Catherine June Lee, 58, of Tasmania, was in court today after being busted in 2022 for having sex with a live brown trout. According to police, June and one Ashley David Hallam, 55, allegedly filmed the act on a boat.

Le requested an adjournment without plea until October, which the court granted. — Read the rest

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A few years ago, Roseberline Turenne, an 18-year-old aide at a Maryland day care center, used her cellphone to take photographs showing "the naked genitals and pubic areas" of eight little girls. Seven of the girls were lying on changing tables, while the eighth was standing in a bathroom. Turenne later claimed she was documenting preexisting diaper rashes, lest she be blamed for allowing them to develop while the girls were in her care.

Turenne was fired after the pictures were discovered because they violated the day care center's policies, which prohibited staff members from photographing children. She also was charged with eight counts each of child sexual abuse, production of child pornography, and possession of child pornography.

Discounting Turenne's explanation of her motive for taking the pictures, a jury convicted her on all 24 counts, resulting in a 126-year prison sentence. Last Friday, the Maryland Supreme Court upheld Turenne's convictions, concluding that the jury reasonably rejected her account, that her conduct met the elements of the three crimes, and that "the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Ms. Turenne took the photos of the children for the purpose of sexual gratification."

Although Turenne's astonishingly severe sentence was not at issue in this appeal, it vividly illustrates how laws related to child pornography can generate penalties that make little sense. Even if you join the jurors, the intermediate appeals court, and the Maryland Supreme Court in disbelieving her account of why she took the pictures, she did not share them with anyone, and she was not accused of assaulting the girls. Yet under Maryland law, Turenne will have to serve at least a quarter of her 126-year sentence—nearly 32 years—before she is eligible for parole.

People convicted of violent crimes in Maryland have to serve at least half of their sentences before they are eligible for parole. But someone who was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and received the maximum 10-year sentence still would have a shot at parole after five years. Even someone convicted of first-degree rape, which triggers a mandatory 25-year minimum, could end up serving less time than Turenne faces for noncontact offenses that consisted of nothing more than taking pictures.

That reality is especially troubling because it is not clear that Turenne committed the crimes with which she was charged. Just four out of seven justices agreed that all of her convictions were valid. In a partial dissent joined by Justice Brynja Booth, Chief Justice Matthew Fader concluded that there was insufficient evidence to convict Turenne of producing and possessing child pornography. Justice Shirley Watts concurred, and she filed a separate dissent arguing that Turenne's sexual abuse convictions also should be overturned.

As relevant here, Maryland law defines child pornography as a "visual representation" that "depicts a minor engaged as a subject…in sexual conduct," which includes the "lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person." Although the statute does not define "lascivious exhibition," the Maryland Supreme Court settled on a "content-plus-context" test for determining "whether the image is objectively sexual in nature."

The production and possession charges, in other words, did not hinge on Turenne's personal motivation. In concluding that Turenne's pictures were "objectively sexual," the majority noted that "all eight girls were partially or fully nude," that "all had nude genitals and pubic areas on display," that "none of the children's faces are visible in the photographs," that the picture "were all very similar to one another," and that several girls were in "poses that resemble what one might see in some adult pornography: the subject on her back, her legs spread, displaying her genitals."

Fader agreed with the test used by his colleagues but argued that they misapplied it. "I would conclude that none of the eight photographs at issue depicts a 'lascivious exhibition of the genitals,'" he writes. "Seven of the photographs depict a child on a diaper-changing table, naked, in a position that is fully consistent with a child having her diaper changed. The final picture depicts a child in a standing position in a bathroom, naked from sternum to the knees. None of the children are posed in anything resembling a sexual position. There are no other people in any of the photographs, nor are there any objects that are sexual in nature or that change the nature of the images from children getting diaper changes to anything objectively sexual."

Although "the framing of the photographs is a relevant consideration," Fader says, "the
framing here still makes clear that the pictures are of children during the process of a diaper change." And contrary to the majority's claim that the girls' "poses" are reminiscent of adult pornography, he adds, "the children are situated in the midst of diaper changes—a perfectly ordinary, nonsexual event—not posed in sexual positions. That an image of an adult posed in a similar manner might be viewed as an objectively sexual image—perhaps viewed as sexual because the position is unnatural for an adult in the ordinary course of a day, or perhaps just because of anatomical development—is irrelevant, because these are images of infants, not adults."

Fader says other "contextual elements" cited by the majority—including the photos' similarity to each other, the fact that "they were all taken at a daycare center," the fact that "they were all taken in the center's bathroom, where Ms. Turenne was secluded," her initial statement that the photos had "no meaning," and her "implausible documentation-of-diaper rash explanation"—were "relevant to the jury's consideration of Ms. Turenne's likely purpose in taking and keeping the images." They therefore were "proper considerations for the jury in determining whether Ms. Turenne exploited the children for her own benefit in connection with the child sexual abuse charges." But the test that the majority applied in upholding the child pornography convictions is supposed to be "objective," making her motivation irrelevant.

"The only contextual element that is relevant to the jury's understanding of what is depicted in the images themselves, to the extent it is unclear in any of them, is that the children in seven of the eight images were lying on a changing table and the eighth was in a bathroom," Fader writes. "But knowledge of the setting in which the pictures were taken does not add any element of objective sexuality to them, separate and apart from Ms. Turenne's subjective motivation. The other contextual elements identified by the Majority speak to Ms. Turenne's subjective motivation, not what is depicted in the images themselves."

To convict Turenne of the sexual abuse charges, the prosecution had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the photos constituted "exploitation of a minor," meaning she "took advantage of or unjustly or improperly used the child for…her own benefit." That "benefit," according to the prosecution, was "sexual gratification." Fader agreed with the majority that "there was sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that Ms. Turenne took the eight pictures at issue for her own benefit."

Watts, however, dissented on that point too. She notes that the prosecution made much of Turenne's sexual orientation, which Watts thinks improperly figured in the verdict.

During Turenne's trial, a prosecutor asked her if she was attracted to women. "I wouldn't say attracted to women," she replied. "I'm bisexual, like, I'm still confused about what I like between men or women. But not children, no."

The prosecution, which noted that all the photographs featured girls and presented testimony from a co-worker who said Turenne had told her "she was gay," argued that her sexual orientation was relevant in assessing why she took the pictures. Prosecutors also noted that Turenne had adult pornography featuring both men and women on her phone—although, contrary to what you might expect given the charges against her, there was no indication that she had "conducted any internet searches for child pornography."

The Maryland Supreme Court explicitly declined to consider that evidence. But Watts argues that it played an important role in the case. Turenne "was prejudiced by the admission of the evidence," Watts says. And "with these circumstances omitted, the remaining evidence is insufficient to support Ms. Turenne's convictions for child sexual abuse."

Watts suggests that Turenne's explanation of her behavior is more plausible than her colleagues think. "Some of the photos show redness or darkened areas—i.e., consistent with diaper rashes—near the genital area and/or in the fold of the buttocks, and one of them shows diaper cream in and around the fold of the buttocks," she writes. "Ms. Turenne testified that she took the photos to prove that children had diaper rashes before she started watching them. Although the jury evidently did not find this part of Ms. Turenne's testimony credible, the nature of the photos and the circumstances surrounding them being taken do not alone establish that the photos were taken for the purpose of sexual gratification."

The majority emphasized that Turenne initially denied taking the pictures, later said they had "no meaning," and did not offer the diaper-rash explanation until her trial. But Watts thinks Turenne's evasiveness and reticence are understandable in the circumstances, even without accepting the prosecution's theory of why she took the photos.

"Although the photos were taken clandestinely in violation of the daycare center's no-photo policy and Ms. Turenne initially denied having taken them, these facts were not sufficient for a rational juror to infer that the photos were taken for sexual gratification," Watts writes. "A rational juror could have inferred that Ms. Turenne took the photos because she was concerned about being blamed for diaper rashes and lied about having taken them because she knew doing so was against the daycare center's policy. A rational juror also could have inferred that Ms. Turenne took the photos while she was alone with the children because she knew that taking the photos was against the center's policy….Without consideration of evidence admitted at trial concerning Ms. Turenne's sexual orientation and possession of adult pornography, no rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt based on the appearance of the photos that they were taken for sexual gratification."

Although Turenne did not challenge her sentence in this appeal, Watts notes that "the circuit court imposed an aggregate sentence of 280 years of imprisonment, with all but 126 years suspended, followed by 5 years of probation and lifetime registration as a sex offender." While "criminal offenses against children are heinous and must be dealt with appropriately," she says, "it is disproportionate and draconian to impose an aggregate sentence of nearly 3 centuries of imprisonment, with all but 126 years suspended, under the circumstances of this case." Whatever you make of Turenne's defense, that much seems clearly true.

The post A Day Care Worker Who Says She Was Documenting Diaper Rashes Got 126 Years for Taking 8 Photos appeared first on Reason.com.

Back in February 2024, the BBC reported that the United Kingdom had rejected resettlement applications for Afghan commandos who fought alongside British soldiers in the fight against the Taliban. From that original report:

When the Taliban swept to power in August 2021, members of Afghan Special Forces units CF 333 and ATF 444 – known as the "Triples" – were among the groups most at risk of reprisal, having supported UK Special Forces in their fight against the Taliban.

— Read the rest

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The Supreme Court on Friday ruled that the right to a trial by jury and to due process apply to people who face a steep sentencing enhancement under federal law, in a ruling that transfers some power from the hands of judges to the public and will affect many criminal defendants' future punishments.

The procedural history of the case is a bit of a whirlwind. But at its center is Paul Erlinger, who was charged in 2017 with being a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced to 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which increases the punishment for that offense—felon in possession of a firearm—from a 10-year maximum to a 15-year minimum if the defendant has been convicted previously of three violent felonies or serious drug offenses on separate occasions.

At sentencing came one of the initial twists, when the judge who handed down the 15-year punishment made clear it was inappropriate. Erlinger, who pleaded guilty, had gained steady employment, started a family, and remained drug-free in the more than a decade since his previous convictions, so a five-year sentence, the judge said, would be "fair." But under the ACCA, the court's hands were tied.

Then came the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, which said shortly thereafter that two of Erlinger's offenses considered for the purposes of the ACCA did not actually qualify as violent felonies or serious drug crimes. Prosecutors, however, were undeterred. They returned to court and invoked convictions related to burglaries Erlinger committed 26 years before the felon in possession of a firearm charge, when he was 18 years old. Erlinger countered that the burglaries in question had been a part of one criminal episode—not distinct events as the ACCA requires—and that, most importantly, a jury would need to make the consequential determination about the separateness of those offenses.

The sentencing court disagreed, ruling it was the judge's decision and that the court was bound by the ACCA, thus reimposing the 15-year sentence that it once again called "unfortunate" and "excessive."

But Justice Neil Gorsuch, writing for the 6–3 majority opinion, explained that Erlinger did indeed have the 5th Amendment and 6th Amendment right to ask a jury whether those offenses were committed separately and if he is therefore vulnerable to the massive increase in incarceration that the sentencing court itself characterized multiple times as unjust. The outcome was at least somewhat predictable when considering yet another twist: After Erlinger appealed on the grounds that his constitutional rights had been violated, the government agreed. But the 7th Circuit still refused to reconsider his sentence, leaving Erlinger to ask the Supreme Court.

Core to Gorsuch's opinion is Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000), a Supreme Court precedent that ruled it was unconstitutional when a judge sentenced a defendant more harshly on the basis that a shooting had allegedly been motivated by racial animus, because no jury considered or made any determination beyond a reasonable doubt on that factor. A jury and a jury only, the Court ruled, may find "facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed" when it will cause the penalty to exceed the prescribed statutory maximum.

But Gorsuch also says the Court has something else on its side today: history. "Prominent among the reasons colonists cited in the Declaration of Independence for their break with Great Britain was the fact Parliament and the Crown had 'depriv[ed] [them] in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury,'" he writes. "The Fifth and Sixth Amendments placed the jury at the heart of our criminal justice system" in order "to mitigate the risk of prosecutorial overreach and misconduct" and serve as a check on the government.

This is not a novel area for Gorsuch, who has made clear his respect for the right to a trial by jury. Last month, he rebuked the Court's demurral from hearing a case concerning Florida's use of six-person juries as opposed to the traditional, historical practice of using 12-person panels.

Though much has been made of the ideologically fractured nature of the current Court, the decision in Erlinger did not fall neatly along partisan lines. Among the dissenters were Justices Samuel Alito, Brett Kavanaugh, and Ketanji Brown Jackson, the latter of whom argued that Apprendi—and, as an extension, the case law that has sprung from it—was wrongly decided. "I recognize that many criminal defendants and their advocates prefer the Apprendi regime, which provides some defendants with more procedural protections at sentencing," Jackson writes. "In my view, however, the benefit that some criminal defendants derive from the Apprendi rule in the context of their individual cases is outweighed by the negative systemic effects that Apprendi has wrought," which she says has hamstrung judges and increased sentencing disparities.

"The only thing judges may not do consistent with Apprendi is increase a defendant's exposure to punishment based on their own factfinding," counters Gorsuch. "Does Justice Jackson really think it too much to ask the government to prove its case (as it concedes it must) with reliable evidence before seeking enhanced punishments under a statute like ACCA when the 'practical realit[y]' for defendants like Mr. Erlinger is exposure to an additional decade (or more) in prison?"

The post The Supreme Court Again Strengthens the Right to a Jury Trial in Criminal Sentencing appeared first on Reason.com.

A federal law that Congress enacted in 1994 prohibits gun possession by people subject to domestic violence restraining orders. Since that seems like a no-brainer, many people were dismayed when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit deemed that provision unconstitutional last year in United States v. Rahimi. But as anyone who reads the majority and concurring opinions in that case can see, there is a striking problem with 18 USC 922(g)(8): It disarms people even when there is little or no evidence that they pose a danger to others.

In an 8–1 decision today, the Supreme Court avoided that issue by noting that the man who challenged his prosecution under Section 922(g)(8), Zackey Rahimi, is a bad dude with an extensive history of violence, including violence against his girlfriend. As applied to people like Rahimi, Chief Justice John Roberts says in the majority opinion, the law is "consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation"—the constitutional test that the Court established in the 2022 case New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen.

"When a restraining order contains a finding that an individual poses a credible threat to the physical safety of an intimate partner, that individual may—consistent with the Second Amendment—be banned from possessing firearms while the order is in effect," Roberts says. The decision does not address the question of whether it is consistent with the Second Amendment to disarm someone without such a judicial finding.

Noting that Rahimi raised a facial challenge, Roberts faults the 5th Circuit for focusing on "hypothetical scenarios where Section 922(g)(8) might raise constitutional  concerns" instead of "consider[ing] the circumstances in which Section 922(g)(8) was most likely to be constitutional." That error, he says, "left the panel slaying a straw man."

As 5th Circuit Judge James Ho emphasized in his Rahimi concurrence, that "straw man" is not merely hypothetical. The "constitutional concerns" to which Roberts alludes derive from the statute's loose requirements for court orders that trigger the gun ban. Under Section 922(g)(8), a restraining order must include at least one of two elements, one of which sweeps broadly enough to encompass individuals with no history of violence or threats.

The first, optional element—a judicial finding that the respondent "represents a credible threat to the physical safety" of his "intimate partner" or that person's child—provides some assurance that the order addresses a real danger, especially since the law requires a hearing in which the respondent has "an opportunity to participate." As Roberts notes, the order against Rahimi included such a finding. But the second, alternative criterion—that the order "by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury"—can be met by the boilerplate language of orders that are routinely granted in divorce cases, whether or not there is good reason to believe the respondent is apt to assault anyone.

In his Rahimi concurrence, Ho noted that protective orders are "often misused as a tactical device in divorce proceedings" and "are granted to virtually all who apply." They are "a tempting target for abuse," he said, and in some cases have been used to disarm the victims of domestic violence, leaving them "in greater danger than before."

In the lone dissent from today's decision, Justice Clarence Thomas likewise notes how easily someone can lose his right to arms under Section 922(g)(8). The provision "does not require a finding that a person has ever committed a crime of domestic violence," he writes. It "is not triggered by a criminal conviction or a person's criminal history." And it "does not distinguish contested orders from joint orders—for example, when parties voluntarily enter a no-contact agreement or when both parties seek a restraining order."

Furthermore, Thomas says, the law "strips an individual of his ability to possess firearms and ammunition without any due process," since "the ban is an automatic, uncontestable consequence of certain orders." The Cato Institute made the same basic point about due process in a brief supporting Rahimi's challenge.

Although a hearing is required for the restraining order itself, Thomas notes, "there is no hearing or opportunity to be heard on the statute's applicability, and a court need not decide whether a person should be disarmed under §922(g)(8)." He also points out that the penalties for violating the provision are severe: up to 15 years in prison, plus permanent loss of gun rights based on the felony conviction.

Roberts, who criticizes the 5th Circuit for requiring a "historical twin" rather than a "historical analogue" under the Bruen test, sees precedent for Section 922(g)(8) in "surety" laws that required threatening people to post bonds, which they would forfeit if they became violent. But Thomas does not think those laws are "relevantly similar" to the provision that Rahimi violated.

"Surety laws were, in a nutshell, a fine on certain behavior," Thomas writes. "If a person threatened someone in his community, he was given the choice to either keep the peace or forfeit a sum of money. Surety laws thus shared the same justification as §922(g)(8), but they imposed a far less onerous burden."

In particular, Thomas says, "a surety demand did not alter an individual's right to keep and bear arms. After providing sureties, a person kept possession of all his firearms; could purchase additional firearms; and could carry firearms in public and private. Even if he breached the peace, the only penalty was that he and his sureties had to pay a sum of money. To disarm him, the Government would have to take some other action, such as imprisoning him for a crime." Thomas thinks the government "has not shown that §922(g)(8)'s more severe approach is consistent with our historical tradition of firearm regulation."

Roberts, by contrast, says a prosecution under Section 922(g)(8) can be consistent with that tradition, at least when a judge concludes that someone "poses a credible threat to the physical safety of an intimate partner." The constitutionality of applying Section 922(g)(8) in cases where there was no such finding remains uncertain. Some Second Amendment scholars, such as the Independence Institute's David Kopel, argue that the provision would be constitutional if it were amended to require a finding of dangerousness.

The Court did clarify an important point in a way that could bode well for other challenges to the broad categories of "prohibited persons" who are not allowed to possess firearms, such as cannabis consumers and other illegal drug users. The majority rejected the Biden administration's position that only "responsible" people qualify for Second Amendment rights.

"We reject the Government's contention that Rahimi may be disarmed simply because he is not 'responsible,'" Roberts writes. "'Responsible' is a vague term. It is unclear what such a rule would entail. Nor does such a line derive from our case law."

In Bruen and in District of Columbia v. Heller, the 2008 case in which the Court first explicitly recognized that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to armed self-defense, Roberts notes, "we used the term 'responsible' to describe the class of ordinary citizens who undoubtedly enjoy the Second Amendment right….But those decisions did not define the term and said nothing about the status of citizens who were not 'responsible.' The question was simply not presented."

The post SCOTUS Dodges a Crucial Problem With Disarming People Based on Restraining Orders appeared first on Reason.com.

Last November, federal prosecutors invited Ilene Wahpeta, an incarcerated woman, to give a victim impact statement at the sentencing of Andrew Jones, a Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employee who was convicted of sexually assaulting three other inmates.

Less than a year later, the U.S. government is fighting a petition Wahpeta filed for early release based on the same allegations that prosecutors previously invited her to speak about, arguing she wasn't a named victim in the criminal case against Jones and that her claims aren't credible.

The Justice Department announced in 2022, amid several damning investigations into sexual assault by staff in federal prisons, that it was working to expand a program for early release to include women who'd been abused behind bars, but Wahpeta's case is one example of what criminal justice advocates say is the Justice Department undercutting that policy. Lawyers representing incarcerated women filing for early release based on their status as sexual assault survivors say federal prosecutors are now routinely fighting to disqualify their clients because of an unreasonably narrow definition.

At the heart of the issue is a new policy passed in April 2023 by the U.S. Sentencing Commission that makes federal inmates who were sexually abused by staff eligible for compassionate release. Compassionate release is a policy that allows federal inmates to petition for early release for "extraordinary and compelling" reasons, such as terminal illness or family emergencies. However, the expansion included a major caveat that was added at the recommendation of the Justice Department. To be eligible, a prisoner's claim of sexual abuse "must be established by a conviction in a criminal case, a finding or admission of liability in a civil case, or a finding in an administrative proceeding."

Families Against Mandatory Minimums (FAMM), a criminal justice advocacy group, has been coordinating legal representation for women who were formerly incarcerated at Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Dublin, a federal women's prison in California that was infested with so much corruption, sexual abuse, and whistleblower retaliation that the BOP shut it down earlier this year. 

Shanna Rifkin, the deputy general counsel at FAMM, says they have secured releases for 17 women out of the 25 cases they've taken on. But Rifkin says government opposition has increased significantly since the new policy statement took effect.

"Before November 1, 2023, when this policy statement went into effect, in almost every single case the government was agreeing or not opposing the compassionate release motion," Rifkin says. "Since then, there has been a lot more resistance to compassionate release motions based on sexual abuse."

The Justice Department argued that requiring a finding of guilt would set a clear standard for judges. It wrote in a public comment on the Sentencing Commission's proposed changes that "permitting compassionate release hearings only after the completion of other administrative or legal proceedings will help ensure that allegations are more fairly adjudicated, prevent mini-trials on allegations, and reduce interference with pending investigations and prosecutions."

However, Rifkin says this undercuts one of the major reforms in the FIRST STEP Act of 2018. That act changed compassionate release to allow inmates to directly petition federal judges, significantly reducing the BOP's power to stonewall and delay petitions.

"It effectively puts the Department of Justice back in the driver's seat," Rifkin says of the new policy statement, "because who drives a criminal case? The Department of Justice. Victims of abuse have no say over when a case against their abuser will be brought, if it will be brought, and who will be charged as the victims in the case."

And while a finding of guilt may sound like a reasonable standard, it is a surprisingly difficult one to meet in cases of sexual assault perpetrated by government employees.

According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, from 2016 to 2018, perpetrators of staff sexual misconduct were only convicted, sentenced, fined, or pleaded guilty in 6 percent of substantiated incidents in federal and state prisons.

Reason detailed last year how a cadre of corrupt guards at a federal minimum security camp in Florida was allowed to prey on women for years without oversight. Those guards eventually admitted under oath to internal affairs investigators that they had assaulted incarcerated women, yet most were allowed to retire and none was ever prosecuted.

Over the past year, the Justice Department has ramped up scrutiny of prisons and prosecutions of corrupt BOP employees, but even with more vigilant oversight, criminal cases do not move quickly through the court system, especially if the defendant goes to trial. Rifkin cited one pending case against a former FCI Dublin correctional officer who has been charged with assaulting three women. He was indicted in May 2023, but his trial isn't scheduled until 2025.

"So women who are survivors of his abuse ostensibly have to wait until the government has concluded their case in order to have a cognizable claim under this policy statement," Rifkin explains.

As for civil suits against government employees, they routinely take years to resolve, and settlements often stipulate that they do not constitute admissions of guilt by the defendants.

The difference between how petitions have been handled before and after the new standard was enacted is stark. Take the case of Aimee Chavira, a former inmate at FCI Dublin who says she was abused by five correctional officers and continued to suffer retaliation after she was transferred out of the prison.

When Chavira filed her compassionate release petition, only one of those officers had been indicted, and another committed suicide while under investigation. Nevertheless, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of California filed a motion of nonopposition in response to her petition. Chavira was released in May of last year.

Contrast that with Wahpeta's case, where prosecutors have not only tried to apply the adjudication requirement but also attacked her credibility.

In a court filing opposing Wahpeta's petition, prosecutors note that Wahpeta never gave her victim impact statement because of objections from Jones' attorney and concerns that her story was insufficiently corroborated. The government also puts significance on the facts that she initially refused to cooperate with FBI investigators and denied being abused; that she didn't mention being abused in letters to her family she wrote while in solitary confinement; that she contemplated getting a lawyer; and that her descriptions of abuse were remarkably similar to the narratives of the named victims in the criminal case against Jones.

"Even when writing to her parents, her main concern was getting out of confinement early, not reporting what she had seen," federal prosecutors argue. "Also, defendant never mentions being a victim of abuse, but rather that she witnessed the abuse."

But this behavior is all too common in cases of sexual abuse in prison. Incarcerated victims of sexual assault often initially refuse to cooperate with investigators out of fear of retaliation from correctional officers, who remain in total control of their lives. Indeed, Wahpeta was put in solitary confinement while Jones was under investigation, and she remained there for more than two months before Jones was removed from the prison. Besides embarrassment or any other number of personal reasons, survivors are also often vague in communications with family because correctional officers can read their letters and emails.

Bay Area news outlet KTVU has interviewed dozens of women over the past two years about sexual abuse and retaliation inside FCI Dublin, and a lawsuit on behalf of multiple incarcerated FCI Dublin women described the repression inside the prison in detail: "Survivors who report sexual abuse are verbally threatened, physically assaulted, sent to solitary confinement, given false disciplinary tickets, have their cells tossed and property destroyed, have their mail (including legal mail) interfered with, strip searched, and transferred to other BOP institutions away from their families—and are even targeted for further sexual abuse."

In a sentencing memorandum filed in Jones' case, prosecutors were keenly aware of how retaliation works inside federal prisons. "To enforce the silence that was so critical to the perpetuation of his predation, Jones created an environment of intimidation, fear, and reprisal," prosecutors wrote. "It wasn't just words. Jones also enforced silence and obedience through violence and threats of violence."

Yet, now federal prosecutors take Wahpeta's silence as a mark against her.

"DOJ has already decided whether Ms. Wahpeta is lying. And it decided she isn't," Wahpeta's attorney wrote in a response. "It decided she isn't when the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of California invited her to read a victim impact statement at Officer Andrew Jones's sentencing hearing. If the government believed that Ms. Wahpeta was lying, it would have had a duty to tell the Court. It did not do so. In fact, until its response here, at no point during the duration of Ms. Wahpeta's cooperation with the government has the government questioned what happened to Ms. Wahpeta to either her or her counsel. Nor could it. Because it's true."

The Justice Department did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The post Advocates Say the Justice Department Is Failing To Provide Relief to Women Who Were Abused in Prison appeared first on Reason.com.

In a statement issued on friday evening, the United States said that Israel may have breached international law with American-supplied weapons. It also said that the flow of munitions will continue all the same.

While the report was a clear rebuke of some Israeli operations in Gaza, it stopped short of definitively saying that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) campaign had breached international law.

— Read the rest

The post US: Israel may have broken international law with our weapons and we will keep sending them more appeared first on Boing Boing.

In a statement issued on friday evening, the United States said that Israel may have breached international law with American-supplied weapons. It also said that the flow of munitions will continue all the same.

While the report was a clear rebuke of some Israeli operations in Gaza, it stopped short of definitively saying that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) campaign had breached international law.

— Read the rest

The post US: Israel may have broken international law with our weapons and we will keep sending them more appeared first on Boing Boing.

In a statement issued on friday evening, the United States said that Israel may have breached international law with American-supplied weapons. It also said that the flow of munitions will continue all the same.

While the report was a clear rebuke of some Israeli operations in Gaza, it stopped short of definitively saying that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) campaign had breached international law.

— Read the rest

The post US: Israel may have broken international law with our weapons and we will keep sending them more appeared first on Boing Boing.

In 2021, Whittier, California, police arrested Victor Manuel Martinez Wario on an outstanding warrant related to a 2012 child molestation conviction. The only problem? Police had arrested the wrong person. However, despite Wario frequently telling police he didn't have any warrants out for his arrest, they didn't bother to check—leaving Wario imprisoned for five days. 

Now, Wario is suing, claiming that police negligence amounted to a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure. The officer's actions caused Wario to suffer "emotional and mental trauma," according to the suit. "He also missed time at work, and was unable to provide care to his disabled fiancée."

In March 2021, Wario was pulled over by several Whittier police officers for a minor traffic violation. During the stop, police mistakenly found that he had an active warrant out for his arrest. Even though Wario denied that he had any active warrants, he was still arrested and booked into a nearby jail.

According to the lawsuit, during the booking process, police told Wario that the warrant originated from Wario's failure to register as a sex offender and "check in with the probation department" after a 2012 conviction for child molestation. Wario again "adamantly told them that they had the wrong person," the complaint reads. But, again, no one decided to double-check that the police had arrested the correct person.

Two days later, Wario was transferred to another jail. This time, "he was assigned special housing for custodies with child molestation cases, given a specially colored jumpsuit indicating his status as a sex offender, and a wristband was placed on his wrist also showing that his case involved child molestation," the suit reads. "Because of his perceived status as a convicted child molester, Mr. Wario was in serious jeopardy of being attacked by fellow inmates."

That day, he was taken to be arraigned. During a brief discussion with his attorney, he again insisted that he was the wrong person. However, when the attorney relayed this to Judge Mary Lou Villar, she set a $30,000 bail and refused to release Wario.  

"She ordered a fingerprints expert to appear in court the following week to take his fingerprints and verify his identity," the suit reads. 

However, the following day, someone finally took basic measures to check Wario's claims. According to the suit, "the Deputy District Attorney assigned to the case obtained the booking photo of the actual defendant in the case and determined that it was not Mr. Wario."

It took another day for Wario to be released—five days after his arrest.

On Tuesday, Wario filed a lawsuit against the Whittier Police Department, claiming that his false arrest was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, arguing that police had no reasonable basis for arresting and jailing him.

"No reasonable conclusion could be drawn that such an arrest and confinement was reasonable," his suit reads. "No objective facts readily available and known to Defendants could have reasonably led them to conclude that Plaintiff was a fugitive from justice stemming from a 2012 child molestation case."

The post California Cops Locked an Innocent Man in a Sex Offender Unit for 3 Days appeared first on Reason.com.

On Friday, the Biden administration unveiled final Title IX regulations, nearly two years after the administration proposed dramatic changes to how colleges handle sexual assault allegations. The new rules largely mirror proposed regulations released last year and will effectively reversing Trump-era due process reforms. 

According to the final regulations, accused students will lose their right to a guaranteed live hearing with the opportunity to have a representative cross-examine their accuser. This is accompanied by a return to the "single-investigator model," which allows a single administrator to investigate and decide the outcome of a case.

Further, under the new rules, most schools will be required to use the "preponderance of the evidence" standard, which directs administrators to find a student responsible if just 51 percent of the evidence points to their guilt. Schools are also no longer required to provide accused students with the full content of the evidence against them. Instead, universities are only bound to provide students with a description of the "relevant evidence," which may be provided "orally" rather than in writing. 

This is a stunning rollback of due process rights for accused students. Under the new regulations, a student can be found responsible for sexually assaulting a classmate because a single administrator believed there was a 51 percent chance he had committed the assault, and this conclusion can be reached without ever allowing the accused student to know the full evidence against him or providing a hearing during which he could defend himself.

The rules also represent a continuing partisan tension in education policy. Following President Barack Obama's 2011 "Dear Colleague" letter, which first mandated campus sexual assault tribunals, regulations have flip-flopped consistently along party lines. In 2020, the Trump administration introduced broad due process rights for accused students while prohibiting schools from taking many cases that occurred off-campus. Today's reforms mark the third major change to Title IX regulations in as many presidents.

"Justice is only possible when hearings are fair for everyone. So today's regulations mean one thing: America's college students are less likely to receive justice if they find themselves in a Title IX proceeding," the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE) said in a Friday statement. "When administrators investigate the most serious kinds of campus misconduct, colleges should use the time-tested tools that make finding the truth more likely. But the new regulations no longer require them to do so."

So far, the new rules have been met with widespread praise from victims' rights groups.

"Students who experience sexual violence or discrimination shouldn't have to weigh our safety against our ability to go to class or participate in campus life," said college student Emily Bach in a press release from Know Your IX, a campus sexual assault awareness group. "The Biden Administration's updated Title IX rule will make sure that students who experience harm can come forward and seek support without jeopardizing our ability to graduate on time or get a degree."

But contrary to what many victims' rights activists say, due process rights for accused students are essential, not contrary, in treating campus sexual assault as a pressing issue. College sexual assault victims should be taken seriously—but taking their accusations with the gravity they deserve also means providing those they accuse with the right to defend themselves in kind.

Even if Title IX hearings don't have the gravity of criminal proceedings, they have the potential to upend accused students' lives. Students have been expelled, had their degrees revoked, or even been deported after being found responsible for a Title IX violation. 

If we want university investigations into sexual assault allegations to maintain any sheen of legitimacy, we can't entrust the power to inflict such severe penalties to a single administrator working behind closed doors. Instead, we need a process that puts due process front and center—any other system quickly becomes shamefully untrustworthy.

The post New Title IX Rules Erase Campus Due Process Protections appeared first on Reason.com.

Police Scotland received thousands of complaints under the nation's new hate crimes law just in the first few days after it took effect. Scottish First Minister Humza Yousaf told The Telegraph that "a tiny percentage" of the numerous complaints are "turning into actual investigations," but control room staff is running up overtime weeding through them. Yousaf, who backed the law, said that even if complaints start to dwindle in the future, it will take "weeks or months" and cost "hundreds of thousands of pounds" to work through the backlog.

The post Brickbat: You Hate To See It appeared first on Reason.com.

Loreen Bea Feralo, 55, and Karen Casbohm, 63, lived in Ashtabula, Ohio with a fellow named Douglas Layman. When Layman died at home last week, Feralo and Casbohm didn't see a tragedy but rather an opportunity. What happened next could be called "Payday at Bernie's." — Read the rest

The post Two women busted propping up dead man at bank to withdraw his cash appeared first on Boing Boing.

In July 2021, Florida deputies arrested a man for shooting down their drone. Last week, a judge sentenced him to four years in federal prison, but not for destruction of property: He was sentenced merely for possession of a firearm as a felon.

According to a criminal complaint filed by an agent with the Department of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, deputies with the Lake County Sheriff's Office responded to reports of a possible burglary at a large commercial property in Mount Dora, Florida. Upon arrival, they found a front entry gate that had been "damaged by impact," as well as "unsecured doors on some of the buildings at the facility."

Thinking there could still be intruders present on the 10-acre site, deputies flew an unmanned aerial vehicle over the property to check it out. As it flew, however, they heard two gunshots ring out and saw the drone "slowly spinning downward and emitting smoke" before it "crashed onto the metal roof of an outbuilding, became suspended on a rain gutter, and caught fire."

Deputies investigated the source of the gunshots and encountered Wendell Goney, who lived nearby. Goney first denied shooting the drone but admitted to it after learning the craft was equipped with cameras. Goney claimed this was the first time he had ever shot at a drone, but he told deputies that he had been "harassed" by people flying them over his property. He said he had bought a .22 caliber rifle to put a stop to it and hadn't known that this particular drone belonged to law enforcement.

When deputies asked, Goney admitted that he was a convicted felon and therefore ineligible to own a firearm under federal law. They arrested Goney, who gave them permission to search his house and told them exactly where to find the rifle.

The criminal complaint noted that Goney "has approximately 23 prior felony convictions. He has been sentenced to more than a year in state prison on multiple occasions, including 1997, 2007, 2009, and 2013." His offenses included forgery, burglary, and multiple instances of grand theft, including the theft of a rifle in 1995. Most recently, he was sentenced in 2013 to two years and eight months in prison on charges including simple battery, aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer, and possession of cocaine.

Goney pled guilty in October 2023. Last week, U.S. District Court Judge Gregory Presnell sentenced Goney to four years in prison, followed by three years of supervised release during which he would have to participate in both drug and mental health treatment programs. He would also be required to pay more than $29,000 in restitution to the Lake County Sheriff's Office to replace the drone.

While Goney was initially charged with both destruction of law enforcement property and possession of a firearm, prosecutors dropped the former charge in exchange for his plea. Noting in their sentencing memo that federal guidelines "call for a recommended sentencing range of between 77–96 months," prosecutors asked for "a sentence at the low end of the applicable sentencing guidelines—77 months." The memo noted that "such a sentence would be slightly more than twice the length of the longest of the prison sentences the defendant has served to date."

But is that a just sentence? Goney's previous longest sentence was two years and eight months for crimes involving assaulting other people, including police; in this case, on the other hand, Goney's only aggressive act was toward an unmanned flying drone, and his only charged offense was possessing a gun without the government's permission.

While it seems sensible to bar felons from owning guns—especially those with such unsavory records as Goney's—the act presents uncomfortable questions of both liberty and constitutionality.

For one, the federal ban on firearm ownership necessarily sweeps up people who have committed nonviolent offenses, even those not involving firearms. In 1995, Bryan Range fraudulently obtained $2,458 in welfare benefits; when caught, Range repaid the money, paid a small fine, and served three years of probation. But under federal law, Range also lost the right to own a firearm as a result of his state misdemeanor conviction. In June 2023, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit ruled that Range's ban violated the Second Amendment's guarantee of a right to keep and bear arms.

Unlike Range, Goney's prior convictions did involve the use of violence. But who is supposed to be protected by keeping Goney from owning a firearm? At the time of his arrest, Goney had not been in trouble with the law for several years, and his only act of aggression was aimed at a drone he thought was "harassing" him.

The original criminal complaint notes that Goney is a felon and "has never had his civil rights restored by executive clemency following these felony convictions." Indeed, the only way for Goney to legally regain his Second Amendment right to own a firearm is through a pardon by the governor.

People convicted of crimes—even felonies, even those involving violence—do not cease to be citizens, or human beings, as a result of their sentences. Once their sentences have been served, they should have the ability to regain the rights they've lost—including the rights to vote, to hold public office, and to serve on juries. The right to bear arms is just as essential.

The post Florida Man Sentenced to 4 Years in Federal Prison After Shooting Down a Drone appeared first on Reason.com.