We didn’t really need more precedent assuring us our rights don’t mean anything at the borders, but we got it anyway.

Within 100 miles of any US border (and that includes international airports), courts have generally ruled that rights are optional. If they seem to be getting in the way of “securing” the border, they have to go. And that’s why intrusive device searches have increased steadily in recent years, despite the Supreme Court’s 2014 Riley decision. That ruling said warrants were required to search cell phones because cell phones, unlike someone’s trunk or pants pockets, contained a wealth of personal and private information previously unseen in the history of the nation.

Given the rationale for the warrant requirement, you’d think courts would extend it to cover the nation’s borders. But no court has. When it comes to border searches, Riley simply doesn’t apply.

Not every court has reached this conclusion. A federal judge in the 2nd Circuit said Riley applied at the border. But that ruling was never ratified at the appellate level, so it hardly changes things in the Second Circuit.

The Ninth Circuit Appeals Court — which covers the largest amount of southern border (which is where pretty much all the intrusion takes place) — did place some restraints on warrantless border device searches, limiting them to searches for “contraband.” How much that changed anything is unknown, but it was a small step further than any other circuit has been willing to go.

The circuit with the second largest amount of border territory (the Fifth Circuit) hasn’t had any qualms about eradicating the Fourth Amendment at border crossings. An unequivocal “no warrants needed” was handed down by that circuit late last summer.

The Seventh Circuit Appeals Court recently revisited this issue. Its earlier ruling on the issue was pretty much a punt. The court decided it didn’t need to deliver any ruling on the issue at that point because it could use the “good faith” release valve to sidestep anything approaching precedent.

The primary positions staked out by the parties could not be more starkly contrasted. The defendant argues that nothing less than a warrant authorizes a search of electronic devices at the border. The government asserts that it may conduct these searches without any particularized suspicion at all. In the end, though, we need not adopt either of these positions, and indeed may avoid entirely the thorny issue of the appropriate level of suspicion required. Instead, we affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress because these agents acted in good faith when they searched the devices with reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime was being committed, at a time when no court had ever required more than reasonable suspicion for any search at the border.

That’s how it went in April 2019. Here’s how it’s going now:

The “longstanding recognition that searches at our borders without probable cause and without a warrant are nonetheless ‘reasonable’ has a history as old as the Fourth Amendment itself.” United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977). That history leads us to join the uniform view of our sister circuits to hold that searches of electronics at the border—like any other border search—do not require a warrant or probable cause, and that the kind of routine, manual search of the phone initially performed here requires no individualized suspicion. We affirm.

That’s from the opening of the appeals court decision [PDF], one that portrays a CBP agent’s trawl through a traveler’s phone as a “routine, manual search,” which included demanding (and obtaining) a passcode, digging through images stored on the phone, and unlocking (with the provided passcode) another application where more images of child sexual abuse were discovered.

The traveler (and the person seeking to suppress the evidence discovered on his phone) is Marcos Mendez, a US citizen who had previous arrests for solicitation of a child and CSAM possession. So, he was already on the CBP radar. That being said, it’s a bit chilling to realize this is what the CBP thinks is an indicator of child sexual abuse — something the Seventh Circuit tacitly endorses by placing it in the decision without further comment:

Mendez also fit the profile for child-pornography offenders: a single adult male traveling alone.

Well… OK, then. The supposed connective tissue was the fact that Mendez traveled alone to Ecuador, which is apparently just as suspicious because… well… rank speculation, I guess?

[M]endez was returning from Ecuador, which CBP officers classified as a potential child trafficking source country.

Couldn’t literally any country be considered a “potential child trafficking source country?” I mean, we’re just talking potential here. It’s not other countries, which are known destinations for people seeking to engage in sex with minors. All this says is that Ecuador, like every other country in the world, has minors in its population and those minors have the potential to be trafficked for sex.

Anyway, the Seventh Circuit isn’t going to let itself get bogged down by questionable assertions about suspicion asserted by our valiant border officers. Instead, it’s just going to get down to business aligning itself with every other circuit by going on (permanent) record with a free pass on constitutional violations anywhere people might enter or exit the United States.

And, in doing so, the court says things the Supreme Court didn’t say about the Riley decision, even as it uses a very selective direct quote. According to the Seventh Circuit, Riley doesn’t apply at the borders because the incident underlying that historic decision did not occur at the border.

Riley involved the search incident to arrest exception and “carefully tailored its analysis to that context.” Wood, 16 F.4th at 533. What is unreasonable after arrest may be perfectly reasonable at customs, as Riley itself anticipated. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 401–02 (“[O]ther case-specific exceptions may still justify a warrantless search of a particular phone.”)

But the Seventh Circuit’s blanket exception for border searches ignores a crucial part of the very decision it quotes:

“[O]ther case-specific exceptions…”

This ruling has nothing to say about specifics. While it’s certainly true a known sex offender will receive greater scrutiny when entering or exiting the country, the ruling here applies this line of thought to everyone crossing borders, whether or not any reasonable suspicion exists to justify the seizure and search of someone’s phone.

There’s evidence here this search was likely justified under the lower level of constitutional protections at our nation’s borders, but the Seventh Circuit looks at a case-specific exception and makes it a blanket exception by refusing to undo precedent that says federal officers can pretty much do whatever they want, so long as it happens within 100 miles of any border crossing.

So, it’s not a great ruling or even a good one. It just is. And because no appellate circuit has been willing to upset this free-for-all at the border by instituting a warrant requirement, every other appellate circuit thinks it’s OK to ignore the greater message of the Riley decision (that being that almost any search of a person’s phone is intrusive) in favor of just keeping their heads down and allowing the status to remain quo.

As we keep more and more personal data on our phones, iPhone and Android devices now have some of the most advanced encryption technology in existence to keep that information safe from prying eyes. The easiest way around that, of course, is for someone to gain access to your phone.

This week, a federal court decided that police officers can make you unlock your phone, even by physically forcing you to press your thumb against it.

In November 2021, Jeremy Payne was pulled over by two California Highway Patrol (CHP) officers over his car's window tinting. When asked, Payne admitted that he was on parole, which the officers confirmed. After finding Payne's cellphone in the car, officers unlocked it by forcibly pressing his thumb against it as he sat handcuffed. (The officers claimed in their arrest report that Payne "reluctantly unlocked the cell phone" when asked, which Payne disputed; the government later accepted in court "that defendant's thumbprint was compelled.")

The officers searched through Payne's camera roll and found a video taken the same day, which appeared to show "several bags of blue pills (suspected to be fentanyl)." After checking the phone's map and finding what they suspected to be a home address, the officers drove there and used Payne's keys to enter and search the residence. Inside, they  found and seized more than 800 pills.

Payne was indicted for possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and cocaine.

In a motion to suppress, Payne's attorneys argued that by forcing him to unlock his phone, the officers "compelled a testimonial communication," violating both the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable search and seizure and the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against self-incrimination. Even though the provisions of his parole required him to surrender any electronic devices and passcodes, "failure to comply could result in 'arrest pending further investigation' or confiscation of the device pending investigation," not the use of force to make him open the phone.

The district court denied the motion to suppress, and Payne pleaded guilty. In November 2022, he was sentenced to 12 years in prison. Notably, Payne had only served three years for the crime for which he was on parole—assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer.

Payne appealed the denial of the motion to suppress. This week, in an opinion authored by Judge Richard Tallman, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit ruled against Payne.

Searches "incident to arrest" are an accepted part of Fourth Amendment precedent. Further, Tallman wrote that as a parolee, Payne has "a significantly diminished expectation of privacy," and even though the conditions of his parole did not require him to "provide a biometric identifier," the distinction was insufficient to support throwing out the search altogether.

But Tallman went a step further in the Fifth Amendment analysis: "We hold that the compelled use of Payne's thumb to unlock his phone (which he had already identified
for the officers) required no cognitive exertion, placing it firmly in the same category as a blood draw or fingerprint taken at booking," he wrote. "The act itself merely provided CHP with access to a source of potential information."

From a practical standpoint, this is chilling. First of all, the Supreme Court ruled in 2016 that police needed a warrant before drawing a suspect's blood.

And one can argue that fingerprinting a suspect as they're arrested is part and parcel with establishing their identity. Nearly half of U.S. states require people to identify themselves to police if asked.

But forcibly gaining access to someone's phone provides more than just their identity—it's a window into their entire lives. Even cursory access to someone's phone can turn up travel history, banking information, and call and text logs—a treasure trove of potentially incriminating information, all of which would otherwise require a warrant.

When they drafted the Fourth Amendment, the Founders drew on the history of "writs of assistance," general warrants used by British authorities in the American colonies that allowed government agents to enter homes at will and look for anything disallowed. As a result, the Fourth Amendment requires search warrants based on probable cause and signed by a judge.

Tallman does note the peculiar circumstances of the case: "Our opinion should not be read to extend to all instances where a biometric is used to unlock an electronic device." But, he adds, "the outcome…may have been different had [the officer] required Payne to independently select the finger that he placed on the phone" instead of forcibly mashing Payne's thumb into it himself.

The post Appeals Court Rules That Cops Can Physically Make You Unlock Your Phone appeared first on Reason.com.

Pennsylvania police officers have reached a settlement with a woman who says she underwent an unnecessary and humiliating strip-search after she was pulled over for a minor traffic violation. 

According to a lawsuit filed in 2021, Holly Elish was traveling through Bentlyville, Pennsylvania, on her way home from work when she was pulled over by local police officer Brian Rousseau.

When Rousseau pulled Elish over, he quickly asked for consent to search her vehicle, which Elish denied. According to the lawsuit, Rousseau responded that "he had the right to search her vehicle." Soon after, a second police officer arrived on the scene. The two men again asked to search Elish's vehicle, telling her that even more officers would soon arrive.

"Fearing for her safety and knowing that the police did not have justification to search her vehicle yet were insistent and intimidating in attempting to do so, Ms. Elish allowed the vehicle search to occur under duress and coercion," the complaint states.

The officers searched Elish's car but found no sign of drugs, illegal weapons, or other contraband. However, that wasn't enough for the officers to let Elish go. A female police officer—unnamed in the suit—had arrived on the scene, and after having a brief conversation with the other officers began to strip-search Elish.

The officer "began the strip search by physically and visually inspecting Ms. Elish's breasts," according to the complaint. Elish then had "to remove her pants and underwear to her ankles and 'squat' to the ground, during which she bent down to the ground with one knee and performed a visual cavity inspection."

The complaint further states that the female police officer "began to put gloves on her hands stating to Ms. Elish, 'I'm sorry. This is the worst part of my job.'" However, the suit states that, just before physically searching Elish, she asked her "Do you know why they want me to do this?" Elish responded that she didn't know and that she was "simply on her way home from work to pick up her child."

Following this interaction, the female officer refused to search Elish. She was eventually allowed to leave, though Rousseau did later write Elish a citation for driving five miles per hour over the speed limit. That citation was dropped, though, when Rousseau failed to appear at the hearing.

Elish filed a lawsuit against the two male officers in November 2021. After a more than three-year legal battle, including a civil trial, a settlement was reached in the case, though the exact terms of the settlement have not yet been revealed.

"This warrantless search culminated in a minor traffic violation for driving five miles per hour over the posted speed limit, for which Ms. Elish was subsequently found not guilty," the complaint read. "As a direct and proximate cause of this search, Ms. Elish suffered mental anguish, embarrassment, and [humiliation]."

The post Pennsylvania Police Settle Lawsuit With Woman Forced to Undergo 'Humiliating' Strip-Search appeared first on Reason.com.

Every year, thousands of New York City families are subjected to invasive home searches as part of child abuse and neglect investigations. While less than 7 percent of these investigations lead the agency to file claims of abuse or neglect, a new lawsuit alleges that the city's Administration for Children's Services (ACS) workers often make misleading—or outright false—threats to coerce parents to allow ACS to conduct warrantless searches of their homes.

According to the lawsuit, which was filed on Tuesday, ACS employs a widespread policy of coercing families under investigation to allow case workers into their homes. ACS workers allegedly often tell families that they "must" or "have to" let them search their homes, insist that they do not need a warrant for the search, and even threaten to take noncompliant parents' children away. 

Even though ACS workers are technically legally required to obtain a warrant to search homes, the agency very rarely seeks them. According to the suit, of the almost 53,000 investigations conducted by ACS in 2023, it only sought 222 court orders to search families' homes.

"Even assuming ACS completed only one home search during each investigation (it typically conducts several), ACS sought court orders for just 0.4% of home entries," the suit states. "This means over 99.5% of home searches that ACS conducts are 'presumptively unreasonable' under the Fourth Amendment."

Once inside a family's home, the suit claims that ACS workers engage in incredibly invasive tactics, looking "inside medicine cabinets, under beds, in closets and dresser drawers, in the refrigerator, and in cupboards." Even more troubling, strip searches of children are common, with workers demanding that children lift up their shirts or pull down their pants. Over the course of an investigation—the average length is 60 days—families are typically subjected to these searches more than once.

The agency itself seems self-aware about the impact of these coercive techniques. According to one 2020 report by the National Innovation Service, ACS policy "incentivizes [staff] to be invasive and not tell parents their rights." The report noted how "the experience of an investigation, even when an allegation is ultimately determined to be unfounded, too often traumatizes parents and children."

Further, agency leadership has also acknowledged that many reports of child abuse and neglect are completely unfounded, as individuals are allowed to make anonymous reports. A 2023 letter from the New York City Bar went so far as to state that a "significant percentage of" child abuse hotline callers "make false reports, for the purpose of harassment."

In all, the suit argues that ACS' policy of using coercive tactics to enter families' homes without a warrant constitutes a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights, arguing that the agency's "failure to adequately train or supervise ACS caseworkers regarding the protection of parents' Fourth Amendment rights" has directly led ACS workers to use manipulative, false tactics to persuade families to allow them to "conduct warrantless, non-exigent searches of Plaintiffs' and class members' homes."

The post NYC Child Protection Agency Uses 'Coercive Tactics' To Bully Parents Into Allowing Warrantless Searches appeared first on Reason.com.