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Seventh Circuit Shrugs, Says The Odor Of Legal Weed Can Justify A Warrantless Vehicle Search

“Odor of marijuana” still remains — even in an era of widespread legalization — a favorite method of justifying warrantless searches. It’s an odor, so it can’t be caught on camera, which are becoming far more prevalent, whether they’re mounted to cop cars, pinned to officers’ chests, or carried by passersby.

Any claim an odor was detected pits the officer’s word against the criminal defendant’s. Even though this is a nation where innocence is supposed to be presumed, the reality of the criminal justice system is that everyone from the cops to the court to the jury tend to view people only accused of crimes as guilty.

But this equation changed a bit as states and cities continued to legalize weed possession. Once that happened, the claim that the “odor” of marijuana had been “detected” only meant the cops had managed to detect the odor of a legal substance. The same thing for their dogs. Drug dogs are considered the piece de resistance in warrantless roadside searches — an odor “detected” by a four-legged police officer that’s completely incapable of being cross-examined during a jury trial.

As legalization spreads, courts have responded. There have been handful of decisions handed down that clearly indicate what the future holds: cops and dog cops that smell weed where weed is legal don’t have much legal footing when it comes to warrantless searches. Observing something legal has never been — and will never be — justification for a search, much less reasonable suspicion to extend a stop.

The present has yet to arrive in the Seventh Circuit. Detecting the odor of a legal substance is still considered to be a permission slip for a warrantless search. And that’s only because there’s one weird stipulation in the law governing legal marijuana possession in Illinois.

In this case, a traffic stop led to the “detection” of the odor of marijuana. That led to the driver fleeing the traffic stop and dropping a gun he was carrying. And that led to felon-in-possession charges for Prentiss Jackson, who has just seen his motion to suppress this evidence rejected by the Seventh Circuit Appeals Court.

Here’s how this all started, as recounted in the appeals court decision [PDF]:

The officer smelled the odor of unburnt marijuana emanating from the car. He knew the odor came from inside the car, as he had not smelled it before he approached the vehicle. During their conversation about the license and registration, the officer told Jackson he smelled “a little bit of weed” and asked if Jackson and the passenger had been smoking. Jackson said he had, but that was earlier in the day, and he had not smoked inside the car.

Through the officer’s training, he knew the most common signs of impairment for driving under the influence were the odor of marijuana or alcohol and speech issues. He was also taught to look for traffic violations. Concerned that Jackson might be driving under the influence because of the head and taillight violation, the odor of marijuana, and Jackson’s admission that he had smoked earlier, the officer asked Jackson whether he was “safe to drive home.” Jackson said he was. His speech was not slurred during the interaction, and his responses were appropriate.

Now, I’m not a federal judge. (And probably shouldn’t be one, for several reasons.) But I think I would have immediately called bullshit here. According to the officer’s own statements, his “training” led him to believe things like unburnt marijuana and unlit headlights/taillights are indicators of “driving under the influence.” I would have asked for the officer to dig deep into the reserves of his “training” to explain these assertions. The only one that fits is Jackson’s admission he had smoked “earlier.” And, even with that admission, Jackson cleared the impairment test.

The officer, however, insisted he had probable cause to engage in a warrantless search of the car, based exclusively on his detection of the odor of “unburnt” marijuana. The officer told Jackson he was going to cite him for weed possession (not for the amount, but for how it was stored in the car). He also told the passenger he would make an arrest if Jackson did not “agree” to a “probable cause search.”

Jackson moved to the back of his car as ordered by the officer. Shortly before the patdown began, Jackson fled, dropping a handgun he was not legally allowed to possess.

Jackson challenged the search in his motion to suppress, arguing that marijuana legalization meant an assertion that the odor of a (legal) drug had been detected by an officer meant nothing in terms of probable cause for a warrantless search. The lower court rejected Jackson’s argument. The Seventh Circuit Appeals Court agrees with the trial court.

First, the court says marijuana, while legal in Illinois, is still illegal under federal law. And the suspicion a federal law has been broken (even if it can’t be enforced locally) is still enough to justify further questions and further exploration of a car.

Furthermore, state requirements for transporting legal marijuana in personal vehicles were not met by Jackson’s baggies of personal use weed.

[T]he [Illinois] Vehicle Code […] clearly states that when cannabis is transported in a private vehicle, the cannabis must be stored in a sealed, odor-proof container—in other words, the cannabis should be undetectable by smell by a police officer.”

That’s a really weird stipulation. It basically tells residents that in order to legally transport drugs they must act like drug smugglers. And, while I haven’t seen a case raising this issue yet, one can be sure people have been criminally charged for following the law because officers believe efforts made to prevent officers from detecting drugs is, at the very least, reasonable suspicion to extend a stop or, better yet, probable cause to engage in a warrantless search.

And this is likely why that particular stipulation (which I haven’t seen in other places where weed is legal) was included in this law: it doesn’t remove one of the handiest excuses to perform a warrantless search — the “odor of marijuana.”

The smell of unburnt marijuana outside a sealed container independently supplied probable cause and thus supported the direction for Jackson to step out of the car for the search.

That’s pretty handy… at least for cops. It allows them to “detect” the odor of a legal substance in order to treat it as contraband. And they need to do little more than claim in court they smelled it — something that’s impossible to disprove. Illinois has managed to do the seemingly impossible: it has legalized a substance while allowing law enforcement officers to treat it as illegal. That’s quite the trick. And because of that, it’s still perfectly legal to pretend legal substances are contraband when it comes to traffic stops in Illinois.

Brickbat: Sign on the Dotted Line

Handcuffs and a ballpoint pen on an arrest warrant. | Mykhailo Polenok | Dreamstime.com

Jeremy Haney, a former police officer in Appleton, Wisconsin, has pleaded no contest to felony misconduct in public office for falsifying information in a report. Haney forged the signatures of a prosecutor and a judge on paperwork to authorize placing a tracking device on a suspect's vehicle as part of a drug investigation. An assistant district attorney spotted the discrepancy when he was reviewing the documents and realized they were not the ones he signed. Haney claimed that he lost the original paperwork, so he reprinted it and forged the signatures. He will receive no jail time but will have to pay fines and fees totaling more than $1,000.

The post Brickbat: Sign on the Dotted Line appeared first on Reason.com.

Tennessee Appeals Court Rules Against Wildlife Agents Who Planted Cameras on Private Land

Wood and wire fence on a farm with a No Trespassing sign, as seen through a camera. | Illustration: Lex Villena; Heather Reeder

In December 2022, Reason reported that both state and federal wildlife agents routinely trespass onto private land and plant cameras. Two Tennessee homeowners successfully sued the state over the practice, and a three-judge panel ruled in their favor. The state appealed the decision, and this week the court of appeals ruled in the homeowners' favor.

At issue is a state law allowing officers of the Tennessee Wildlife Resource Agency (TWRA) to "go upon any property, outside of buildings, posted or otherwise," in order to "enforce all laws relating to wildlife." In the case of Terry Rainwaters and Hunter Hollingsworth, TWRA officers not only entered their respective properties but also installed trail cameras to look for hunting violations, all without a warrant and ignoring "No Trespassing" signs. A lawsuit filed by the Institute for Justice (I.J.) on behalf of Rainwaters and Hollingsworth asked the court to declare the law unconstitutional and issue an injunction against the TWRA, barring it from carrying out any further unwarranted intrusions.

Under the "open-fields doctrine," Supreme Court precedent dating back to Prohibition holds that undeveloped land on someone's property lacks the same rigorous Fourth Amendment protections as their home and the "curtilage," the area immediately surrounding the home.

In March 2022, a three-judge panel from the Benton County Circuit Court ruled in the homeowners' favor, finding that the state constitution provided more protections than the Fourth Amendment. It determined that the state law allowing the TWRA practice created an "intolerable risk" of abuse and was "facially unconstitutional," but it stopped short of issuing an injunction. The state appealed the decision the following month.

In a hearing before the Tennessee Court of Appeals Western Section on June 20, 2023, I.J. attorney Josh Windham argued that the state law is unconstitutionally broad. "It allows TWRA officers to enter and roam around private land, fishing for evidence of crime," Windham said. "It doesn't require consent. It doesn't require warrants. It doesn't require probable cause….It's a blank check for officers to invade private land whenever and however they please."

Amanda Jordan argued for the Tennessee Attorney General's office that the statute was not unconstitutional and that the policy was necessary for the TWRA to do its job. She argued that "it's the particular purpose and function of the TWRA which makes such warrantless entry reasonable."

Judge Jeffrey Usman asked Jordan why, if the state would need a warrant in order to enter someone's property to look for criminal violations, it should not also need a warrant to do the same for civil violations of hunting laws. Jordan agreed that "while normal law enforcement officers would not be able to enter" without a warrant, "you have to look at the state's interest in furthering its duty of protecting and preserving" Tennessee's wildlife.

But Usman pressed further, asking whether the state has "an even stronger interest in protecting persons than wildlife." Further, he asked, "If you can't enter to investigate a crime being committed against a person…why is the interest greater to enter to protect wildlife?"

In a decision issued Thursday, the court of appeals ruled in favor of the property owners. The TWRA claimed that the homeowners' claims of injury were "speculative" as "TWRA agents have not entered the Plaintiffs' lands since September 2018." The court disagreed: Writing for a unanimous court, Usman noted in the decision,

Even if the TWRA has not entered the Plaintiffs' properties since 2018, it continues to assert its power to do so. The TWRA has asserted a continuing right to enter upon the Plaintiffs' properties. At oral argument, the TWRA suggested that if the Plaintiffs want to keep the TWRA off of their land in the future that they should desist in hunting.

"At the most foundational level," the court determined, "the statute is facially constitutional because there are applications of the statute that are constitutionally permissible," including "wild waste land areas." But in this specific scenario, where wildlife agents planted cameras on homeowners' land without ever even pursuing a warrant, the court found the TWRA's actions unconstitutional as applied.

"The TWRA's contention is a disturbing assertion of power on behalf of the government that stands contrary to the foundations of the search protections against arbitrary governmental intrusions in the American legal tradition, generally, and in Tennessee, specifically," Usman wrote. "What the TWRA claims is reasonable is not."

"Our entire theory of the case was vindicated by this decision," Windham tells Reason. "The part that goes against the trial court ruling [says] that the statute can be constitutionally applied to land where people haven't taken any steps to exert control or exert their privacy, which is a rule we don't particularly object to."

The post Tennessee Appeals Court Rules Against Wildlife Agents Who Planted Cameras on Private Land appeared first on Reason.com.

Appeals Court Rules That Cops Can Physically Make You Unlock Your Phone

Woman holds a smartphone open to a screen that asks for her fingerprint authentication. | Prostockstudio | Dreamstime.com

As we keep more and more personal data on our phones, iPhone and Android devices now have some of the most advanced encryption technology in existence to keep that information safe from prying eyes. The easiest way around that, of course, is for someone to gain access to your phone.

This week, a federal court decided that police officers can make you unlock your phone, even by physically forcing you to press your thumb against it.

In November 2021, Jeremy Payne was pulled over by two California Highway Patrol (CHP) officers over his car's window tinting. When asked, Payne admitted that he was on parole, which the officers confirmed. After finding Payne's cellphone in the car, officers unlocked it by forcibly pressing his thumb against it as he sat handcuffed. (The officers claimed in their arrest report that Payne "reluctantly unlocked the cell phone" when asked, which Payne disputed; the government later accepted in court "that defendant's thumbprint was compelled.")

The officers searched through Payne's camera roll and found a video taken the same day, which appeared to show "several bags of blue pills (suspected to be fentanyl)." After checking the phone's map and finding what they suspected to be a home address, the officers drove there and used Payne's keys to enter and search the residence. Inside, they  found and seized more than 800 pills.

Payne was indicted for possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and cocaine.

In a motion to suppress, Payne's attorneys argued that by forcing him to unlock his phone, the officers "compelled a testimonial communication," violating both the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable search and seizure and the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against self-incrimination. Even though the provisions of his parole required him to surrender any electronic devices and passcodes, "failure to comply could result in 'arrest pending further investigation' or confiscation of the device pending investigation," not the use of force to make him open the phone.

The district court denied the motion to suppress, and Payne pleaded guilty. In November 2022, he was sentenced to 12 years in prison. Notably, Payne had only served three years for the crime for which he was on parole—assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer.

Payne appealed the denial of the motion to suppress. This week, in an opinion authored by Judge Richard Tallman, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit ruled against Payne.

Searches "incident to arrest" are an accepted part of Fourth Amendment precedent. Further, Tallman wrote that as a parolee, Payne has "a significantly diminished expectation of privacy," and even though the conditions of his parole did not require him to "provide a biometric identifier," the distinction was insufficient to support throwing out the search altogether.

But Tallman went a step further in the Fifth Amendment analysis: "We hold that the compelled use of Payne's thumb to unlock his phone (which he had already identified
for the officers) required no cognitive exertion, placing it firmly in the same category as a blood draw or fingerprint taken at booking," he wrote. "The act itself merely provided CHP with access to a source of potential information."

From a practical standpoint, this is chilling. First of all, the Supreme Court ruled in 2016 that police needed a warrant before drawing a suspect's blood.

And one can argue that fingerprinting a suspect as they're arrested is part and parcel with establishing their identity. Nearly half of U.S. states require people to identify themselves to police if asked.

But forcibly gaining access to someone's phone provides more than just their identity—it's a window into their entire lives. Even cursory access to someone's phone can turn up travel history, banking information, and call and text logs—a treasure trove of potentially incriminating information, all of which would otherwise require a warrant.

When they drafted the Fourth Amendment, the Founders drew on the history of "writs of assistance," general warrants used by British authorities in the American colonies that allowed government agents to enter homes at will and look for anything disallowed. As a result, the Fourth Amendment requires search warrants based on probable cause and signed by a judge.

Tallman does note the peculiar circumstances of the case: "Our opinion should not be read to extend to all instances where a biometric is used to unlock an electronic device." But, he adds, "the outcome…may have been different had [the officer] required Payne to independently select the finger that he placed on the phone" instead of forcibly mashing Payne's thumb into it himself.

The post Appeals Court Rules That Cops Can Physically Make You Unlock Your Phone appeared first on Reason.com.

Alabama Couple Awarded $1 Million Over Warrantless Raid Of Their House That Saw Cops Walk Off With All Their Cash

Very rarely do you see anyone prevail in court when any form of forfeiture is in play. The forfeiture litigation deck is firmly stacked in favor of the government, which rarely needs anything approaching actual proof to walk off with someone’s property.

It’s even more rare to see someone awarded damages in a civil lawsuit against law enforcement officers. In most cases, qualified immunity terminates the lawsuit. If qualified immunity is not awarded, agencies and governments are often swift to offer plaintiffs no-fault settlements that allow the accused to walk away from the lawsuit without having to admit any wrongdoing, much less pay out of their own pockets for their misdeeds.

This case contains both rarities. Not only does it involve regular people securing some sort of justice for their violated rights, but the underlying set of rights violations included officers walking out the home they’d raided without a warrant with all the valuables they could get their hands on, including $4,000 in cash.

Here’s how the raid went down, as recounted by C.J. Ciaramella for Reason back in 2019.

On January 31, 2018, a Randolph County sheriff’s deputy showed up at the home of Greg and Teresa Almond in Woodland, Alabama, to serve Greg court papers in a civil matter.

Greg, 50, wasn’t home, but his wife Teresa told the deputy he would be back before long. About two hours later, after Greg had returned home, he heard loud knocking on the door. He remembers shouting “hang on” and walking toward the door when it suddenly flew open. The next thing he knew he was on the floor—ears ringing, dazed, wondering if he’d just been shot.

Several deputies from the Randolph County Sheriff’s Department had kicked in his front door and thrown a flashbang grenade at his feet. The officers handcuffed and detained the couple at gunpoint, then started searching their house. The deputy from earlier had reportedly smelled marijuana, and so a county drug task force was descending on the Almonds’ home, looking for illegal drugs.

The supposed odor of marijuana eventually led the deputies to a small marijuana plant, a few scattered leaves, and a single prescription pill that was not located in its bottle. The home invasion also led deputies to other stuff they wanted, but had no legitimate reason to take. They took the cash they found in the house, a wedding ring, some guns, a coin collection, and a couple guitars.

To the Sheriff’s Office, the $4,000 probably seemed insignificant. But it was pretty much all they had. They were in the middle of refinancing an agricultural loan to ensure their chicken farm remained solvent. Thanks to being forced to spend most of two days in jail, they missed their refinancing deadline. That ultimately resulted in the couple losing their house. They were residing in an insulated shed by the time the court took up their lawsuit.

More than four years after the raid, the couple has finally secured some form of justice. The $1 million in damages awarded by the jury will likely be appealed by the sheriff’s department, but for now, that’s what a jury has said the couple is entitled to.

The judge overseeing the case issued an order [PDF] along with the directed verdict, stating that the “rarity” of a directed verdict in a civil rights lawsuit necessitates some explanation.

The explanation reveals just how much of a blatant violation of rights this raid was. Deputy Kevin Walker had no excuse for his actions.

During trial, Judge Amy Newsome testified that she never issued a telephonic warrant to Defendant Walker, or to the drug task force, on January 31, 2018, for a search of the Plaintiffs’ home. She also testified that she did not tell Walker that he had a warrant. In addition, Defendant Walker testified that Judge Newsome did not tell him that he had a telephonic search warrant, although she did tell him that he probably had enough for a warrant.

He also acknowledged that the requirements for a telephonic warrant were not satisfied, that he did not have a search warrant, and that it was a warrantless search. Given this undisputed testimony, even when considered in the light most favorable to Defendant Walker, the search of the Plaintiffs’ home was without a warrant, even a defective one, and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. No reasonable jury could have concluded otherwise as there was no question of fact on this issue.

Yeah. That’s inexcusable. And yet, Walker had an excuse: good faith. He attempted to avail himself of the good faith warrant exception. But, as the judge points out, good faith relies on someone believing a valid warrant has actually been issued, not just thinking they could probably obtain one at some point in the future. On top of that, the good faith exception invoked by the deputy only applies in criminal trials, not civil trials. Even if it did apply in this content, Walker would still lose. (Emphasis in the original.)

But even if the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule can apply in the civil context, the good faith exception still would not apply in the circumstances of this case. First, per Judge Newsome and Defendant Walker, there was no warrant, telephonic or written, and thus there was nothing upon which Walker could rely in good faith. In other words, because Defendant Walker knew that he did not have a warrant at the time of the incident, the good faith exception does not apply.

And the cases Walker cites are inapplicable to the facts here: Taylor, Moorehead, Henderson,
and Ganzer all involved situations where written warrants were issued, not situations where a warrant was never issued in the first place. And secondly, as a matter of law, given the undisputed facts concerning the non-existence of a warrant, it was objectively unreasonable for an experienced law enforcement officer to believe that he could search an occupied home when no warrant existed, when no judge told him that he had a warrant, when he was merely told that he had enough for a warrant, and when none of the formalities or requirements associated with a telephonic or written warrant were followed.

As the court notes in this order, it fully expects Walker to raise the other form of good faith in a future motion, indicating that while a jury has already said the couple is owed $1 million in damages, the court has yet to issue an order blessing that payout. Hopefully, if nothing else, this utter failure to salvage a blatantly unconstitutional search will urge Walker’s employers to cut a check, rather than continue to embarrass itself in court.

NYC Child Protection Agency Uses 'Coercive Tactics' To Bully Parents Into Allowing Warrantless Searches

Od: Emma Camp
CPS | Illustration: Lex Villena; ID 103942721 © Miunicaneurona | Dreamstime.com

Every year, thousands of New York City families are subjected to invasive home searches as part of child abuse and neglect investigations. While less than 7 percent of these investigations lead the agency to file claims of abuse or neglect, a new lawsuit alleges that the city's Administration for Children's Services (ACS) workers often make misleading—or outright false—threats to coerce parents to allow ACS to conduct warrantless searches of their homes.

According to the lawsuit, which was filed on Tuesday, ACS employs a widespread policy of coercing families under investigation to allow case workers into their homes. ACS workers allegedly often tell families that they "must" or "have to" let them search their homes, insist that they do not need a warrant for the search, and even threaten to take noncompliant parents' children away. 

Even though ACS workers are technically legally required to obtain a warrant to search homes, the agency very rarely seeks them. According to the suit, of the almost 53,000 investigations conducted by ACS in 2023, it only sought 222 court orders to search families' homes.

"Even assuming ACS completed only one home search during each investigation (it typically conducts several), ACS sought court orders for just 0.4% of home entries," the suit states. "This means over 99.5% of home searches that ACS conducts are 'presumptively unreasonable' under the Fourth Amendment."

Once inside a family's home, the suit claims that ACS workers engage in incredibly invasive tactics, looking "inside medicine cabinets, under beds, in closets and dresser drawers, in the refrigerator, and in cupboards." Even more troubling, strip searches of children are common, with workers demanding that children lift up their shirts or pull down their pants. Over the course of an investigation—the average length is 60 days—families are typically subjected to these searches more than once.

The agency itself seems self-aware about the impact of these coercive techniques. According to one 2020 report by the National Innovation Service, ACS policy "incentivizes [staff] to be invasive and not tell parents their rights." The report noted how "the experience of an investigation, even when an allegation is ultimately determined to be unfounded, too often traumatizes parents and children."

Further, agency leadership has also acknowledged that many reports of child abuse and neglect are completely unfounded, as individuals are allowed to make anonymous reports. A 2023 letter from the New York City Bar went so far as to state that a "significant percentage of" child abuse hotline callers "make false reports, for the purpose of harassment."

In all, the suit argues that ACS' policy of using coercive tactics to enter families' homes without a warrant constitutes a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights, arguing that the agency's "failure to adequately train or supervise ACS caseworkers regarding the protection of parents' Fourth Amendment rights" has directly led ACS workers to use manipulative, false tactics to persuade families to allow them to "conduct warrantless, non-exigent searches of Plaintiffs' and class members' homes."

The post NYC Child Protection Agency Uses 'Coercive Tactics' To Bully Parents Into Allowing Warrantless Searches appeared first on Reason.com.

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