Today a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted broadband providers' request for a stay of the Federal Communications Commission's rule that would classify broadband internet providers as common carriers under the Communications Act, often referred to as "net neutrality." According to the panel, the broadband providers were likely to succeed on the merits–in part due to the major questions doctrine–and this justified staying the rule pending review of their petitions. The panel consisted of Chief Judge Sutton and Judges Clay and Davis.

From the court's unanimous per curiam order:

Broadband internet refers to the set of platforms that permit users to access the internet at speeds faster than dial-up services. . . . Over three-quarters of Americans have access to high-speed broadband service. . . . In addition to renting or constructing the physical network connecting computers, broadband internet providers offer other services that enable subscribers to access content from "edge providers"–namely websites, such as Google, Netflix, and Amazon, that host content on their own networks. . . . These services include DNS, short for Domain Name Services, a "phonebook" that matches web addresses (e.g., http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov) with their IP (internet protocol) addresses. And they include "caching" services that speed up data access by storing copies of edge provider content closer to the user's home system. . . .

The Communications Act of 1934 covers broadband providers, and it gives the Federal Communications Commission authority to promulgate rules and regulations under the Act. The extent of that regulatory authority turns on whether the providers count as common carriers under the Act. If a business counts as a common carrier, it must comply with Title II of the Act, which includes rate-review regulations and non-discrimination obligations. . . . For other businesses, the Commission may impose only the ancillary regulations authorized under Title I, which generally preserve the ability of companies to respond to market conditions. . . .

The development of the internet presented the Commission with a classification challenge. When Congress first enacted this law in 1934, it defined common carriers to include anyone involved in "wire communications." . . . Think telephone companies and the monopolies that went with them. But by the 1970s, telephone companies and others had begun competing to offer data processing services through telephone wires. . . . Common carrier rules designed for telephone-wire monopolies, the Commission realized, could inhibit the development of "data information services." . . . The Commission responded by distinguishing the "basic transmission service" that transferred data between two points from the "enhanced service" that allowed subscribers to interact with data stored elsewhere.

Responding to these developments, Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996. It established a new category of "telecommunications service," which offers "the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and received." . . . The Commission must treat telecommunications service providers as common carriers. . . . The 1996 Act also created a new category of "information service," which applies to a company that offers "a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications." The Commission may not treat information service providers as common carriers. . . .

After passage of the 1996 Act, the Commission for many years took the view that broadband internet access services were information services, not telecommunication services. That left them free of Title II's common carrier requirements. . . .

Reviewing a decision from the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court upheld this classification under Chevron. [See Brand X]. . . Specifically, the Supreme Court found that the classification of broadband internet access offered through cable modems as an information service was a permissible interpretation of the Communications Act. . . .

In 2010, the Commission continued to treat broadband internet services as something covered by Title I but opted to alter its rules based on a debate over the risk that broadband providers could favor some edge providers' content over others. . . . The Commission tried to use its Title I authority to impose "open internet" rules on broadband providers that banned them from blocking or unreasonably discriminating between lawful content. . . . A federal court invalidated this rule on the ground that the Commission could impose such requirements only under Title II.

The next chapter unfolded in 2015. That year, the Commission promulgated a rule that categorized broadband providers as common carriers and required net neutrality under Title II. . . .

In 2018, the Commission returned to its prior view. It issued a new rule that broadband providers fall under Title I and do not qualify as common carriers. . . . The D.C. Circuit again upheld the classification and again did so under Chevron. . . .

On May 22, 2024, the Commission switched positions again. Under its current rule, the Commission has classified broadband providers as common carriers under Title II. . . . The rule requires broadband providers to disclose "accurate information regarding the network management practices" and forbids them from engaging in blocking, throttling, paid prioritization, and "unreasonable interference" with users and edge providers. . . . The rule at this point forbears other Title II regulations, including rate regulation and tariffing. . . .

The petitioners are likely to succeed on the merits because the final rule implicates a major question, and the Commission has failed to satisfy the high bar for imposing such regulations. Although the petitioners have raised other arguments in support of their position that the FCC exceeded its authority in promulgating the rule at issue, such as whether broadband can be classified as a telecommunications service under the Communications Act and the stare decisis effect of the Brand X decision, we decline to reach those arguments at this preliminary stage.

An agency may issue regulations only to the extent that Congress permits it. . . . When Congress delegates its legislative authority to an agency, it presumably resolves "major questions" of policy itself while authorizing the agency to decide only those "interstitial matters" that arise in day-to-day practice. . . .When Congress upsets that presumption and delegates its power to “alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme” to an agency, it must speak clearly, without "hid[ing] elephants in mouseholes." The more an agency asks of a statute, in short, the more it must show in the statute to support its rule.

Net neutrality is likely a major question requiring clear congressional authorization. As the Commission's rule itself explains, broadband services "are absolutely essential to modern day life, facilitating employment, education, healthcare, commerce, community-building, communication, and free expression," to say nothing of broadband's importance to national security and public safety.

Congress and state legislatures have engaged in decades of debates over whether and how to require net neutrality. Because the rule decides a question of "vast economic and political significance," it is a major question. . . . The Communications Act likely does not plainly authorize the Commission to resolve this signal question. Nowhere does Congress clearly grant the Commission the discretion to classify broadband providers as common carriers. To the contrary, Congress specifically empowered the Commission to define certain categories of communications services–and never did so with respect to broadband providers specifically or the internet more generally. . . . Absent a clear mandate to treat broadband as a common carrier, we cannot assume
that Congress granted the Commission this sweeping power, and Petitioners have accordingly shown that they are likely to succeed on the merits. . . .

Chief Judge Sutton also wrote a separate concurrence, emphasizing that even without the major questions doctrine, the FCC would likely lose. As Sutton notes, "The best reading of the statute, and the one in place for all but three of the last twenty-eight years, shows that Congress likely did not view broadband providers as common carriers under Title II of the Telecommunications Act."

The post Sixth Circuit Puts Net Neutrality Rule on Ice appeared first on Reason.com.

In Bradford v. U.S. Department of Labor, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected a challenge to a Labor Department rule requiring federal contractors, including some permittees, to pay their workers a $15 per hour minimum wage. The majority concluded that this requirement was authorized by the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (FPASA, sometimes referred to as the "Property Act" or the "Procurement Act"), which grants the President broad authority to impose requirements on federal contractors. The third judge, however, concluded that FPASA violates existing nondelegation doctrine precedent and is thus unconstitutional in a very interesting opinion. (The case is also interesting because the Supreme COurt has had very little to say about FPASA over the years.)

The majority opinion, by Judge Holmes and joined by Judge Ebel, summarizes the case:

Plaintiffs-Appellants Duke Bradford, Arkansas Valley Adventure (AVA), and the Colorado River Outfitters Association (CROA) appeal from the District of Colorado's order denying their motion to preliminarily enjoin a Department of Labor (DOL) rule requiring federal contractors to pay their employees a $15.00 minimum hourly wage. The DOL promulgated the rule pursuant to a directive in Executive Order (EO) 14,026, which President Biden issued on April 27, 2021. EO 14,026 imposed the minimum wage requirement on most federal contractors, and it rescinded an exemption for recreational services outfitters that operate pursuant to permits on federal lands, which President Trump had adopted in EO 13,838. President Biden issued EO 14,026 pursuant to his authority under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act ("FPASA"), 40 U.S.C. §§ 101–1315, which authorizes the President to "prescribe policies and directives that the President considers necessary to carry out" FPASA and that are "consistent with" FPASA, 40 U.S.C. § 121(a). One purpose of FPASA is to "provide the Federal Government with an economical and efficient system for . . . [p]rocuring and supplying property and nonpersonal services." 40 U.S.C. § 101(1).

Appellants argue that the district court erred in concluding that FPASA authorizes the minimum wage rule as applied to recreational services permittees because the government does not procure any services from them or supply anything to them. They also argue that the DOL acted arbitrarily and capriciously in promulgating the minimum wage rule without exempting recreational service permittees.

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), we affirm. We first conclude that Appellants have not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits that the DOL's rule was issued without statutory authority. Specifically, the district court did not err in concluding that FPASA likely authorizes the minimum wage rule because the DOL's rule permissibly regulates the supply of nonpersonal services and advances the statutory objectives of economy and efficiency. Furthermore, we hold that Appellants have not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits that the DOL's rule is arbitrary and capricious. In sum, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying Appellants' motion for a preliminary injunction.

Judge Allison Eid dissented, and not merely because the federal government sought to impose this minimum wage requirement on federal permittees who are not, in any traditional sense "federal contractors." Rather, she concluded that FPASA has a nondelegation problem. Her opinion begins:

Only Congress can wield legislative power. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1. Yet the law here, by lacking an intelligible principle, delegates just that to the President. The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act ("FPASA") grants the President nearly unfettered power to create any policy he considers necessary to carry out nonpersonal services under the guise of economy and efficiency. In granting this power, Congress did not (1) require the President to conduct any preliminary factfinding or to respond to a specified situation. Nor did Congress (2) provide the President a standard that sufficiently guides his broad discretion. Accordingly, I would hold that the FPASA runs afoul of the nondelegation doctrine. Because the majority holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent.

As Judge Eid explains, the problem is not merely that FPASA appears to offer no intelligible principle to guide the executive branch's use of the delegated power, but also that there is no required process to help channel the exercise of the power. This makdes FPASA invalid under Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry (neither of which has ever been overruled) and, according to Judge Eid, distinguishes FPASA from other statutes upheld against nondelegation challenge.  From her opinion:

Under the nondelegation doctrine, Congress must cabin its delegation of legislative authority to the President with an "intelligible principle." Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2129 (2019) (plurality) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has identified an intelligible principle as falling into either of the "two buckets" identified in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935): "(1) whether the Congress has required any finding by the President in the exercise of the authority, and (2) whether the Congress has set up a standard for the President's action." Allstates Refractory Contractors, LLC v. Su, 79 F.4th 755, 773 (6th Cir. 2023) (Nalbandian, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). . .

Under the first "bucket," a law must contain a situational or fact-finding requirement. Panama Refin., 293 U.S. at 415 (considering "whether the Congress has required any finding by the President in the exercise of the authority to enact the prohibition"). In many cases, the Supreme Court has upheld laws if executive action can only come about as a response to certain situations. . . .

Under the second, a law must contain "a standard" limiting executive discretion. Panama Refin., 293 U.S. at 415 (considering "whether the Congress has set up a standard for the President's action"). Some laws delegate to the executive the ability to "fill up the details" in "general provisions." Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825). Even so, the Supreme Court has required that Congress provide a "sufficiently definite and precise" standard that can "enable Congress, the courts and the public to ascertain whether the [Executive official] . . . has conformed to those standards." Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944); . . .. Only then could a court be confident of what "general policy" a delegee "must pursue" and the "boundaries of [his] authority." Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129 (plurality) . . . Because if not—if "an absence of standards" makes it "impossible in a proper proceeding to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed"—a nondelegation violation occurs. Yakus, 321 U.S. at 426.

Such permissible, testable standards have taken the form of mandatory "factors" that the executive must conform to in acting. . . .

Lastly, the Supreme Court has noted that the more power a law delegates, the more the law must limit that delegation. Indeed, "the degree of agency discretion that is acceptable varies according to the scope of the power congressionally conferred." Whitman, 531 U.S. at 475; . . .

The bottom line is that courts must examine statutes for an intelligible principle. That is because a law delegating power must have one to withstand Article I. As aptly summarized from "over two centuries worth of caselaw," looking for an intelligible principle in turn "requires a court to analyze a statute for two things: (1) a fact-finding or situation that provokes executive action or (2) standards that sufficiently guide executive discretion—keeping in mind that the amount of detail governing executive discretion must correspond to the breadth of delegated power." Allstates Refractory Contractors, LLC, 79 F.4th at 776 (Nalbandian, J., dissenting) (cleaned up).

This is an interesting take on a very broad delegation of authority, the aggressive exercise of which has prompted significant litigation (as with the vaccine mandate requirements for federal contractors I discussed here and here).

I am not sure I am convinced by Judge Eid's analysis. Unlike in most cases in which nondelegation concerns are raised, the government here is imposing rules governing those who choose to contract with or engage with the federal government. Thus exercises of FPASA do not raise the same concerns as do regulations governing purely private conduct. Insofar as the regulation here raises such concerns by imposing requirement on those who cannot really be said to be federal contractors, or reaching operations that are unrelated to federal contracts, it would seem that FPASA is readily subject to a narrowing construction that would eliminate the constitutional concern (and which is arguably more consistent with the power Congress actually delegated. It would do no harm to FPASA's text to recognize that it only confers authority on the President to impose conditions that meaningfully relate to the efficiency and efficacy of the performance of federal functions, and not the authority to use federal contracts (or, in this case, permits) as a lever with which to reach private conduct more broadly.  That said, Judge Eid's opinion makes an interesting case, and one that I suspect may catch the attention of one or more of the justices.

The post Is the Federal Property & Administrative Services Act Unconstitutional? appeared first on Reason.com.

Better not read this post out loud to anyone—federal labor regulators might not like it.

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) stretched its speech-policing powers to new highs last week when an in-house administrative judge ruled that Amazon CEO Andy Jassy had violated federal labor law by expressing anti-unionization views during several televised interviews in recent years. Specifically, Judge Brian Gee dinged Jassy for suggesting that Amazon employees might be "better off" without a union and the layers of bureaucracy that come with it.

Jassy made those comments during an appearance on CNBC in 2022—during a segment in which he was discussing Amazon's response to ongoing unionization efforts at some warehouses. In the ruling, Gee highlighted similar comments that Jassy made during public forums hosted by The New York Times and Bloomberg.

The First Amendment protects Jassy's right to talk about those things and federal labor law allows employers to discuss unionization as long as they are not harassing or intimidating employees by doing so.

None of that seems to matter to the NLRB. In the ruling, Gee said Jassy had engaged in unlawful "coercive predictions about the effects of unionization" and ordered Amazon to post notices at its facilities reminding workers of their rights.

The punishment isn't really the point, however. Going after Jassy for remarks made in obviously public forums—comments that certainly were not meant to harass or intimidate current or would-be union members—is a signal that the NLRB sees virtually no limit to its powers to police executives' speech.

"Reasonable people may disagree about the line between permissible and impermissible speech" within the bounds of federal labor laws, said Edwin Egee, a vice president at the National Retail Federation, in a statement. "However, if Judge Gee's decision is left to stand, the effect would be to erase this line entirely. Employers would rightly wonder whether they can speak about unionization at all, despite their legally protected right to do so."

Gee's ruling in the Amazon case sits awkwardly alongside other recent rulings by the NLRB that gave wide leeway to employees' speech about similar topics. As the Washington Examiner noted, the NLRB in January forced Amazon to rehire an employee who had been sacked after directing an expletive-laden tirade at a fellow worker.

Meanwhile, some Google employees who were fired after protesting the company's contractual relationship with the state of Israel have filed a complaint with the NLRB asking to be reinstated. The former workers say they were unfairly terminated for engaging in speech that was "directly and explicitly connected to their terms and conditions of work," The Washington Post reported.

It's too soon to know how the NLRB will handle that case, but something has to give. It simply cannot be true that federal labor law permits employees to engage in any and all conduct without consequence, while simultaneously preventing CEOs and employers from speaking freely during media appearances and other public forums.

Federal bureaucrats don't have the authority to decide that all speech is either mandatory or forbidden—and whether they like it or not, the First Amendment applies even to the CEOs of successful businesses.

The post Labor Board Goes After Amazon CEO for Suggesting Workers Might Be 'Better Off' Without Unions appeared first on Reason.com.

On March 26, 2019, every American who owned a bump stock, a rifle accessory that facilitates rapid firing, was suddenly guilty of a federal felony punishable by up to 10 years in prison. That did not happen because a new law took effect; it happened because federal regulators reinterpreted an existing law to mean something they had long said it did not mean.

On Wednesday, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the question of whether those bureaucrats had the authority to do that. The case, Garland v. Cargill, turns on whether bump stocks are prohibited under the "best reading" of the federal statute covering machine guns. While several justices were clearly inclined to take that view, several others had reservations.

The products targeted by the government are designed to assist bump firing, which involves pushing a rifle forward to activate the trigger by bumping it against a stationary finger, then allowing recoil energy to push the rifle backward, which resets the trigger. As long as the shooter maintains forward pressure and keeps his finger in place, the rifle will fire repeatedly. The "interpretive rule" at issue in this case, which was published in December 2018 and took effect three months later, bans stock replacements that facilitate this technique by allowing the rifle's receiver to slide back and forth.

Officially, the purpose of that rule was merely to "clarify" that bump stocks are illegal. According to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), they always have been, although no one (including the ATF) realized that until 2018.

Federal law defines a machine gun as a weapon that "automatically" fires "more than one shot" by "a single function of the trigger." The definition also covers parts that are "designed and intended…for use in converting a weapon" into a machine gun.

During Wednesday's oral arguments, Principal Deputy Solicitor General Brian H. Fletcher maintained that a rifle equipped with a bump stock plainly meets the criteria for a machine gun. It "fires more than one shot by a single function of the trigger," he said, because "a function of the trigger happens when some act by the shooter, usually a pull, starts a firing sequence." An ordinary semi-automatic rifle, according to Fletcher, "fires one shot for each function of the trigger because the shooter has to manually pull and release the trigger for every shot." But "a bump stock eliminates those manual movements and allows the shooter to fire many shots with one act, a forward push."

Fletcher argued that a rifle with a bump stock also "fires more than one shot automatically, that is, through a self-regulating mechanism." After "the shooter presses forward to fire the first shot," he said, "the bump stock uses the gun's recoil energy to create a continuous back-and-forth cycle that fires hundreds of shots per minute."

Jonathan F. Mitchell, the attorney representing Michael Cargill, the Texas gun shop owner who challenged the bump stock ban, argued that Fletcher was misapplying both of those criteria. First, he said, a rifle equipped with a bump stock "can fire only one shot per function of the trigger because the trigger must reset after every shot and must function again before another shot can be fired." The trigger "is the device that initiates the firing of the weapon, and the function of the trigger is what that triggering device must do to cause the weapon to fire," he added. "The phrase 'function of the trigger' can refer only to the trigger's function. It has nothing to do with the shooter or what the shooter does to the trigger because the shooter does not have a function."

Second, Mitchell said, a rifle with a bump stock "does not and cannot fire more than one shot automatically by a single function of the trigger because the shooter, in addition to causing the trigger to function, must also undertake additional manual actions to ensure a successful round of bump firing." That process "depends entirely on human effort and exertion," he explained, because "the shooter must continually and repeatedly thrust the force stock of the rifle forward with his non-shooting hand while simultaneously maintaining backward pressure on the weapon with his shooting hand. None of these acts are automated."

Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson seemed eager to accept Fletcher's reading of the law, arguing that it is consistent with what Congress was trying to do when it approved the National Firearms Act of 1934, which imposed tax and registration requirements on machine guns. Although bump stocks did not exist at the time, they suggested, the law was meant to cover any firearm that approximated a machine gun's rate of fire.

According to Fletcher, "a traditional machine gun" can "shoot in the range of 700 to 950 bullets a minute," while a semi-automatic rifle with a bump stock can "shoot between 400 and 800 rounds a minute." As he conceded, however, the statute does not refer to rate of fire. "This is not a rate-of-fire statute," he said. "It's a function statute." To ban bump stocks, in other words, the ATF has to show that they satisfy the disputed criteria.

"It seems like, yes, that this is functioning like a machine gun would," Justice Amy Coney Barrett said. "But, you know, looking at that definition, I think the question is, 'Why didn't Congress pass…legislation to make this cover it more clearly?'"

Justice Neil Gorsuch made the same point. "I can certainly understand why these items should be made illegal," he said, "but we're dealing with a statute that was enacted in the 1930s, and through many administrations, the government took the position that these bump stocks are not machine guns." That changed after a gunman murdered 60 people at a Las Vegas country music festival in October 2017, and it turned out that some of his rifles were fitted with bump stocks.

The massacre inspired several bills aimed at banning bump stocks. Noting that "the ATF lacks authority under the law to ban bump-fire stocks," Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D–Calif.) said "legislation is the only answer." President Donald Trump, by contrast, maintained that new legislation was unnecessary. After he instructed the ATF to ban bump stocks by administrative fiat, the agency bent the law to his will. Noting that "the law has not changed," Feinstein warned that the ATF's "about face," which relied partly on "a dubious analysis claiming that bumping the trigger is not the same as pulling it," would invite legal challenges.

Feinstein was right about that, and one of those challenges resulted in the decision that the government is now asking the Supreme Court to overturn. In January 2023, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit rejected the ATF's redefinition of machine guns.

"A plain reading of the statutory language, paired with close consideration of the mechanics of a semi-automatic firearm, reveals that a bump stock is excluded from the technical definition of 'machinegun' set forth in the Gun Control Act and National Firearms Act," 5th Circuit Judge Jennifer Walker Elrod wrote in the majority opinion. And even if that were not true, Elrod said, "the rule of lenity," which requires construing an ambiguous criminal statute in a defendant's favor, would preclude the government from punishing people for owning bump stocks.

Gorsuch alluded to Feinstein's prescient concerns about the ATF rule's legal vulnerability: "There are a number of members of Congress, including Senator Feinstein, who said that this administrative action forestalled legislation that would have dealt with this topic directly, rather than trying to use a nearly 100-year-old statute in a way that many administrations hadn't anticipated." The ATF's attempt to do that, he said, would "render between a quarter of a million and a half million people federal felons," even though they relied on guidance from "past administrations, Republican and Democrat," that said bump stocks were legal.

Justices Brett Kavanaugh and Samuel Alito also were troubled by that reversal's implications for people who already owned bump stocks. Fletcher tried to assuage those concerns.

"ATF made [it] very clear in enacting this rule that anyone who turned in their bump stock or destroyed it before March of [2019] would not face prosecution," Fletcher said. "As a practical matter," he added, "the statute of limitations for this offense is five years," meaning prosecutions of people who owned bump stocks before the rule took effect will no longer be possible a month from now. "We have not prosecuted those people," he said. "We won't do it. And if we try to do it, I think they would have a good defense based on entrapment by estoppel," which applies when someone follows official advice in trying to comply with the law.

"What is the situation of people who have possessed bump stocks between the time of the ATF's new rule and the present day or between the time of the new rule and the 5th Circuit decision?" Alito asked. "Can they be prosecuted?" Fletcher's answer: "probably yes." That prospect, Alito said, is "disturbing."

Kavanaugh wondered about gun owners who did not destroy or surrender their bump stocks because they did not know about the ATF's rule. "For prosecuting someone now," he asked, "what mens rea showing would the government have to make to convict someone?" Fletcher said the defendant would "have to be aware of the facts" that, according to the ATF's reinterpretation of the law, make bump stocks illegal. "So even if you are not aware of the legal prohibition, you can be convicted?" Kavanaugh asked. "That's right," Fletcher replied.

"That's going to ensnare a lot of people who are not aware of the legal prohibition," Kavanaugh said. "Why not require the government to also prove that the person knew that what they were doing…was illegal?"

Gorsuch mocked Fletcher's apparent assumption that gun owners can be expected to keep abreast of the ATF's edicts. "People will sit down and read the Federal Register?" he said to laughter. "That's what they do in their evening for fun. Gun owners across the country crack it open next to the fire and the dog."

Maybe not, Fletcher admitted, but the publicity surrounding the ban and the legal controversy it provoked probably brought the matter to many people's attention. "I agree not everyone is going to find out about those things," he said, "but we've done everything the government could possibly do to make people aware."

Beyond the unfairness to gun owners who bought products they quite reasonably thought were legal, the ATF's about-face lends credibility to the complaint that its current interpretation of the law is misguided. If the ATF was wrong before, how can we be confident that it is right now?

According to the agency's new understanding of the statute, Mitchell noted, "function of the trigger" hinges on what the shooter is doing. But "function is an intransitive verb," he said. "It can't take an object grammatically. It's impossible. The trigger has to be the subject of function. It can't be the object."

Gorsuch picked up on that point, noting that the government had likened "function of the trigger" to "a stroke of a key or a throw of the dice or a swing of the bat." But "those are all things that people do," he said. Since function is an intransitive verb, "people don't function things. They may pull things, they may throw things, but they don't function things."

Gorsuch noted that the ATF is relying on "a very old statute" designed for "an obvious problem" posed by gangsters like Al Capone armed with machine guns that fired repeatedly "with a single function of the trigger—that is, the thing itself was moved once." Maybe legislators "should have written something better," he said. "One might hope they might write something better in the future. But that's the language we're stuck with."

What about the ATF's claim that a rifle equipped with a bump stock shoots "automatically"? Fletcher conceded that "an expert" can bump-fire a rifle "without any assistive device at all" and that "you can also do it if you have a lot of expertise by hooking your finger into a belt loop or using a rubber band or something else like that to hold your finger in place." But he added that "we don't think those things function automatically because the definition of 'automatically'" entails "a self-regulating mechanism."

As the government sees it, a shooter creates such a mechanism by using a bump stock, notwithstanding the "manual actions" that Mitchell highlighted. "There's nothing automatic about that," Mitchell argued. "The shooter is the one who is pushing. It's human effort, human exertion. Nothing automatic at all about this process."

Barrett asked Fletcher how the ATF would treat an elastic "bump band" marketed as an accessory to facilitate rapid firing. "Why wouldn't that then be a machine gun under the statute?" she wondered. "We think that's still not functioning automatically because that's not a self-regulating mechanism," Fletcher replied.

Mitchell, by contrast, argued that Barrett's hypothetical product and a bump stock are "indistinguishable when it comes to 'automatically.'" Bump firing with either involves "a manual action undertaken entirely by the shooter," he said. "There is no automating device….It is all being done by the shooter."

Justice Sonia Sotomayor, who was sympathetic to Fletcher's argument, nevertheless implied that the legal status of bump stocks might not be as clear as the government suggests. "The back-and-forth here leads me to believe that at best there might be some ambiguity," she said. But if the statute is in fact unclear, the 5th Circuit said, the ambiguity should be resolved in a way that protects gun owners from prosecution for a crime invented by bureaucrats.

The post SCOTUS Ponders the Implications of Prosecuting Gun Owners for a Crime Invented by Bureaucrats appeared first on Reason.com.

I was listening to the oral argument in Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System today, and I was struck by the following exchange (from the transcript):

JUSTICE JACKSON: If I understand you correctly, each new company that is created in an industry can suddenly bring a challenge that might risk or undermine valid –invalidation of the entire basis of the industry, each new company, because you say each new company that's created can bring such a lawsuit. Now, whether or not it will succeed, I understand, but aren't you risking destabilization of the industry in this way?

MR. WEIR: We don't think so. We—we think the experience in the Sixth Circuit is what you'll see. There –there was no uptick in challenges to old regulations in the Sixth Circuit, and we would have seen them there in the last —

JUSTICE JACKSON: Is —is that possible because we had other doctrines that prevented, so, you know, for example, Chevron existed and so there were lots of things that already –you know, right? Like, there are reasons why you might not have an uptick. I'm just wondering, in a world in which you could bring these actions, why wouldn't you have this problem?

MR. WEIR: Well, I –I think that because most regulations are –are valid, there's –there's no argument that they're unlawful. So you would –so you wouldn't see them. It's only the ones that have defects that you're going to see challenges to or potential defects.

Was this a suggestion that Chevron will no longer exist after this term? I suppose we will know by July.

UPDATE: I should have listened to the second-half of the argument before posting. Had I done so, I would have noted this question from Justice Kagan:

JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. –Mr. Snyder, I want to emphasize that I'm asking you a hypothetical question. It's an "if" question. There is obviously another big challenge to the way courts review agency action before this Court. Has the –has the Justice Department and the agencies considered whether there is any interaction between these two challenges? And, again, you know, if Chevron were reinforced, were affirmed. If Chevron were reversed, how does that affect what you're talking about here?

Does this question make it more or less likely that Justice Jackson inadvertently disclosed Chevron's fate? Was Justice Kagan just being precise? Or was she covering for her colleague's gaffe? Again, time will tell.

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The Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral argument in FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine and Danco Laboratories v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, the combined cases concerning the Food & Drug Administration's regulation of mifepristone, on March 26.

This morning, on the Orders List, the Court denied a motion to intervene filed by Missouri, Kansas, and Idaho. These states argued that the should be allowed to intervene so as to ensure that the requirements of Article III standing are met so that the Court can reach the merits. (This is, I take it, a tacit admission that the plaintiffs' standing claims are quite tenuous, as I have argued at length in some of the poses linked below.) The states base this argument, in part, on their successful motion to intervene in the trial court (which Adam Unikowsky dissects here). In any event, the Court rejected the motion.

The Court also ruled on two applications to file late-submitted amicus briefs, one from the American Bar Association and one from former Commissioners of the FDA. Interestingly enough, the Court rejected the former brief, but accepted the latter. Looking at the two briefs, this seems like a reasonable call. The FDA Commissioners brief provides relevant expertise that might be absent from other filed briefs. The ABA brief, not so much. Indeed, one has to wonder why the ABA brief was filed at all, as this case does not relate (even tangentially) to the needs or interests of the legal profession and does not add much given what has already been filed on the FDA's behalf in this case. Moreover, filing briefs like this is something the ABA should avoid if it wants to be seen as an apolitical organization that represents the legal profession and can speak to questions relating to the practice of law with any degree of authority.

The Court also denied a motion to intervene filed by Gregory J. Roden as "Next Friend of Americans en ventre sa mere." No surprise there.

For those interested in more about this case, yesterday I participated in a panel discussion on this case with my colleague Jessie Hill, sponsored by the Law-Medicine Center at the Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Video of that program may be viewed here.

Also, here are my prior blog posts about this case and the issues it raises:

• "The Next Abortion Battlegrounds," June 22, 2022;
• "Assessing the Legal Claims in Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine v. FDA," March 8, 2023;
• "AHM v. FDA: A Contrary View and a Rejoinder," March 28, 2023;
• "Blue-State AGs Have A Mifepristone Lawsuit of Their Own," March 29, 2023;
• "Two (Wrong) Mifepristone Court Rulings in One Day," April 8, 2023;
• "The Good and Bad of the Fifth Circuit's Abortion Pill Ruling," April 13, 2023.
• "BREAKING: Supreme Court to Consider Fifth Circuit's Abortion Pill Decision," Dec. 13, 2023.

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