from the rear at a high rate of speed in a residential area, and the vehicle behind the driver has already pulled to the side of the road so that the law enforcement officer could pass him. And, on the dashcam footage, Edmonds appeared to pull over to the side of the road in a reasonable manner…

The government’s response to the suppression motion claimed Trooper Gabriel was “concerned” about Edmonds’ “driving pattern.” Then it claimed the stop was supported by Gabriel’s claim he witnessed Edmonds driving without a seat belt.

Fine, says the court. Have it your way. If the driving wasn’t unlawful, let’s make this all about a seat belt violation. The court goes on to criticize everything about the government’s arguments, as well as everything about the trooper’s actions. And that includes the dog that supposedly gave him permission for a warrantless search of the car.

It first notes that no real traffic stop was performed. Edmonds was not pulled over. Trooper Gabriel never activated his lights or siren. Instead, he just started yelling at Edmonds after he had voluntarily stopped and then began the string of rights violations by ordering him to turn off his car and exit his vehicle.

Even then, it was all bullshit. The court notes that Trooper Gabriel maintained the seal belt violation pretense until redirect under cross examination by Edmonds’ lawyer. At that point, he admitted he had seen the car pass through a “high narcotics” area he was surveilling. Everything was pretext and the trooper obviously hoped to net a drug bust.

Which would explain why he brought out the dog and pretended it had alerted to the scent of narcotics. The court has some things to say about the performance of “Dragon” and the even less-believable performance of Trooper Gabriel.

Going back to what Trooper Gabriel told Edmonds about the supposed alert before he began his constitutional search:

Trooper Gabriel returned to Edmonds and explained that Dragon does “a passive alert on a vehicle.” Trooper Gabriel stated, “That means he will either sit, or stare, or freeze if he has an indication that there is an odor of narcotics in the vehicle.”

The trooper either lied to Edmonds or lied to the court. Actually, it’s not an “either” situation. He lied to both parties. Here’s what happened when the trooper was subjected to cross-examination while testifying:

At the hearing, Trooper Gabriel conceded that Dragon did not sit, stare, or freeze while sniffing Edmonds’ car. He testified, however, that is not actually how Dragon alerts. Instead, Trooper Gabriel testified, the dog alerts by changing his posture and increasing his respiration. He testified the dog’s actions of sitting, staring, or freezing are not an “alert” but rather a “final indication.”

lolwut

The dog alerts by breathing or moving, if it isn’t alerting by sitting, staring, or [re-reads testimony] not moving.

The court isn’t having this. If the court gave this testimony credence, the fact that the dog was present on the scene of any traffic stop and did literally anything (including sitting passively in the trooper’s cruiser), it would be “alerting,” thus “justifying” a warrantless search.

Rather than give this ridiculous cop more leash than he gives his dog, the court shuts this all down, referring to nothing more than the evidence submitted by the government in support (lol!) of this search and arrest.

The Court has viewed the dashcam and bodycam footage numerous times. The Court can discern no difference in the dog’s posture or respiration when he arrives at the driver’s side of the car for the second time, which is when he allegedly alerted. There is no visible change in his rate of respiration. Throughout the sniff of the car, Dragon followed Trooper Gabriel’s hand. He does not ever attempt to walk past Trooper Gabriel. When Trooper Gabriel moves, Dragon follows. When Trooper Gabriel stops, Dragon stops. This is Dragon’s conduct throughout the dog sniff. The only time Dragon walked ahead of Trooper Gabriel was when Dragon walked to the curb after first being released from his crate and then after Dragon completed the drug sniff and headed back to the state trooper vehicle.

The evidence is suppressed. The search was unjustified. Trooper Gabriel is a liar.

The strange thing is the government felt this was worth pursuing in court. Its actions exposed the trooper’s unconstitutional behavior, which began before the traffic stop (that wasn’t even a real traffic stop) was initiated (by the sedan’s driver, rather than the officer). The government had access to the dashcam footage and somehow decided it could get this suppression motion rejected.

That’s the saddest thing of all. When Trooper Gabriel’s employers should have been putting together paperwork to get him drummed out the law enforcement business, it was instead putting its efforts behind an effort that embarrassed everyone involved, including the dog that wanted nothing more than make sure Trooper Gabriel approved of its performance.

Retiree Jim Ficken can finally breathe easy. After six years, two lawsuits, and harrying legal wrangling over a $30,000 fine for tall grass in Dunedin, Florida, a new settlement has brought him closure.

The agreement, announced on April 22, ends the city's pursuit to recover $10,000 in attorney fees that Dunedin officials tried to characterize as "administrative expenses" after reducing Ficken's original fine by 80 percent. The reduction was only possible because of reforms the city instituted soon after Ficken filed his first lawsuit.

Initially, the city attempted to tack on $25,000 for out-of-pocket legal expenses before realizing it had miscalculated that figure. As a result of this settlement, Ficken will not have to cough up any amount for bogus fees—an important consolation following setbacks in his first lawsuit.

Ficken attempted to reason with code enforcers before going to court—explaining that his lawn had grown long while he was settling his late mother's estate in South Carolina and that the landscaper he had hired to mow his grass while he was gone had died unexpectedly. He asked for leniency, but the city refused to budge and insisted on full payment: $500 per day for nearly two months, plus interest. They even put liens on Ficken's home and authorized city attorneys to initiate proceedings to seize it.

In response, Ficken filed a federal lawsuit with representation from the Institute for Justice, asserting that the excessive fines and lack of due process violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He lost in district court in 2021 and again in 2022 at the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals—but he won in other ways. His case ignited a media frenzy and public calls for reform, prompting Dunedin to overhaul its code enforcement regime to prevent ruinous fines for trivial offenses.

After his legal battles, Ficken managed to get the fines reduced enough to prevent foreclosure. He thought he was safe. But then the city hit him with the bill for attorney fees, a retroactive attempt to penalize him for seeking his day in court. Left with no choice, he sued again in 2023.

The city could have avoided both lawsuits merely by treating Ficken like a neighbor instead of a cash machine.

While Ficken acknowledged his breach of a city ordinance and expected some penalty, Dunedin's aggressive tactics—aiming to extract tens of thousands of dollars and take his home—were blatantly excessive. American jurisprudence dictates that punishment must fit the crime. Municipalities must balance code enforcement with common sense and respect for property rights.

Dunedin moved in the right direction by making adjustments to its policies; however, the problem of excessive fines and fees is not confined to Dunedin—it is a national issue.

Across the country, similar stories of overzealous code enforcement abound. In Lantana, Florida, homeowner Sandy Martinez was fined more than $100,000 for parking violations on her own property. In Doraville, Georgia, Hilda Brucker was criminally prosecuted for having cracks in her driveway. And in Pagedale, Missouri, Valerie Whitner had to pay a fine for not having a screen on her back door.

Florida demographics create additional pressures. Many residents are retirees on fixed incomes living in single-family housing. People like Ficken have a right to stay, but some officials would prefer younger, more affluent taxpayers in their communities. Aggressive code enforcement is one way to target less desirable residents.

Sometimes enforcement is about preserving a certain aesthetic, as seen in Miami Shores, Florida in 2013. Officials declared vegetable gardens unsightly and threatened Hermine Ricketts and Tom Carroll with daily fines if they did not remove their front yard vegetables.

Regardless of motive, cities and towns must exercise restraint. The Constitution sets the baseline, and without it, abuses can and will grow quickly out of hand, and tall grass will be nothing in comparison.

The post Florida Man's Tall Grass Saga Comes to an End appeared first on Reason.com.

The government had a few years to sort this out, but as usual, the final call came down to the last minute. Shortly after Section 702 expired at midnight, April 19, the Senate pushed through a two-year reauthorization — one pretty much free of any reforms.

This happened despite there being a large and vocal portion of the Republican party seeking to curb the FBI’s access to these collections because some of their own had been subjected to the sort of abuse that has become synonymous with the FBI’s interaction with this particular surveillance program.

The reauthorization passed to the Senate from the House had been stripped of a proposed warrant requirement and saddled with an especially expansive definition of the term “electronic communication service provider.” Here’s how Senator Ron Wyden explained it while speaking out against the amendment:

Now, if you have access to any communications, the government can force you to help it spy. That means anyone with access to a server, a wire, a cable box, a wifi router, a phone, or a computer. Think about the millions of Americans who work in buildings and offices in which communications are stored or pass through.

After all, every office building in America has data cables running through it. These people are not just the engineers who install, maintain and repair our communications infrastructure; there are countless others who could be forced to help the government spy, including those who clean offices and guard buildings. If this provision is enacted, the government could deputize any one of these people against their will, and force them to become an agent for Big Brother.

For example, by forcing an employee to insert a USB thumb drive into a server at an office they clean or guard at night.

This could all happen without any oversight. The FISA Court won’t know about it. Congress won’t know about it. The Americans who are handed these directives will be forbidden from talking about it. And unless they can afford high priced lawyers with security clearances who know their way around the FISA Court, they will have no recourse at all.

So, instead of reform, we’re getting an even worse version of what’s already been problematic, especially when the FBI’s involved. As the clock ticked down on this vote (but not really: the FISA court had already granted the Biden administration’s request to keep the program operable as-is until 2025), attempts were made to strip the bill of this dangerous addition and add back in the warrant requirement amendment that had failed in the House.

None of this worked, as Gaby Del Valle reports for The Verge:

Sens. Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Josh Hawley (R-MO) introduced an amendment that would have struck language in the House bill that expanded the definition of “electronic communications service provider.” Under the House’s new provision, anyone “who has access to equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store wire or electronic communications.” The expansion, Wyden has claimed, would force “ordinary Americans and small businesses to conduct secret, warrantless spying.” The Wyden-Hawley amendment failed 34-58, meaning that the next iteration of the FISA surveillance program will be more expansive than before.

Both Sens. Paul and Dick Durbin (D-IL) introduced separate amendments imposing warrant requirements on surveilling Americans. A similar amendment failed in the House on a 212-212 vote. Durbin’s narrower warrant requirement wouldn’t require intelligence agencies to obtain a warrant to query for those communications, though it requires one to access them.

The version headed to the president’s desk is the worst version. The rush to push this version of the bill through possibly gained a little urgency when two unnamed service providers informed the government they would stop complying with FISA orders pretty much immediately if the Senate didn’t renew the program.

One communications provider informed the National Security Agency that it would stop complying on Monday with orders under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which enables U.S. intelligence agencies to gather without a warrant the digital communications of foreigners overseas — including when they text or email people inside the United States.

Another provider suggested that it would cease complying at midnight Friday unless the law is reauthorized, according to the people familiar with the matter, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive negotiations.

We’ll never know how empty these threats might have been or if the Intelligence Community would have even noticed the brief interruption in the flow of communications. Section 702 has been given a two-year extension in the form approved by the Senate, superseding the FISA Court’s blessing of one more year of uninterrupted spying if discussions over renewal blew past the April 19, 2024 deadline.

If you’re a fan of bipartisan efforts — no matter the outcome — well… enjoy your victory, I guess. But there’s nothing about this renewal debacle that can actually be called a win. Unless you’re the FBI, of course. Then it’s all gravy.

The Fourth Amendment exists for a reason. It’s supposed to protect our private possessions and data from government snooping, unless they have a warrant. It doesn’t entirely prevent the government from getting access to data, they just need to show probable cause of a crime.

But, of course, the government doesn’t like to make the effort.

And these days, many government agencies (especially law enforcement) have decided to take the shortcut that money can buy: they’re just buying private data on the open market from data brokers and avoiding the whole issue of a warrant altogether.

This could be solved with a serious, thoughtful, comprehensive privacy bill. I’m hoping to have a post soon on the big APRA data privacy bill that’s getting attention lately (it’s a big bill, and I just haven’t had the time to go through the entire bill yet). In the meantime, though, there was some good news, with the House passing the “Fourth Amendment is Not For Sale Act,” which was originally introduced in the Senate by Ron Wyden and appears to have broad bipartisan support.

We wrote about it when it was first introduced, and again when the House voted it out of committee last year. The bill is not a comprehensive privacy bill, but it would close the loophole discussed above.

The Wyden bill just says that if a government agency wants to buy such data, if it would have otherwise needed a warrant to get that data in the first place, it should need to get a warrant to buy it in the market as well.

Anyway, the bill passed 219 to 199 in the House, and it was (thankfully) not a partisan vote at all.

It is a bit disappointing that the vote was so close and that so many Representatives want to allow government agencies, including law enforcement, to be able to purchase private data to get around having to get a warrant. But, at least the majority voted in favor of the bill.

And now, it’s up to the Senate. Senator Wyden posted on Bluesky about how important this bill is, and hopefully the leadership of the Senate understand that as well.

Can confirm. This is a huge and necessary win for Americans' privacy, particularly after the Supreme Court gutted privacy protections under Roe. Now it's time for the Senate to do its job and follow suit.

[image or embed]

— Senator Ron Wyden (@wyden.senate.gov) Apr 17, 2024 at 3:30 PM

The Fourth Amendment exists for a reason. It’s supposed to protect our private possessions and data from government snooping, unless they have a warrant. It doesn’t entirely prevent the government from getting access to data, they just need to show probable cause of a crime.

But, of course, the government doesn’t like to make the effort.

And these days, many government agencies (especially law enforcement) have decided to take the shortcut that money can buy: they’re just buying private data on the open market from data brokers and avoiding the whole issue of a warrant altogether.

This could be solved with a serious, thoughtful, comprehensive privacy bill. I’m hoping to have a post soon on the big APRA data privacy bill that’s getting attention lately (it’s a big bill, and I just haven’t had the time to go through the entire bill yet). In the meantime, though, there was some good news, with the House passing the “Fourth Amendment is Not For Sale Act,” which was originally introduced in the Senate by Ron Wyden and appears to have broad bipartisan support.

We wrote about it when it was first introduced, and again when the House voted it out of committee last year. The bill is not a comprehensive privacy bill, but it would close the loophole discussed above.

The Wyden bill just says that if a government agency wants to buy such data, if it would have otherwise needed a warrant to get that data in the first place, it should need to get a warrant to buy it in the market as well.

Anyway, the bill passed 219 to 199 in the House, and it was (thankfully) not a partisan vote at all.

It is a bit disappointing that the vote was so close and that so many Representatives want to allow government agencies, including law enforcement, to be able to purchase private data to get around having to get a warrant. But, at least the majority voted in favor of the bill.

And now, it’s up to the Senate. Senator Wyden posted on Bluesky about how important this bill is, and hopefully the leadership of the Senate understand that as well.

Can confirm. This is a huge and necessary win for Americans' privacy, particularly after the Supreme Court gutted privacy protections under Roe. Now it's time for the Senate to do its job and follow suit.

[image or embed]

— Senator Ron Wyden (@wyden.senate.gov) Apr 17, 2024 at 3:30 PM

A San Marcos, Texas, couple would like to remove a reference to a Ku Klux Klan supporter from the front of their home, but the local historic preservation board has said no dice.

The reference in question is a large metal "Z" bolted to a wrought iron Juliette balcony on the front of Kristy Kay Money and Rolf Jacob Sraubhaar's house in San Marcos' Burleson Historic District.

That "Z" is the initial of the home's owner and builder, Frank Zimmerman, a prominent local businessman and owner of the city's downtown historic theater who served as San Marcos mayor from 1949 to 1951.

Zimmerman also has ties to the Ku Klux Klan. His theater hosted Ku Klux Klan days and screenings of Birth of a Nation.

Given this legacy, Money and Sraubhaar decided they wanted to remove the balcony and its large "Z" from the front of their home.

But because their home is in a historic district, although not a historic structure itself, the couple needed to get the sign-off of San Marcos' Historic Preservation Commission to alter its façade. In May 2023 the commission voted unanimously to deny their application to remove the balcony from the front of the house.

In response, Money and Sraubhaar sued San Marcos in federal court, arguing that the city's refusal to let them remove the balcony and initial is an uncompensated physical taking in violation of the Fifth and 14th Amendments and an unconstitutional exercise of police powers under the Texas Constitution.

"It's an occupation of property for a public benefit. It's for an alleged public purpose, in this case, the people on the design review board want to look at it. So, we think that's a taking," says Chance Weldon, a lawyer with the Texas Public Policy Foundation, which is representing the couple.

In response, San Marcos filed a motion to dismiss the case, primarily arguing that Money and Sraubhaar should first have to appeal their case to the city's Zoning Board of Adjustment before taking their case to court.

The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas Austin Division is currently considering the case.

"We think it's wholly un-American that if you want to change something to the aesthetic of your property, you have to get sign-off from a board of unelected bureaucrats based on what they think looks right," Weldon tells Reason.

The post Historic Preservation Board Stops Family Removing KKK Supporter's Initial From Front of their House appeared first on Reason.com.

Earlier today, Lawfare published my article criticizing the Supreme Court's recent article in the Trump Section 3 disqualification case. Here is an excerpt from the introduction:

The Supreme Court's unanimous recent decision in Trump v. Anderson overturned the Colorado Supreme Court ruling disqualifying Donald Trump from the presidency under Section 3 of the 14th Amendment. It does so on the grounds that Section 3 is not "self-executing." In a per curiam opinion jointly authored by five justices, including Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court ruled that only Congress, acting through legislation, has the power to determine who is disqualified and under what procedures. This outcome was predictable based on the oral argument… But the Court nonetheless got the issue badly wrong….

Section 3 states that "No person" can hold any state or federal office if they had previously been "a member of Congress, or … an officer of the United States" or a state official and then "engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof."

By focusing exclusively on the self-execution issue, the Court left for another day all the other arguments at stake in the Trump case, such as whether the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the Capitol qualifies as an "insurrection," whether Trump "engaged" in it, whether his actions were protected by the First Amendment, whether Trump received adequate due process, and whether the president is an "officer of the United States" covered by Section 3. The justices may hope they can avoid ever having to decide these questions.

In my view, Trump deserved to lose on all these points, and the Colorado Supreme Court correctly rejected his arguments on them. But I think he did have a plausible argument on the issue of whether his involvement in the Jan. 6 attack was extensive enough to qualify as "engaging" in insurrection. At the very least, he had a better argument there than on self-execution. The Court's resolution of the latter issue is based on badly flawed reasoning and relies heavily on dubious policy arguments invoking the overblown danger of a "patchwork" of conflicting state resolutions of Section 3 issues. The Court's venture into policy was also indefensibly one-sided, failing to consider the practical dangers of effectively neutering Section 3 with respect to candidates for federal office and holders of such positions.

The post New Lawfare Article on "What the Supreme Court Got Wrong in the Trump Section 3 Case" appeared first on Reason.com.

At the Supreme Court’s oral arguments about Florida and Texas’ social media content moderation laws, there was a fair bit of talk about Section 230. As we noted at the time, a few of the Justices (namely Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch) seemed confused about Section 230 and also about what role (if any) it had regarding these laws.

The reality is that the only role for 230 is in preempting those laws. Section 230 has a preemption clause that basically says no state laws can go into effect that contradict Section 230 (in other words: no state laws that dictate how moderation must work). But that wasn’t what the discussion was about. The discussion was mostly about Thomas and Gorsuch’s confusion over 230 and thinking that the argument for Section 230 (that you’re not held liable for third party speech) contradicts the arguments laid out by NetChoice/CCIA in these cases, where they talked about the platforms’ own speech.

Gorsuch and Thomas were mixing up two separate things, as both the lawyers for the platforms and the US made clear. There are multiple kinds of speech at issue here. Section 230 does not hold platforms liable for third-party speech. But the issue with these laws was whether or not it constricted the platforms’ ability to express themselves in the way in which they moderated. That is, the editorial decisions that were being made expressing “this is what type of community we enable” are a form of public expression that the Florida & Texas laws seek to stifle.

That is separate from who is liable for individual speech.

But, as is the way of the world whenever it comes to discussions on Section 230, lots of people are going to get confused.

Today that person is Steven Brill, one of the founders of NewsGuard, a site that seeks to “rate” news organizations, including for their willingness to push misinformation. Brill publishes stories for NewsGuard on a Substack (!?!?) newsletter titled “Reality Check.” Unfortunately, Brill’s piece is chock full of misinformation regarding Section 230. Let’s do some correcting:

February marks the 28th anniversary of the passage of Section 230 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Today, Section 230 is notorious for giving social media platforms exemptions from all liability for pretty much anything their platforms post online. But in February of 1996, this three-paragraph section of a massive telecommunications bill aimed at modernizing regulations related to the nascent cable television and cellular phone industries was an afterthought. Not a word was written about it in mainstream news reports covering the passage of the overall bill.

The article originally claimed it was the 48th anniversary, though it was later corrected (without a correction notice — which is something Newsguard checks on when rating the trustworthiness of publications). That’s not that big a deal, and I don’t think there’s anything wrong with “stealth” corrections for typos and minor errors like that.

But this sentence is just flat out wrong: “Section 230 is notorious for giving social media platforms exemptions from all liability for pretty much anything their platforms post online.” It’s just not true. Section 230 gives limited exemptions from some forms of liability for third party content that they had no role in creating. That’s quite different than what Brill claims. His formulation suggests they’re not liable for anything they, themselves, put online. That’s false.

Section 230 is all about putting the liability on whichever party created the violation under the law. If a website is just hosting the content, but someone else created the content, the liability should go to the creator of the content, not the host.

Courts have had no problem finding liability on social media platforms for things they themselves post online. We have a string of such cases, covering Roommates, Amazon, HomeAway, InternetBrands, Snap and more. In every one of those cases (contrary to Brill’s claims), the courts have found that Section 230 does not protect things these platforms post online.

Brill gets a lot more wrong. He discusses the Prodigy and CompuServe cases and then says this (though he gives too much credit to CompuServe’s lack of moderation being the reason why the court ruled that way):

That’s why those who introduced Section 230 called it the “Protection for Good Samaritans” Act. However, nothing in Section 230 required screening for harmful content, only that those who did screen and, importantly, those who did not screen would be equally immune. And, as we now know, when social media replaced these dial-up services and opened its platforms to billions of people who did not have to pay to post anything, their executives and engineers became anything but good Samaritans. Instead of using the protection of Section 230 to exercise editorial discretion, they used it to be immune from liability when their algorithms deliberately steered people to inflammatory conspiracy theories, misinformation, state-sponsored disinformation, and other harmful content. As then-Federal Communications Commission Chairman Reed Hundt told me 25 years later, “We saw the internet as a way to break up the dominance of the big networks, newspapers, and magazines who we thought had the capacity to manipulate public opinion. We never dreamed that Section 230 would be a protection mechanism for a new group of manipulators — the social media companies with their algorithms. Those companies didn’t exist then.”

This is both wrong and misleading. First of all, nothing in Section 230 could “require” screening for harmful content, because both the First and Fourth Amendments would forbid that. So the complaint that it did not require such screening is not just misplaced, it’s silly.

We’ve gone over this multiple times. Pre-230, the understanding was that, under the First Amendment, liability of a distributor was dependent on whether or not the distributor had clear knowledge of the violative nature of the content. As the court in Smith v. California made clear, it would make no sense to hold someone liable without knowledge:

For if the bookseller is criminally liable without knowledge of the contents, and the ordinance fulfills its purpose, he will tend to restrict the books he sells to those he has inspected; and thus the State will have imposed a restriction upon the distribution of constitutionally protected as well as obscene literature.

That’s the First Amendment problem. But, we can take that a step further as well. If the state now requires scanning, you have a Fourth Amendment problem. Specifically, as soon as the government makes scanning mandatory, none of the content found during such scanning can ever be admissible in court, because no warrant was issued upon probable cause. As we again described a couple years ago:

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. Like the rest of the Bill of Rights, the Fourth Amendment doesn’t apply to private entities—except where the private entity gets treated like a government actor in certain circumstances. Here’s how that happens: The government may not make a private actor do a search the government could not lawfully do itself. (Otherwise, the Fourth Amendment wouldn’t mean much, because the government could just do an end-run around it by dragooning private citizens.) When a private entity conducts a search because the government wants it to, not primarily on its own initiative, then the otherwise-private entity becomes an agent of the government with respect to the search. (This is a simplistic summary of “government agent” jurisprudence; for details, see the Kosseff paper.) And government searches typically require a warrant to be reasonable. Without one, whatever evidence the search turns up can be suppressed in court under the so-called exclusionary rule because it was obtained unconstitutionally. If that evidence led to additional evidence, that’ll be excluded too, because it’s “the fruit of the poisonous tree.”

All of that seems kinda important?

Yet Brill rushes headlong on the assumption that 230 could have and should have required mandatory scanning for “harmful” content.

Also, most harmful content remains entirely protected by the First Amendment, making this idea even more ridiculous. There would be no liability for it.

Brill seems especially confused about how 230 and the First Amendment work together, suggesting (incorrectly) that 230 gives them some sort of extra editorial benefit that it does not convey:

With Section 230 in place, the platforms will not only have a First Amendment right to edit, but also have the right to do the kind of slipshod editing — or even the deliberate algorithmic promotion of harmful content — that has done so much to destabilize the world.  

Again, this is incorrect on multiple levels. The First Amendment gives them the right to edit. It also gives them the right to slipshod editing. And the right to promote harmful content via algorithms. That has nothing to do with Section 230.

The idea that “algorithmic promotion of harmful content… has done so much to destabilize the world” is a myth that has mostly been debunked. Some early algorithms weren’t great, but most have gotten much better over time. There’s little to no supporting evidence that “algorithms” have been particularly harmful over the long run.

Indeed, what we’ve seen is that while there were some bad algorithms a decade or so ago, pressure from the market has pushed the companies to improve. Users, advertisers, the media, have all pressured the companies to improve their algorithms and it seems to work.

Either way, those algorithms still have nothing to do with Section 230. The First Amendment lets companies use algorithms to recommend things, because algorithms are, themselves, expressions of opinion (“we think you would like this thing more than the next thing”) and nothing in there would trigger legal liability even if you dropped Section 230 altogether.

It’s a best (or worst) of both worlds, enjoyed by no other media companies.

This is simply false. Outright false. EVERY company that has a website that allows third-party content is protected by Section 230 for that third-party content. No company is protected for first-party content, online or off.

For example, last year, Fox News was held liable to the tune of $787 million for defaming Dominion Voting Systems by putting on guests meant to pander to its audience by claiming voter fraud in the 2020 election. The social media platforms’ algorithms performed the same audience-pleasing editing with the same or worse defamatory claims. But their executives and shareholders were protected by Section 230. 

Except… that’s not how any of this works, even without Section 230. Fox News was held liable because the content was produced by Fox News. All of the depositions and transcripts were… Fox News executives and staff. Because they created the defamatory content.

The social media apps didn’t create the content.

This is the right outcome. The blame should always go to the party who violated the law in creating the content.

And Fox News is equally as protected by Section 230 if there is defamation created by someone else but posted in a comment to a Fox News story (something that seems likely to happen frequently).

This whole column is misleading in the extreme, and simply wrong at other points. NewsGuard shouldn’t be publishing misinformation itself given that the company claims it’s promoting accuracy in news and pushing back against misinformation.

Very rarely do you see anyone prevail in court when any form of forfeiture is in play. The forfeiture litigation deck is firmly stacked in favor of the government, which rarely needs anything approaching actual proof to walk off with someone’s property.

It’s even more rare to see someone awarded damages in a civil lawsuit against law enforcement officers. In most cases, qualified immunity terminates the lawsuit. If qualified immunity is not awarded, agencies and governments are often swift to offer plaintiffs no-fault settlements that allow the accused to walk away from the lawsuit without having to admit any wrongdoing, much less pay out of their own pockets for their misdeeds.

This case contains both rarities. Not only does it involve regular people securing some sort of justice for their violated rights, but the underlying set of rights violations included officers walking out the home they’d raided without a warrant with all the valuables they could get their hands on, including $4,000 in cash.

Here’s how the raid went down, as recounted by C.J. Ciaramella for Reason back in 2019.

On January 31, 2018, a Randolph County sheriff’s deputy showed up at the home of Greg and Teresa Almond in Woodland, Alabama, to serve Greg court papers in a civil matter.

Greg, 50, wasn’t home, but his wife Teresa told the deputy he would be back before long. About two hours later, after Greg had returned home, he heard loud knocking on the door. He remembers shouting “hang on” and walking toward the door when it suddenly flew open. The next thing he knew he was on the floor—ears ringing, dazed, wondering if he’d just been shot.

Several deputies from the Randolph County Sheriff’s Department had kicked in his front door and thrown a flashbang grenade at his feet. The officers handcuffed and detained the couple at gunpoint, then started searching their house. The deputy from earlier had reportedly smelled marijuana, and so a county drug task force was descending on the Almonds’ home, looking for illegal drugs.

The supposed odor of marijuana eventually led the deputies to a small marijuana plant, a few scattered leaves, and a single prescription pill that was not located in its bottle. The home invasion also led deputies to other stuff they wanted, but had no legitimate reason to take. They took the cash they found in the house, a wedding ring, some guns, a coin collection, and a couple guitars.

To the Sheriff’s Office, the $4,000 probably seemed insignificant. But it was pretty much all they had. They were in the middle of refinancing an agricultural loan to ensure their chicken farm remained solvent. Thanks to being forced to spend most of two days in jail, they missed their refinancing deadline. That ultimately resulted in the couple losing their house. They were residing in an insulated shed by the time the court took up their lawsuit.

More than four years after the raid, the couple has finally secured some form of justice. The $1 million in damages awarded by the jury will likely be appealed by the sheriff’s department, but for now, that’s what a jury has said the couple is entitled to.

The judge overseeing the case issued an order [PDF] along with the directed verdict, stating that the “rarity” of a directed verdict in a civil rights lawsuit necessitates some explanation.

The explanation reveals just how much of a blatant violation of rights this raid was. Deputy Kevin Walker had no excuse for his actions.

During trial, Judge Amy Newsome testified that she never issued a telephonic warrant to Defendant Walker, or to the drug task force, on January 31, 2018, for a search of the Plaintiffs’ home. She also testified that she did not tell Walker that he had a warrant. In addition, Defendant Walker testified that Judge Newsome did not tell him that he had a telephonic search warrant, although she did tell him that he probably had enough for a warrant.

He also acknowledged that the requirements for a telephonic warrant were not satisfied, that he did not have a search warrant, and that it was a warrantless search. Given this undisputed testimony, even when considered in the light most favorable to Defendant Walker, the search of the Plaintiffs’ home was without a warrant, even a defective one, and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. No reasonable jury could have concluded otherwise as there was no question of fact on this issue.

Yeah. That’s inexcusable. And yet, Walker had an excuse: good faith. He attempted to avail himself of the good faith warrant exception. But, as the judge points out, good faith relies on someone believing a valid warrant has actually been issued, not just thinking they could probably obtain one at some point in the future. On top of that, the good faith exception invoked by the deputy only applies in criminal trials, not civil trials. Even if it did apply in this content, Walker would still lose. (Emphasis in the original.)

But even if the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule can apply in the civil context, the good faith exception still would not apply in the circumstances of this case. First, per Judge Newsome and Defendant Walker, there was no warrant, telephonic or written, and thus there was nothing upon which Walker could rely in good faith. In other words, because Defendant Walker knew that he did not have a warrant at the time of the incident, the good faith exception does not apply.

And the cases Walker cites are inapplicable to the facts here: Taylor, Moorehead, Henderson,
and Ganzer all involved situations where written warrants were issued, not situations where a warrant was never issued in the first place. And secondly, as a matter of law, given the undisputed facts concerning the non-existence of a warrant, it was objectively unreasonable for an experienced law enforcement officer to believe that he could search an occupied home when no warrant existed, when no judge told him that he had a warrant, when he was merely told that he had enough for a warrant, and when none of the formalities or requirements associated with a telephonic or written warrant were followed.

As the court notes in this order, it fully expects Walker to raise the other form of good faith in a future motion, indicating that while a jury has already said the couple is owed $1 million in damages, the court has yet to issue an order blessing that payout. Hopefully, if nothing else, this utter failure to salvage a blatantly unconstitutional search will urge Walker’s employers to cut a check, rather than continue to embarrass itself in court.

Earlier today, in the case of Anderson v. Trump, Illinois circuit court Judge Tracie Porter ruled that Donald Trump is disqualified from the presidency under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore must be removed from the Illinois Republican primary ballot. Section 3 states that "No person" can hold any state or federal office if they had previously been "a member of Congress, or… an officer of the United States" or a state official, and then "engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof."

Judge Porter's ruling largely follows the reasoning of the Colorado Supreme Court decision on the same issue, which is currently being reviewed by the federal Supreme Court. She has stayed her ruling in anticipation of an appeal, and it will likely remain on hold until the federal Supreme Court issues its own decision.

I think the Colorado Supreme Court got all the major federal constitutional issues right, and therefore also agree with today's ruling. Unfortunately, the federal Supreme Court oral argument strongly suggests the justices are going to reverse the Colorado decision on the grounds that Section 3 is not "self-executing," and therefore cannot be enforced by state governments unless and until Congress enacts additional legislation. If that happens, the Illinois decision won't have any effect. The same goes for a December ruling against Trump by the Maine Secretary of State.

For those interested, I have filed an amicus brief in  the federal Supreme Court case, which explains why a prior criminal conviction on charges of insurrection (or any other criminal charges) is not necessary for for Trump to be disqualified.

I have also written about other issues related to the Section 3 litigation  writings, most extensively here and here. In a series of previous VC, I explained why the January 6, 2021 attack on the Capitol qualifies as an "insurrection" under Section 3 (see here, here, and here).

 

 

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