The Supreme Court issued nine opinions in two days this week as the justices work to finish up October Term 2023. The justices have decided forty-seven cases thus far, with fourteen left to go (though these fourteen may be decided in as few as twelve opinions). Wednesday, June 26 will be the next opinion day. If the justices are ready to issue four or five opinions per day, they could meet the traditional-if-informal deadline of ending their work before July.

As I have noted before, the justices have shown a surprising degree of unanimity thus far this term. (See also this post by Adam Feldman at Empirical SCOTUS.) The Court has been unanimous in the judgment in 55 percent of the cases decided this term. Note, however, that in some of these cases the justices have diverged sharply in their reasoning, and not all of those cases featured a unanimous opinion for the Court. Today's opinion in Smith v. Arizona is a case in point, as are Trump v. Anderson and Vidal v. Elster. Given the cases left for the justices to decide, the overall proportion of unanimous decisions is likely to drop.

Among those cases that were not unanimous, two were 8-1, three were 7-2, thirteen were 6-3, and three were 5-4. Of note, only five of the Court's 6-3 decisions thus far this term divided the justices along traditional ideological lines. Some of those cases have also featured quite surprising line-ups, such as today's decision in Erlinger v. United States, in which Justice Gorsuch wrote for the Court, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Barrett, while Justices Alito, Kavanaugh and Jackson dissented.

In terms of individual opinion authorship, here is where we stand.

• Sotomayor: 7
• Thomas: 7
• Kagan: 6
• Kavanaugh: 5
• Jackson: 5
• Alito: 4
• Barrett: 4
• CJ Roberts: 3
• Gorsuch: 3

There have also been three per curiam opinions, and some cases are likely to be merged into a single opinion (e.g. the two Chevron cases, Relentless and Loper-Bright will almost certainly be decided in a single opinion; we'll see if that happens with the two NetChoice cases).

Thus far this term, the "liberal" justices have written thirty-eight percent of the opinions for the Court, despite representing only one-third of the Court. This leads me to think we will few (if any) additional decisions authored by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, or Jackson—though I think one more Jackson opinion is likely.

Now, for what you've all been waiting for, my purely speculative predictions for what we may see for the balance of the term.

• SEC v. Jarkesy—Gorsuch
• Purdue Pharma—Roberts
• Loper Bright/Relentless—Roberts
• Corner Post—Gorsuch
• Ohio v. EPA– Barrett (a change from prior prediction of Kavanaugh)
• NetChoice—Alito (though likely a splintered mess across the two cases)
• Murthy—Barrett (a change from prior prediction of Gorsuch)
• Snyder—Jackson
• Fischer—Gorsuch
• Grants Pass—Alito
• Moyle v. U.S.—Kavanaugh
• Trump v. U.S. – Roberts

As always, these predictions are worth no more than you paid for them, though I will note that I correctly called Rahimi, Texas v. New Mexico and Smith but not Erlinger.

The post Supreme Court OT2023 in the Final Stretch appeared first on Reason.com.

Guilty on all counts: Last night, a jury found former President Donald Trump guilty on all 34 counts. He was convicted of falsifying business records to cover up hush money payments to porn star Stormy Daniels, with whom he had a tryst, in the lead-up to the 2016 election.

Sentencing, which may include prison time but does not necessarily, has been set for July 11. Trump still has appeals to exhaust, and Judge Juan M. Merchan could also choose to seek probation instead of throwing the presidential candidate in the slammer. In other words: There are a lot of different ways this could play out which would still allow Trump to campaign for president (and be elected).

Since this happened last night, we do not yet have polling data on how this verdict will affect the presidential race. But a recent Quinnipiac University poll found that 6 percent of Trump voters would be less likely to vote for their favored candidate if convicted, while "24 percent say they would be more likely to vote for him" and an impressive "68 percent say it would not make a difference." That 6 percent could be consequential in a tight race.

Critics on the left, many of whom are hungry for Trump to receive jail time, and those on the right who are willing to excuse his criminal and norms-shattering behavior time and time again are both frequently wrong, but in this particular case, the legal argument was mighty dubious, writes Reason's Jacob Sullum, and the verdict was perhaps reached too swiftly, providing fodder for the argument that this was politically motivated.

"In legal terms, the quick verdict is hard to fathom," writes Sullum. "That's not because there were so many counts to consider, each related to a specific invoice, check, or ledger entry allegedly aimed at disguising a hush-money reimbursement as payment for legal services. Once jurors accepted the prosecution's theory of the case, it was pretty much inevitable that they would find Trump guilty on all 34 counts. But that theory was complicated, confusing, and in some versions highly implausible, if not nonsensical."

The basics: One of the prosecution's basic arguments was that Trump falsified business records with "an intent to commit another crime or to aid or conceal the commission thereof." That other crime would be a violation of Section 17-152, a New York state election law that considers it a misdemeanor for "two or more persons" to "conspire to promote or prevent the election of any person to a public office by unlawful means."

But Judge Merchan told jurors they did not have to agree on what "unlawful means" were used, or what that even means, to reach a unanimous verdict. And prosecutors needed to convince jurors that Trump "knowingly and willfully" engaged in such criminal conspiracy with his fixer, Michael Cohen, which strains credulity: One argument, put forth by prosecutors, was that Cohen "made an excessive campaign contribution, thereby violating the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), when he fronted the money to pay Daniels" (per Sullum)—an offense Cohen pleaded guilty to several years ago and a piece of evidence jurors heard but were instructed to use "to assess Cohen's credibility" but not his guilt—but it is in fact quite plausible that Trump did not know that instructing Cohen to pay Daniels was illegal.

"The prosecutors zapped a dead misdemeanor back into life by claiming a violation under New York's election law 17-152," writes Jonathan Turley at The Hill. "The argument is that the crime was committed to further another crime as an unlawful means to influence the election. However, that other crime can be the falsification of business records. So the jury (or some jurors, at least) could find that some documents were falsified as an unlawful means of falsifying other documents."

HOODWINKED: It's all legally shaky, but that didn't stop prosecutors from making wild arguments (as they do), like one that the hush-money payment (also called "[an] effort to hoodwink the American voter") "could very well be what got President Trump elected" in 2016, and that the cover-up of the Daniels affair amounted to "a subversion of democracy" meant to "manipulate and defraud the voters."

The payment to Daniels "turned out to be one of the most valuable contributions anyone ever made to Trump," Prosecutor Joshua Steinglass argued at one point. But, ultimately, jurors were convinced by these arguments—even if much of the conservative legal movement and punditry (even those who aren't Trump fans) were not.

As far as appeals, Trump has plenty of "material to work with" writes Ankush Khardori at Politico. "What he's got has almost nothing to do with the salacious and supposedly extraneous details offered by Daniels about her sexual encounter with Trump—after all, Trump and his legal team foolishly invited that testimony themselves by denying its existence—but with the underlying legal architecture of the case, which imported complex principles of federal election law into a state law case about false business records."

Scenes from New York: That's enough New York for today.

QUICK HITS

• It's pretty fun to play with this tool—called "Build a Trump Voter"/"Build a Biden Voter"—from The Economist.
• Bill Ackman preps for Pershing Square IPO.
• I'm here for all shots fired at baby boomers but am not sure whether stinginess—also termed frugality or fiscal prudence—is the concern. Why are we trying to audit an entire generation's consumer spending habits? Who cares?
• Inside the world of TikTok influencers who instruct their lady followers on how to snag a rich guy.
• Ukraine is now allowed to hit targets within Russia using American-made weapons in order to defend itself from its aggressors.
• Not sold on the term "climate refugees" (or apocalypticism about what the future will hold) but Brazilian flooding is displacing hundreds of thousands of people, leaving the government scrambling.
• Are you a libertarian left wondering who Chase Oliver is? Ask no more. Watch Just Asking Questions (and send us hate mail/love letters, vows of loyalty, notes of criticism, anything you desire). Some have said my views, espoused within, are "based" but I still do not know what this word means nor will I investigate.

The post First Felon appeared first on Reason.com.

After deliberating for a little more than a day, a Manhattan jury on Thursday found Donald Trump guilty of falsifying 34 business records to aid or conceal "another crime," an intent that turns what would otherwise be misdemeanors into felonies. If you assumed that the jury's conclusions would be driven by political animus, this first-ever criminal conviction of a former president is the result you probably expected in a jurisdiction where Democrats outnumber Republicans by 9 to 1. But in legal terms, the quick verdict is hard to fathom.

That's not because there were so many counts to consider, each related to a specific invoice, check, or ledger entry allegedly aimed at disguising a hush-money reimbursement as payment for legal services. Once jurors accepted the prosecution's theory of the case, it was pretty much inevitable that they would find Trump guilty on all 34 counts. But that theory was complicated, confusing, and in some versions highly implausible, if not nonsensical. Given the puzzles posed by the charges, you would expect conscientious jurors to spend more than an afternoon, a morning, and part of another afternoon teasing them out.

Manhattan District Attorney Alvin Bragg's case against Trump stemmed from the $130,000 that Michael Cohen, then Trump's lawyer and fixer, paid porn star Stormy Daniels shortly before the 2016 presidential election to keep her from talking about her alleged 2006 sexual encounter with Trump. When Trump reimbursed Cohen in 2017, prosecutors said, he tried to cover up the arrangement with Daniels by pretending that he was paying Cohen, whom he had designated as his personal attorney, for legal work.

Cohen testified that Trump instructed him to pay off Daniels and approved the plan to mischaracterize the reimbursement. Cohen was the only witness who directly confirmed those two points, and the defense team argued that jurors should not trust a convicted felon, disbarred lawyer, and admitted liar with a powerful grudge against his former boss. But even without Cohen's testimony, there was strong circumstantial evidence that Trump approved the payoff and went along with the reimbursement scheme.

The real problem for the prosecution was proving that Trump falsified business records  with "an intent to commit another crime or to aid or conceal the commission thereof"—the element that was necessary to treat the misleading documents as felonies. Prosecutors said the other crime was a violation of Section 17-152, an obscure, little-used provision of the New York Election Law. Section 17-152 makes it a misdemeanor for "two or more persons" to "conspire to promote or prevent the election of any person to a public office by unlawful means." But prosecutors never settled on any particular explanation of "unlawful means," and Juan Merchan, the judge presiding over the trial, told the jurors they could find Trump guilty even if they could not agree on one.

According to one theory, Cohen made an excessive campaign contribution, thereby violating the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), when he fronted the money to pay Daniels. Cohen pleaded guilty to that offense in 2018 as part of an agreement that also resolved several other, unrelated federal charges against him. Cohen therefore had a strong incentive to accept the characterization of the Daniels payment as an illegal campaign contribution. While jurors heard about Cohen's guilty plea during the trial, CNN notes, Merchan instructed them that they should consider it only "to assess Cohen's credibility and give context to the events that followed, but not in determining the defendant's guilt."

It is unclear whether Trump violated FECA by soliciting Cohen's "contribution," a question that hinges on the fuzzy distinction between personal and campaign expenditures. Given the uncertainty on that point, it is plausible that Trump did not think the Daniels payment was illegal, which helps explain why he was never prosecuted under FECA: To obtain a conviction, federal prosecutors would have had to prove that he "knowingly and willfully" violated the statute.

The New York prosecutors said Cohen and Trump conspired to promote his election through "unlawful means." Under New York law, a criminal conspiracy requires "a specific intent to commit a crime." Trump's understanding of FECA was relevant in assessing whether he had such an intent, meaning he recognized the nondisclosure agreement with Daniels as "unlawful means." Trump's understanding of FECA therefore also was relevant in assessing whether he falsified business records with the intent of covering up "another crime."

That theory assumed three things: 1) that Trump recognized the Daniels payment as a FECA violation; 2) that he knew about Section 17-152, a moribund, rarely invoked law; and 3) that he anticipated how New York prosecutors might construe Section 17-152 in light of FECA. The first assumption is questionable, the second is unlikely, and the third is highly implausible. Yet you would have to believe all three things to conclude that Trump approved a plan to misrepresent his reimbursement of Cohen as payment for legal services with the intent of covering up a FECA-dependent violation of Section 17-152.

According to a second theory, Trump facilitated a violation of New York tax law by allowing Cohen to falsely report his reimbursement as income. Although that violation is described as "criminal tax fraud," Merchan said it did not matter that Cohen's alleged misrepresentation resulted in a higher tax bill. The judge noted that it is illegal to submit "materially false or fraudulent information in connection with any return," regardless of whether that information benefits the taxpayer.

Putting aside that counterintuitive definition of tax fraud, this theory required believing that Trump, when he reimbursed Cohen, not only contemplated what would happen when Cohen filed his returns the following year but also thought that "unlawful means" somehow would influence an election that had already happened. The logic here was hard to follow.

Likewise with the third theory of "unlawful means." Prosecutors suggested that Trump's falsification of business records was designed to aid or conceal the falsification of other business records. CNN reported that the latter records could involve, among other things, the corporate bank account that Cohen created to pay Daniels, Cohen's transfer of the money to Daniels' lawyer, or the Trump Organization's 1099-MISC forms for the payments to Cohen.

Since the 1099 forms were issued after the election, it is hard to see how they could have been aimed at ensuring Trump's victory. And although the other records predated the election, this theory involves a weird sort of bootstrapping.

Prosecutors said the records related to Cohen's dummy corporation, for example, were falsified because they misrepresented the nature and purpose of that entity, which by itself is a misdemeanor. That misdemeanor was the "unlawful means" by which Trump allegedly sought to promote his election, another misdemeanor. And because Trump allegedly tried to conceal the latter misdemeanor by falsifying the records related to Cohen's reimbursement, those records are 34 felonies instead of 34 misdemeanors.

The theory that Trump falsified business records to conceal the falsification of business records was "so circular as to produce vertigo in the jury room," George Washington University law professor Jonathan Turley said. If so, the jurors seem to have quickly recovered from their queasiness. They accepted either this dubious theory, one of the others, or possibly some combination of them. Since unanimity was not required, it is possible that some jurors bought the FECA theory, some preferred the double falsification theory, and some concluded that the case was clinched by a tax fraud with no pecuniary benefit.

To disguise the difficulties with its dueling theories, the prosecution averred that Trump committed "election fraud" when he directed Cohen to pay Daniels for her silence, thereby concealing information that voters might have deemed relevant in choosing between him and Hillary Clinton. "This was a planned, coordinated, long-running conspiracy to influence the 2016 election, to help Donald Trump get elected through illegal expenditures, to silence people who had something bad to say about his behavior," lead prosecutor Matthew Colangelo told the jury in his opening statement. "It was election fraud, pure and simple."

During his summation, prosecutor Joshua Steinglass called the nondisclosure agreement with Daniels "a subversion of democracy." He said it was an "effort to hoodwink the American voter." He told "a sweeping story about a fraud on the American people," as The New York Times put it. "He argue[d] that the American people in 2016 had the right to determine whether they cared that Trump had slept with a porn star or not, and that the conspiracy prevented them from doing so."

Did the American people have such a right? If so, Trump would have violated it even he had merely asked Daniels to keep quiet, perhaps by appealing to her sympathy for his wife. If Daniels had agreed, the result would have been the same. As the prosecution told it, that still would amount to "election fraud," even though there is clearly nothing illegal about it.

The jurors evidently bought this cover story. During deliberations, they revisited the testimony of former National Enquirer publisher David Pecker, a Trump buddy whom prosecutors implicated in that "long-running conspiracy to influence the 2016 election." Pecker's arrangement with Trump, which he described as mutually beneficial, was not the basis for any of the charges against Trump. But his testimony reinforced Bragg's legally dubious claim that Trump engaged in "election interference" when he sought to avoid bad press.

Pecker said he agreed to help Trump in several ways. He would run positive stories about Trump and negative stories about his opponents. He also would keep an eye out for potentially damaging stories about Trump and alert Cohen to them. The latter promise resulted in two agreements that the Enquirer negotiated with Dino Sajudin, a former Trump Tower doorman who falsely claimed that Trump had fathered a child with a woman hired to clean the building, and former Playboy Playmate Karen McDougal, who described a year-long affair with Trump. After paying $30,000 to Sajudin and $150,000 to McDougal for exclusive rights to their stories, the Enquirer sat on them.

Again, Trump was not charged in connection with any of this, and much of what Pecker did was constitutionally protected, albeit journalistically unethical. The fact that the jury nevertheless wanted to be read excerpts from Pecker's testimony suggests they accepted the prosecution's commodious understanding of "election fraud," which did not necessarily require any actual lawbreaking, let alone any attempt to interfere with the casting, counting, or reporting of votes.

In short, there was a glaring mismatch between the charges against Trump and what prosecutors described as the essence of his crime, which is not a crime at all. Since they could not charge him with "election fraud" merely because he tried to hide embarrassing information, they instead built a convoluted case that relied on interacting statutes and questionable assumptions about Trump's knowledge and intent.

That approach suggests several possible grounds for appeal. It is not clear, for example, whether a violation of federal campaign finance regulations, even when filtered through Section 17-152, counts as "another crime" under the state law dealing with falsification of business records. Nor is it clear that Section 17-152 applies in the context of a federal election, where federal law generally pre-empts state law. There are also questions about what is required to prove that Trump had "an intent to defraud" when he signed the checks to Cohen.

Bragg's predecessor, Cyrus R. Vance Jr., after lengthy consideration of possible state charges based on the Daniels payment, decided they were too legally iffy to pursue. Mark Pomerantz, a former prosecutor in Vance's office who worked on the Trump investigation, concluded that "such a case was too risky under New York law." In a 2023 book, Pomerantz noted that "no appellate court in New York had ever upheld (or rejected) this interpretation of the law."

Last week, New York Times columnist David French worried about the consequences of a conviction that is overturned on appeal. "Imagine a scenario in which Trump is convicted at the trial, Biden condemns him as a felon and the Biden campaign runs ads mocking him as a convict," he wrote. "If Biden wins a narrow victory but then an appeals court tosses out the conviction, this case could well undermine faith in our democracy and the rule of law." In his desperation to prevent Trump from reoccupying the White House, Bragg has already accomplished that.

The post Trump's Conviction Suggests Jurors Bought the Prosecution's Dubious 'Election Fraud' Narrative appeared first on Reason.com.

Justice Brett Kavanagh spoke at the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference in Austin, Texas today. According to a Bloomberg report, he discussed the "pressure" created by emergency filings, including appeals of nationwide injunctions or other extraordinary relief entered by lower courts. From a Bloomberg report:

Speaking Friday in Austin, Texas, Kavanaugh lamented the strain the expedited timeline places on the justices and said it leads to decreased output in other areas.

"This puts pressure on us," he said during remarks at a US Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit conference. "We're appellate judges; we don't like making snap decisions or decisions without lots of briefs or lots of lower court opinions. It's a challenge for us. I think we're dealing with it as best as we can in an imperfect situation."

Kavanaugh, in response to a question from moderator Fifth Circuit Chief Judge Priscilla Richman, said that in order to decide emergency issues the court must "take a peek at the merits, and that's really hard." This becomes circular, he said, "because we're going to decide the merits a couple of years from now." . . .

Resolving issues on the emergency docket is keeping the court from writing more opinions in merits cases, Kavanaugh said. . . .

"It occupies a lot of time," he said.

It is interesting that he made these remarks at the Fifth Circuit judicial conference, as the Fifth Circuit has been responsible for more than its fair share of "shadow docket" filings.

Justice Kavanaugh also indicated that he thinks the Supreme Court should hear more cases—more like 75 per term instead of 60. As I have noted on this blog, Justice Kavanaugh often votes to grant certiorari in cases the Court ultimately denies.

The post Justice Kavanaugh Tells Fifth Circuit that "Shadow Docket" Places Pressure on Supreme Court appeared first on Reason.com.

On Wednesday, District Court Judge Michael Fitzgerald of the Central District of California dismissed Genesis B. v. Environmental Protection Agency, another "kids climate suit" against the federal government. In this case, as in the Juliana litigation, the plaintiffs sought to argue that the federal government is constitutionally obligated to take more aggressive action to control greenhouse gas emissions.

Among other things, the Genesis plaintiffs sought to argued that discounting future harms from climate change constitutes invidious age discrimination under the Equal Protection clause. As extravagant as such substantive arguments were, the plaintiffs here faced a larger threshold problem: Demonstrating federal court jurisdiction to hear the claims.

In the order, Judge Fitzgerald noted that there was no basis upon which to distinguish this case from the Juliana case, which the Ninth Circuit ordered dismissed on standing grounds. However, Judge Fitzgerald did grant the plaintiffs leave to amend, offering them another opportunity to reformulate their claims. No doubt the plaintiffs will file an amended complaint, but I am skeptical it will produce a different result.

The post District Court Dismisses Genesis B. Kids Climate Suit Against the EPA appeared first on Reason.com.

Today a unanimous panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted the U.S. Department of Justice's petition for a writ of mandamus seeking dismissal of Juliana v. United States, the so-called "Kids Climate Case."

The brief order was short and direct. It noted that the Ninth Circuit had previously concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing and ordered the case dismissed. Contrary to the plaintiffs' claims, no intervening decisions changed that fact, and that there was no basis for the district court to allow the plaintiffs to amend the complaint.

This decision should not have been a surprise. It should also be a relief to those who hope to see further climate litigation, as the Ninth Circuit panel saw no need to consider issues beyond the plaintiffs' Article III standing, and dismissal of the case obviates any need for the DOJ to seek Supreme Court review. Judge Aiken was wrong to revive this case, and now the Ninth Circuit has killed it for good.

Meanwhile, there are other (more well-grounded) climate cases proceeding in state courts under state law. More on those cases in future posts.

I've reproduced the Ninth Circuit's order after the jump.

Here is the text of the brief order:

In the underlying case, twenty-one plaintiffs (the Juliana plaintiffs) claim that—by failing to adequately respond to the threat of climate change—the government has violated a putative "right to a stable climate system that can sustain human life." Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-CV-01517-AA, 2023 WL 9023339, at *1 (D. Or. Dec. 29, 2023). In a prior appeal, we held that the Juliana plaintiffs lack Article III standing to bring such a claim. Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1175 (9th Cir. 2020). We remanded with instructions to dismiss on that basis. Id. The district court nevertheless allowed amendment, and the government again moved to dismiss. The district court denied that motion, and the government petitioned for mandamus seeking to enforce our earlier mandate. We have jurisdiction to consider the petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651. We grant it.

1. "[M]andamus is an extraordinary remedy . . . reserved for extraordinary situations." Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 289 (1988). "[M]andamus is the appropriate remedy" when "sought on the ground that the district court failed to follow the appellate court's mandate." Vizcaino v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of Wash., 173 F.3d 713, 719 (9th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of N.Y., 334 U.S. 258, 263 (1948). We review a district court's compliance with the mandate de novo. Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 615 F.3d 1069, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010).

2. The petition accuses the district court of failing to execute our mandate on remand. District courts must "act on the mandate of an appellate court, without variance or examination, only execution." United States v. Garcia-Beltran, 443 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2006). "[T]he only step" that a district court can take is "to obey the mandate." Rogers v. Consol. Rock Prods. Co., 114 F.2d 108, 111 (9th Cir. 1940). A district court must "implement both the letter and the spirit of the mandate, taking into account the [prior] opinion and the circumstances it embraces." Pit River Tribe, 615 F.3d at 1079 (emphasis added) (cleaned up).

3. In the prior appeal, we held that declaratory relief was "not substantially likely to mitigate the plaintiffs' asserted concrete injuries." Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1170. To the contrary, it would do nothing "absent further court action," which we held was unavailable. Id. We then clearly explained that Article III courts could not "step into the[] shoes" of the political branches to provide the relief the Juliana plaintiffs sought. Id. at 1175. Because neither the request for declaratory relief nor the request for injunctive relief was justiciable, we "remand[ed] th[e] case to the district court with instructions to dismiss for lack of Article III standing." Id. Our mandate was to dismiss.

4. The district court gave two reasons for allowing amendment. First, it concluded that amendment was not expressly precluded. Second, it held that intervening authority compelled a different result. We reject each.

The first reason fails because we "remand[ed] . . . with instructions to dismiss for lack of Article III standing." Id. Neither the mandate's letter nor its spirit left room for amendment. See Pit River Tribe, 615 F.3d at 1079. The second reason the district court identified was that, in its view, there was an intervening change in the law. District courts are not bound by a mandate when a subsequently decided case changes the law. In re Molasky, 843 F.3d 1179, 1184 n.5 (9th Cir. 2016). The case the court identified was Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, which "ask[ed] whether an award of nominal damages by itself can redress a past injury." 141 S. Ct. 792, 796 (2021). Thus, Uzuegbunam was a damages case which says nothing about the redressability of declaratory judgments. Damages are a form of retrospective relief. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 608–09 (2001). Declaratory relief is prospective. The Juliana plaintiffs do not seek damages but seek only prospective relief.

Nothing in Uzuegbunam changed the law with respect to prospective relief. We held that the Juliana plaintiffs lack standing to bring their claims and told the district court to dismiss. Uzuegbunam did not change that. The district court is instructed to dismiss the case forthwith for lack of Article III standing, without leave to amend.

PETITION GRANTED.

For those interested, here are my prior posts on the Juliana litigation:

• "Is Kids Climate Case Coming to an End?" Nov. 26, 2018.
• "Ninth Circuit Dismisses Kids Climate Case for Lack of Standing (Updated)," Jan. 17, 2020.
• "Kids Climate Plaintiffs to Seek Rehearing En Banc," Jan. 20, 2020.
• "Ninth Circuit Denies Petition for En Banc Rehearing in Kids Climate Case," Feb. 10, 2021.
• "Will the Justice Department Settle a Case the Ninth Circuit Already Dismissed?" May 26, 2021.
• "States Seek to Intervene to Prevent Settlement in Kids Climate Case Ninth Circuit Already Ordered Dismissed," June 9, 2021.
• "Blue States File Brief Encouraging District Court to Consider Juliana Settlement," July 7, 2021.
• "Juliana Plaintiffs Opt Against Filing Cert Petition in Kids Climate Case," July 13, 2021.
• "District Court Judge Revives Kids Climate Case," June 1, 2023.
• "The Next Kids Climate Case: Genesis B. v. EPA," Dec. 15, 2023.
• "Federal Court Again Refuses to Dismiss Juliana Climate Case," Jan. 2, 2024.
• "Justice Department to Seek Mandamus to End Juliana Litigation (Again)," Jan. 29, 2024.
• "DOJ Files Petition for Writ of Mandamus to End Juliana Climate Litigation," Feb. 6, 2024.

The post Ninth Circuit Puts An End to the Kids Climate Case appeared first on Reason.com.

In the course of an interview mostly devoted to other issues, a Japanese reporter recently asked me whether there is a difference between justice and the rule of law. Some of his (understandable) confusion was purely linguistic. Both "justice" and "rule of law"are fuzzy terms that different people use in different ways. It's easy to see how non-native English speakers could get confused.

Nonetheless, there are differences between the two concepts that go beyond semantics. Sometimes, of course, "rule of law" might be used in ways that preemptively rule out the possibility that legislation that meets rule-of-law requirements could ever be unjust. In the famous Hart-Fuller debate of the 1950s, Lon Fuller argued that gravely unjust rules and regulations (like those of Nazi Germany) could never be real laws. If so, enforcing such mandates can never be squared with the rule of law.

More commonly, however, "rule of law" is used to denote crucial procedural elements of a legal system, particularly that that ordinary people should be able to readily determine what laws they are required to obey, and that whether or not you get charged by the authorities depends mostly on objective legal rules rather than the exercise of official discretion (thus, the contrast between the rule of law and the "rule of men"). We might add that the rule of law bars—or at least presumptively forbids—discrimination on the basis of certain morally irrelevant characteristics, such as race, ethnicity, and gender.

By contrast, "justice" is a broader notion that focuses on the substantive rightness of the legal rule in question. Laws protecting freedom are (at least usually) just. Laws promoting slavery are not. And so on.

Understood in this way, it is easy to see how legislation that meets the requirements of the rule of law can nonetheless be profoundly unjust. Consider a law mandating the death penalty for jaywalking. It's certainly clear and unequivocal. Assume, further, that there is no enforcement discretion; no discrimination on the basis of race, gender, or any other morally arbitrary trait. Nor is there any favoritism. It is enforced against the rich and powerful no less than the poor and weak. If the governor of the state jaywalks, he or she will be executed just as readily as a homeless person who commits the same offense.

This rule meets the requirements of the rule of law. But it is still blatantly unjust. The death penalty is a hugely disproportionate punishment for the offense of jaywalking, no matter how evenly it is applied.

The same can be true of laws where "crime" itself is something that should not be illegal, even aside from the severity of the punishment. Imagine a law imposing forced labor on a large swathe of the population, such as one requiring all able-bodied adult citizens to do a month of forced labor each year. In Butler v. Perry (1916), the Supreme Court actually upheld a Florida law that required all able-bodied male citizens between the ages of 21 and 45 to either do road repair work for six days each year, provide a substitute, or pay a $3 tax (a much larger amount in inflation-adjusted terms in 1916 than it would be today).

In 1916 Florida, this law was likely enforced much more aggressively against blacks and poor people than against affluent whites. Such unequal enforcement arguably violated rule-of-law principles. Perhaps the rule of law was also undermined by the fact that the law only mandated forced labor for men, exempting women. But we could easily imagine a version of the law that is enforced equally, and also covers women. That version would satisfy the requirements of the rule of law. And, unlike the death penalty for jaywalking law, the punishment seems at least reasonably proportional to the offense.

The forced labor law would nonetheless be terribly unjust, because forced labor (including forced labor for the state) is itself unjust—no matter how equally enforced. Indeed, fully equal enforcement might in some ways make things worse, because it would increase the number of people who are victimized.

If laws that meet the requirements of the rule of law can still be unjust, we might also consider whether justice might sometimes require dispensing with rule-of-law constraints. At the very least, it seems like such a possibility cannot be categorically ruled out.

Elsewhere, I have argued that the rule of law is undermined by our having too many laws.

Because of the vast scope of current law, in modern America the authorities can pin a crime on the overwhelming majority of people, if they really want to. Whether you get hauled into court or not depends more on the discretionary decisions of law enforcement officials than on any legal rule. And it is difficult or impossible for ordinary people to keep track of all the laws they are subject to and to live a normal life without running afoul of at least some of them….

Scholars estimate that the vast majority of adult Americans have violated criminal law at some point in their lives. Indeed, a recent survey finds that some 52 percent admit to violating the federal law banning possession of marijuana, to say nothing of the myriad other federal criminal laws. If you also include civil laws…. even more Americans are lawbreakers….

For most people, it is difficult to avoid violating at least some laws, or even to keep track of all the laws that apply to them….

Ignorance of the law may not be a legally valid excuse. But such ignorance is virtually inevitable when the law regulates almost every aspect of our lives and is so extensive and complicated that few can hope to keep track of it….

Most Americans, of course, never face punishment for their lawbreaking. But that is true only because the authorities lack the resources to pursue most violators and routinely exercise discretion in determining which ones are worth the effort….

In this way, the rule of law has largely been supplanted by the rule of chance and the rule of executive discretion.

The post The Difference Between Justice and the Rule of Law appeared first on Reason.com.

Yesterday the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Trump v. United States, in which Donald Trump has been trying to argue that he is immune from prosecution for acts taken while he was President (as Eugene noted here). It has ordered expedited briefing (although not quite as expedited as special counsel Jack Smith requested), and we can hope for a decision before the end of June.

As I noted in a blog post three weeks back, there were serious arguments in favor of the Court granting this case to iron out some aspects of the D.C. Circuit's ruling against Trump. (On this point, see this essay by Jack Goldsmith.)

While the D.C. Circuit correctly rejected Trump's immunity claims in a hastily drafted (yet largely well-crafted) decision, there are questions about how presidential immunity claims should be conceived and the extent to which immunity claims prevent even the initiation of prosecution, as opposed to requiring the government to make certain showings (e.g. that given acts were not official acts, etc.).  That said, I would have preferred that the Court had acted a bit more quickly than it did, but the Court is not always known (or celebrated) for speed. (It seems the "shadow docket" has its virtues.)

The Court's order treated Trump's application for a stay as a petition for certiorari and rewrote the question presented in the case. Trump's application for a stay presented two questions:

I. Whether the doctrine of absolute presidential immunity includes immunity from criminal prosecution for a President's official acts, i.e., those performed within the "'outer perimeter' of his official responsibility." Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756 (1982) (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959)).

II. Whether the Impeachment Judgment Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7, and principles of double jeopardy foreclose the criminal prosecution of a President who has been impeached and acquitted by the U.S. Senate for the same and/or closely related conduct that underlies the criminal charges.

The Court limited its grant of certiorari to the following:

Whether and if so to what extent does a former President enjoy presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office.

There are a few points worth making about this. First, the Court is not considering the second question at all. The U.S. Court of Appeals decisively (and correctly) rejected this argument below. It was never a serious argument, and is not worth the justices' time. No, a failure of the Senate to convict an impeached President does not preclude subsequent prosecution for the same or related acts.

Second, as Jack Goldsmith notes in this Xitter thread, the Court framed the issue in terms of "presidential immunity," not "absolute immunity" as Trump had argued. Further, by asking both "whether" and "to what extent" a President may be immune, the Court can make clear that mere invocation of alleged "official acts" is not enough to make the prosecution go away, while still providing immunity for core executive prerogatives. So the Court could decide that running for reelection is not an "official" act entitled to any immunity, or not sufficiently core to executive function to justify immunity, without raising the specter of future partisan prosecutions of former presidents for official acts (e.g. ordering military actions, like drone strikes, that result in the death of U.S. citizens, etc.).

Stepping back, while I liked the idea of the Court simply leaving the D.C. Circuit's decision in place and allowing a trial to go forward, there is no question that this case was objectively cert worthy. Ideally, the Senate would have convicted Trump after he was impeached, as the argument that the Senate lacked such authority was quite weak, but that was not to be. It would also have been far preferable had the Justice Department acted more quickly to investigate and initiate prosecution than it did, but that was not to be either. This leaves us with the unhappy choice of letting the Supreme Court further define the contours of presidential immunity on the eve of a presidential election in which the defendant is a candidate. That is not a great place to be, but that's where we are.

UPDATE: Ed Whelan flags another interesting aspect of the Court's order that I overlooked.

The Court failed to grant Trump's stay application. The grant of certiorari had the same effect, however, as the Court ordered the D.C. Circuit to withhold its mandate. Here's the interesting part: It take five votes to grant a stay, but only four to grant certiorari. Thus the lack of a stay suggests a majority of the Court may have been inclined to affirm the D.C. Circuit, even if some had concerns about the lower court's reasoning. That at least four voted to grant certiorari may also mean no more than at least four justices saw a need to refine the D.C. Circuit's analysis so as to provide greater clarity about the scope of presidential immunity going forward.

The post The Supreme Court's Grant in Trump v. U.S. (UPDATED) appeared first on Reason.com.

On March 26, 2019, every American who owned a bump stock, a rifle accessory that facilitates rapid firing, was suddenly guilty of a federal felony punishable by up to 10 years in prison. That did not happen because a new law took effect; it happened because federal regulators reinterpreted an existing law to mean something they had long said it did not mean.

On Wednesday, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the question of whether those bureaucrats had the authority to do that. The case, Garland v. Cargill, turns on whether bump stocks are prohibited under the "best reading" of the federal statute covering machine guns. While several justices were clearly inclined to take that view, several others had reservations.

The products targeted by the government are designed to assist bump firing, which involves pushing a rifle forward to activate the trigger by bumping it against a stationary finger, then allowing recoil energy to push the rifle backward, which resets the trigger. As long as the shooter maintains forward pressure and keeps his finger in place, the rifle will fire repeatedly. The "interpretive rule" at issue in this case, which was published in December 2018 and took effect three months later, bans stock replacements that facilitate this technique by allowing the rifle's receiver to slide back and forth.

Officially, the purpose of that rule was merely to "clarify" that bump stocks are illegal. According to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), they always have been, although no one (including the ATF) realized that until 2018.

Federal law defines a machine gun as a weapon that "automatically" fires "more than one shot" by "a single function of the trigger." The definition also covers parts that are "designed and intended…for use in converting a weapon" into a machine gun.

During Wednesday's oral arguments, Principal Deputy Solicitor General Brian H. Fletcher maintained that a rifle equipped with a bump stock plainly meets the criteria for a machine gun. It "fires more than one shot by a single function of the trigger," he said, because "a function of the trigger happens when some act by the shooter, usually a pull, starts a firing sequence." An ordinary semi-automatic rifle, according to Fletcher, "fires one shot for each function of the trigger because the shooter has to manually pull and release the trigger for every shot." But "a bump stock eliminates those manual movements and allows the shooter to fire many shots with one act, a forward push."

Fletcher argued that a rifle with a bump stock also "fires more than one shot automatically, that is, through a self-regulating mechanism." After "the shooter presses forward to fire the first shot," he said, "the bump stock uses the gun's recoil energy to create a continuous back-and-forth cycle that fires hundreds of shots per minute."

Jonathan F. Mitchell, the attorney representing Michael Cargill, the Texas gun shop owner who challenged the bump stock ban, argued that Fletcher was misapplying both of those criteria. First, he said, a rifle equipped with a bump stock "can fire only one shot per function of the trigger because the trigger must reset after every shot and must function again before another shot can be fired." The trigger "is the device that initiates the firing of the weapon, and the function of the trigger is what that triggering device must do to cause the weapon to fire," he added. "The phrase 'function of the trigger' can refer only to the trigger's function. It has nothing to do with the shooter or what the shooter does to the trigger because the shooter does not have a function."

Second, Mitchell said, a rifle with a bump stock "does not and cannot fire more than one shot automatically by a single function of the trigger because the shooter, in addition to causing the trigger to function, must also undertake additional manual actions to ensure a successful round of bump firing." That process "depends entirely on human effort and exertion," he explained, because "the shooter must continually and repeatedly thrust the force stock of the rifle forward with his non-shooting hand while simultaneously maintaining backward pressure on the weapon with his shooting hand. None of these acts are automated."

Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson seemed eager to accept Fletcher's reading of the law, arguing that it is consistent with what Congress was trying to do when it approved the National Firearms Act of 1934, which imposed tax and registration requirements on machine guns. Although bump stocks did not exist at the time, they suggested, the law was meant to cover any firearm that approximated a machine gun's rate of fire.

According to Fletcher, "a traditional machine gun" can "shoot in the range of 700 to 950 bullets a minute," while a semi-automatic rifle with a bump stock can "shoot between 400 and 800 rounds a minute." As he conceded, however, the statute does not refer to rate of fire. "This is not a rate-of-fire statute," he said. "It's a function statute." To ban bump stocks, in other words, the ATF has to show that they satisfy the disputed criteria.

"It seems like, yes, that this is functioning like a machine gun would," Justice Amy Coney Barrett said. "But, you know, looking at that definition, I think the question is, 'Why didn't Congress pass…legislation to make this cover it more clearly?'"

Justice Neil Gorsuch made the same point. "I can certainly understand why these items should be made illegal," he said, "but we're dealing with a statute that was enacted in the 1930s, and through many administrations, the government took the position that these bump stocks are not machine guns." That changed after a gunman murdered 60 people at a Las Vegas country music festival in October 2017, and it turned out that some of his rifles were fitted with bump stocks.

The massacre inspired several bills aimed at banning bump stocks. Noting that "the ATF lacks authority under the law to ban bump-fire stocks," Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D–Calif.) said "legislation is the only answer." President Donald Trump, by contrast, maintained that new legislation was unnecessary. After he instructed the ATF to ban bump stocks by administrative fiat, the agency bent the law to his will. Noting that "the law has not changed," Feinstein warned that the ATF's "about face," which relied partly on "a dubious analysis claiming that bumping the trigger is not the same as pulling it," would invite legal challenges.

Feinstein was right about that, and one of those challenges resulted in the decision that the government is now asking the Supreme Court to overturn. In January 2023, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit rejected the ATF's redefinition of machine guns.

"A plain reading of the statutory language, paired with close consideration of the mechanics of a semi-automatic firearm, reveals that a bump stock is excluded from the technical definition of 'machinegun' set forth in the Gun Control Act and National Firearms Act," 5th Circuit Judge Jennifer Walker Elrod wrote in the majority opinion. And even if that were not true, Elrod said, "the rule of lenity," which requires construing an ambiguous criminal statute in a defendant's favor, would preclude the government from punishing people for owning bump stocks.

Gorsuch alluded to Feinstein's prescient concerns about the ATF rule's legal vulnerability: "There are a number of members of Congress, including Senator Feinstein, who said that this administrative action forestalled legislation that would have dealt with this topic directly, rather than trying to use a nearly 100-year-old statute in a way that many administrations hadn't anticipated." The ATF's attempt to do that, he said, would "render between a quarter of a million and a half million people federal felons," even though they relied on guidance from "past administrations, Republican and Democrat," that said bump stocks were legal.

Justices Brett Kavanaugh and Samuel Alito also were troubled by that reversal's implications for people who already owned bump stocks. Fletcher tried to assuage those concerns.

"ATF made [it] very clear in enacting this rule that anyone who turned in their bump stock or destroyed it before March of [2019] would not face prosecution," Fletcher said. "As a practical matter," he added, "the statute of limitations for this offense is five years," meaning prosecutions of people who owned bump stocks before the rule took effect will no longer be possible a month from now. "We have not prosecuted those people," he said. "We won't do it. And if we try to do it, I think they would have a good defense based on entrapment by estoppel," which applies when someone follows official advice in trying to comply with the law.

"What is the situation of people who have possessed bump stocks between the time of the ATF's new rule and the present day or between the time of the new rule and the 5th Circuit decision?" Alito asked. "Can they be prosecuted?" Fletcher's answer: "probably yes." That prospect, Alito said, is "disturbing."

Kavanaugh wondered about gun owners who did not destroy or surrender their bump stocks because they did not know about the ATF's rule. "For prosecuting someone now," he asked, "what mens rea showing would the government have to make to convict someone?" Fletcher said the defendant would "have to be aware of the facts" that, according to the ATF's reinterpretation of the law, make bump stocks illegal. "So even if you are not aware of the legal prohibition, you can be convicted?" Kavanaugh asked. "That's right," Fletcher replied.

"That's going to ensnare a lot of people who are not aware of the legal prohibition," Kavanaugh said. "Why not require the government to also prove that the person knew that what they were doing…was illegal?"

Gorsuch mocked Fletcher's apparent assumption that gun owners can be expected to keep abreast of the ATF's edicts. "People will sit down and read the Federal Register?" he said to laughter. "That's what they do in their evening for fun. Gun owners across the country crack it open next to the fire and the dog."

Maybe not, Fletcher admitted, but the publicity surrounding the ban and the legal controversy it provoked probably brought the matter to many people's attention. "I agree not everyone is going to find out about those things," he said, "but we've done everything the government could possibly do to make people aware."

Beyond the unfairness to gun owners who bought products they quite reasonably thought were legal, the ATF's about-face lends credibility to the complaint that its current interpretation of the law is misguided. If the ATF was wrong before, how can we be confident that it is right now?

According to the agency's new understanding of the statute, Mitchell noted, "function of the trigger" hinges on what the shooter is doing. But "function is an intransitive verb," he said. "It can't take an object grammatically. It's impossible. The trigger has to be the subject of function. It can't be the object."

Gorsuch picked up on that point, noting that the government had likened "function of the trigger" to "a stroke of a key or a throw of the dice or a swing of the bat." But "those are all things that people do," he said. Since function is an intransitive verb, "people don't function things. They may pull things, they may throw things, but they don't function things."

Gorsuch noted that the ATF is relying on "a very old statute" designed for "an obvious problem" posed by gangsters like Al Capone armed with machine guns that fired repeatedly "with a single function of the trigger—that is, the thing itself was moved once." Maybe legislators "should have written something better," he said. "One might hope they might write something better in the future. But that's the language we're stuck with."

What about the ATF's claim that a rifle equipped with a bump stock shoots "automatically"? Fletcher conceded that "an expert" can bump-fire a rifle "without any assistive device at all" and that "you can also do it if you have a lot of expertise by hooking your finger into a belt loop or using a rubber band or something else like that to hold your finger in place." But he added that "we don't think those things function automatically because the definition of 'automatically'" entails "a self-regulating mechanism."

As the government sees it, a shooter creates such a mechanism by using a bump stock, notwithstanding the "manual actions" that Mitchell highlighted. "There's nothing automatic about that," Mitchell argued. "The shooter is the one who is pushing. It's human effort, human exertion. Nothing automatic at all about this process."

Barrett asked Fletcher how the ATF would treat an elastic "bump band" marketed as an accessory to facilitate rapid firing. "Why wouldn't that then be a machine gun under the statute?" she wondered. "We think that's still not functioning automatically because that's not a self-regulating mechanism," Fletcher replied.

Mitchell, by contrast, argued that Barrett's hypothetical product and a bump stock are "indistinguishable when it comes to 'automatically.'" Bump firing with either involves "a manual action undertaken entirely by the shooter," he said. "There is no automating device….It is all being done by the shooter."

Justice Sonia Sotomayor, who was sympathetic to Fletcher's argument, nevertheless implied that the legal status of bump stocks might not be as clear as the government suggests. "The back-and-forth here leads me to believe that at best there might be some ambiguity," she said. But if the statute is in fact unclear, the 5th Circuit said, the ambiguity should be resolved in a way that protects gun owners from prosecution for a crime invented by bureaucrats.

The post SCOTUS Ponders the Implications of Prosecuting Gun Owners for a Crime Invented by Bureaucrats appeared first on Reason.com.