In Spartanburg County, South Carolina, on Interstate 85, police officers stop vehicles for traveling in the left lane while not actively passing, touching the white fog line, or following too closely. This annual crackdown is called Operation Rolling Thunder, and the police demand perfection.

Any infraction, no matter how minor, can lead to a roadside interrogation and warrantless search. However, a 21-month fight for transparency shows participating agencies play loose with South Carolina's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which requires the government to perform its business in an "open and public manner."

Motorists must follow state laws with exactness. But the people in charge of enforcement give themselves a pass.

Deny, Deny, Deny

The drawn-out FOIA dispute started on October 11, 2022, less than one week after a five-day blitz that produced nearly $1 million in cash seizures. Our public-interest law firm, the Institute for Justice, requested access to incident reports for all 144 vehicle searches that occurred during the joint operation involving 11 agencies: The Cherokee, Florence, Greenville, and Spartanburg County sheriff's offices; the Duncan, Gaffney, and Wellford police departments; the South Carolina Highway Patrol, Law Enforcement Division, and State Transport Police; and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

Our intent was simple. We wanted to check for constitutional violations, which can multiply in the rush to pull over and search as many vehicles as possible within a set time frame. South Carolina agencies have conducted the operation every year since 2006, yet no one has ever done a systematic audit.

Rather than comply with its FOIA obligation, Spartanburg County denied our request without citing any provision in the law. We tried again and then recruited the help of South Carolina resident and attorney Adrianne Turner, who filed a third request in 2023.

It took a lawsuit to finally pry the records loose. Turner filed the special action with outside representation.

Key Findings

The incident reports, released in batches from March through July 2024, show why Spartanburg County was eager to prevent anyone from obtaining them.

• Over 72 percent of vehicle searches during Operation Rolling Thunder in 2022 produced nothing illegal. Officers routinely treated innocent drivers like criminals.
• Carrying any amount of cash is legal, but officers treated currency as contraband. The records describe no single case in which officers found a large amount of cash and did not seize it. All money was presumed dirty.
• Officers pressured property owners to sign roadside abandonment forms, giving up claims to their cash on the spot.
• South Carolina residents mostly got a pass. Officers focused on vehicles with out-of-state plates, rental cars, and commercial buses. Over 83 percent of the criminal suspects identified during warrantless searches lived out of state. Nearly half were from Georgia.
• Black travelers were especially vulnerable. Nearly 74 percent of the suspects identified and 75 percent of the people arrested were black. This is more than triple the South Carolina black population of 25 percent.

Working in the Shadows

While these records shine a light on police conduct, still more secrets remain.

By policy, the Spartanburg County Sheriff's Office and partner agencies do not create incident reports for every search. They only document their "wins" when they find cash or contraband. They do not document their "losses" when they come up empty.

Thanks to this policy, Spartanburg County has no records for 102 of the 144 searches that occurred during Operation Rolling Thunder in 2022. Nowhere do officers describe how they gained probable cause to enter the vehicles where nothing was found. The police open and close investigations and then act like the searches never happened.

This leaves government watchdogs in the dark—by design. They cannot inspect public records that do not exist. Victims cannot cite them in litigation. And police supervisors cannot review them when evaluating job performance.

Even if body camera video exists, there is no paper trail. This lack of recordkeeping undercuts the intent of FOIA. Agencies dodge accountability by simply not summarizing their embarrassing or potentially unconstitutional conduct.

The rigged system is rife with abuse. Available records show that officers routinely order drivers to exit their vehicles and sit in the front seat of a patrol car. If people show signs of "labored breathing," "nervousness," or being "visibly shaken," the police count this toward probable cause.

Officers overlook that anxiety is normal when trapped in a police cruiser without permission to leave. Even people who value their Fourth Amendment right to be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures" can break under pressure and consent to a search.

If travelers refuse, officers can bring K9 units to the scene for open-air sniffs. Having no drugs in the vehicle does not always help. False positives occurred during Operation Rolling Thunder, but the lack of recordkeeping makes a complete audit impossible.

Intimidation, harassment, and misjudgment are easily hidden. The police tell travelers: "If you have nothing to hide, you should let us search." But when the roles are reversed and the public asks questions, agencies suddenly want to remain silent.

The post Operation Rolling Thunder: The Shocking Truth Behind Spartanburg's Traffic Stops appeared first on Reason.com.

Today, in Culley v. Marshall, the Supreme Court reached a dubious decision in an asset forfeiture property rights case, holding that the seizure of property through civil forfeiture requires a "timely hearing," it does not require "a separate preliminary hearing to determine whether the police may retain the car pending the forfeiture hearing." The justices split 6-3 along ideological lines. However, a concurring opinion by Justice Neil Gorsuch (joined by Justice Clarence Thomas) suggests there may be a majority in favor of a more fundamental challenge to the abusive asset forfeiture regimes that exist in many states.

Civil asset forfeiture enables the government to seize property that has allegedly been used in the commission of a crime, even if the owner has never been charged or convicted of anything. In many states, including Alabama (whose policies are at issue in Culley), law enforcement can then hold on to the property for many months before the owner is allowed to contest the seizure. Moreover, many states allow law enforcement to keep the proceeds from seized property, thereby creating an incentive to take as much as possible. Culley involves two Alabama cases where the owners of cars were subject to asset forfeitures as a result of the use of the vehicles by other people to conduct illegal drug transactions. The owners eventually managed to prevail in state court. But that process took many months. In the meantime, they were deprived of their vehicles, without any compensation.

Critics have long argued that such practices violate the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which bar the government from  depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." If the police can seize property and hold on to it for months on end without any meaningful process at all, that surely is not "due process of law."

In an opinion written by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, the Supreme Court nonetheless ruled that a separate "preliminary hearing" is not required in such cases, for two reasons. First, they contend the issue was resolved in two earlier Supreme Court precedents:

Ultimately, we need not reweigh the competing due process arguments advanced by the parties because this Court's decisions in United States v. $8,850, 461 U. S. 555 (1983), and United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U. S. 242 (1986), already resolved the issue. After a State seizes and seeks civil forfeiture of personal property, due process requires a timely forfeiture hearing but does not require a separate preliminary hearing….

The dispute in $8,850 arose when the Customs Service seized currency from an individual entering the United States, but then waited before filing for civil forfeiture of the currency…. The property owner argued that the delay violated due process….This Court concluded that a post-seizure delay "may become so prolonged that the dispossessed property owner has been deprived of a meaningful hearing at a meaningfultime." Id., at 562–563. The Court elaborated that timeliness in civil forfeiture cases must be assessed by "analog[izing] . . . to a defendant's right to a speedy trial" and considering four factors: the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, whether the property owner asserted his rights, and whether the delay was prejudicial. Id., at 564… Those factors are appropriate guides in the civil forfeiture context, the Court explained, because the factors ensure that "the flexible requirements of due process have been met…."

In Von Neumann, the Court addressed whether a timely forfeiture hearing, without more, provides the process that is due in civil forfeiture cases. See 474 U. S., at 249–251. The property owner there failed to declare the purchase of his new car upon driving it into the United States. See id.,at 245. A customs official determined that the car was subject to civil forfeiture and seized it. See ibid. The plaintiff filed a petition for remission of the forfeiture—in essence, a request under federal law that the Federal Government exercise its discretion to forgive the forfeiture. See id., at 245–246. The Government did not respond to that petition for 36 days. See id., at 246. The plaintiff sued, arguing that the Government's 36-day delay in answering the remission petition violated due process…. Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court broadly held that due process did not require a pre-forfeiture-hearing remission procedure in the first place….

This Court's decisions in $8,850 and Von Neumann resolve this case. As the Court stated in Von Neumann, a timely forfeiture hearing "satisfies any due process right"
with respect to a "car" that has been seized for civil forfeiture. 474 U. S., at 251; see also id., at 249. The Due Process Clause does not require a separate preliminary
hearing.

The second reason why the majority rejects the need for a pre-forfeiture hearing is the originalist argument that Founding-era evidence suggests it wasn't required:

Historical practice reinforces the holdings of $8,850 and Von Neumann that due process does not require preliminary hearings in civil forfeiture cases. Since the Founding era, statutes have authorized the Government to seize personal property and hold it pending a forfeiture hearing, without a separate preliminary hearing. For example, the first federal forfeiture law, the Collection Act of 1789, authorized the civil forfeiture of ships, goods, and merchandise involved in suspected violations of the customs laws…. The collector then filed a forfeiture action, which a court would "hear and determine . . . according to law." §36, id., at 47. While that action was pending, the seized property could remain in the custody of the collector." §25, id., at 43.…

The Collection Act did not require a separate preliminary hearing before the forfeiture hearing. Rather, the forfeiture "trial" supplied the opportunity for the property owner to challenge the collector's case.

In a forceful concurring opinion that reads more like a dissent, Justice Gorsuch outlines serious due process flaws in the current asset forfeiture regime, and in the process undermines the majorities arguments. Like Justice Sotomayor in her dissent for the three liberal justices, Gorsuch emphasizes the abusive practices of the modern asset forfeiture regime, and the fact that most of it is of relatively recent origin, arising from the growth of the War on Drugs.  This puts it in serious tension with text and original meaning:

To my mind, the due process questions surrounding these relatively new civil forfeiture practices are many. Start with the most fundamental one. The Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments guarantee that no government in this country may take "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." As originally understood, this promise usually meant that a government seeking to deprive an individual of her property could do so only after a trial before a jury in which it (not the individual) bore the burden of proof. See, e.g., 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 134– 135 (1765) (Blackstone); Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304, 315 (CC Pa. 1795) (Patterson, J.); Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627, 657 (1829) (Story, J.). So how is it that, in civil forfeiture, the government may confiscate property first and provide process later?

The answer, if there is one, turns on history. If, as a rule, the Due Process Clauses require governments to conduct a trial before taking property, some exceptions are just asdeeply rooted. And for just that reason, these exceptions, too, may be consistent with the original meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Gorsuch goes on to note that the Founding-era and Supreme Court precedents cited by the majority may not be generally applicable, because they arose in " the discrete arenas of admiralty, customs, and revenue law." That's true of the Collections Act, and also of $8850 and Von Neumann, the two modern precedents emphasized by Kavanaugh. But, as Gorsuch points out, these areas are likely to be special cases, exceptions to the general rule that the government may only seize property after a trial:

The reasons for the law's traditionally permissive attitude toward civil forfeiture in those three contexts may merit exploration, too. From a brief look, it seems they were
sometimes justified for reasons particular to their fields. In the early Republic, for example, once a ship involved in violations of the Nation's piracy or customs laws slipped port for a foreign destination, American courts often could not exercise jurisdiction over it or its crew, let alone its owners…. In many instances, the law recognized that seizing the ship, subject to postdeprivation procedures, represented "the only adequate means of suppressing the offence or wrong, or insuring an indemnity to the injured party." Harmony v. United States, 2 How. 210, 233 (1844) (Story, J.); see also 3 Blackstone 262 (1768) (justifying civil forfeiture in customs cases as necessary "to secure such forfeited goods for the public use, though the offender himself had escaped the reach of justice"). But if history sanctions that line of thinking, it's hard not to wonder: How does any of that support the use of civil forfeiture in so many cases today, where the government can secure personal jurisdiction over the wrongdoer? And where seizing his property is not the only adequate means of addressing his offense?

How indeed?

Notice that Gorsuch's reasoning effectively disposes of both of the main arguments advanced by the majority: $8850 and Von Neumann are not dispositive precedents, because both were customs cases, which are a special, distinct situation. For the same reason, the Founding-era evidence cited by Kavanaugh is also inadequate. It too focuses on customs legislation.

More generally, if Gorsuch is right to conclude that "a government seeking to deprive an individual of her property could do so only after a trial before a jury in which it (not the individual) bore the burden of proof," then the Alabama laws at issue in this case are clearly unconstitutional! A procedure under which the government can seize and hold on to property for many months before providing any kind of hearing clearly doesn't meet that standard. Ditto for the way in which Alabama (like many other states) effectively shifts the burden of proof onto the property owner.

Thus, by their own reasoning, Gorsuch and Thomas should have dissented. Even if a "separate preliminary hearing" isn't required, the government still may not seize property without holding a trial first, and a procedure that, as Gorsuch puts it, allows "it take and keep private property without a warrant or any other form of prior process" is clearly unconstitutional, and violates the requirement of a "timely" hearing.

Justice Sotomayor's dissenting opinion offers additional constitutional criticisms of the Alabama asset forfeiture system, and others like it. Like Gorsuch, she also highlights the perverse incentives created by the current system (which allows law enforcement to profit from seizures), ways in which that system disproportionately burdens the poor and disadvantaged, including property owners who don't have the resources for a prolonged legal battle. Losing the use of your car for many months may be only a moderate burden for the relatively affluent. It's a much bigger one for a poor or working class person. She also points out additional flaws in the majority's use of precedent.

From the standpoint of civil libertarians and property rights advocates, there is a silver lining to today's otherwise terrible decision: at least five justices seem open to issuing a broader ruling curbing asset forfeiture. In his concurring opinion, Gorsuch comes close to inviting litigants to file a broad challenge arguing that most asset forfeitures require a prior jury trial:

Why does a Nation so jealous of its liberties tolerate expansive new civil forfeiture practices that have "led to egregious and well-chronicled abuses"? Leonard, 580 U. S., at 1180 (statement of THOMAS, J.). Perhaps it has something to do with the relative lack of power of those on whom the system preys. Perhaps government agencies' increasing dependence on forfeiture as a source of revenue is an important piece of the puzzle…. But maybe, too, part of the reason lies closer to home. In this Nation, the right to a jury trial before the government may take life, liberty, or property has always been the rule. Yes, some exceptions exist. But perhaps it is past time for this Court to examine more fully whether and to what degree contemporary civil forfeiture practices align with that rule and those exceptions.

If Justice Sotomayor's dissent is any indication, the three liberal justices also seem open to a broader attack on at least the more egregious current asset forfeiture practices, prevalent in many states.  Defense lawyers and public interest organizations should take note—and take up Gorsuch's thinly veiled invitation. Victory may yet be snatched from the jaws of today's defeat.

The post Supreme Court Issues Flawed Ruling in Asset Forfeiture Case appeared first on Reason.com.

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled Thursday that the due process rights of two Alabama women were not violated when they both had to wait over a year for a court hearing to challenge the police seizure of their cars.

In a 6–3 decision, the Court's conservative majority held in the case Culley v. Marshall, Attorney General of Alabama that property owners in civil asset forfeiture proceedings have no due process right to a preliminary court hearing to determine if police had probable cause to seize their property.

"When police seize and then seek civil forfeiture of a car that was used to commit a drug offense, the Constitution requires a timely forfeiture hearing," Justice Brett Kavanaugh wrote in the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito, Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, and Amy Coney Barrett. "The question here is whether the Constitution also requires a separate preliminary hearing to determine whether the police may retain the car pending the forfeiture hearing. This Court's precedents establish that the answer is no: The Constitution requires a timely forfeiture hearing; the Constitution does not also require a separate preliminary hearing."

Under civil asset forfeiture laws, police can seize property suspected of being connected to criminal activity, even if the owner is never charged or convicted of a crime. Law enforcement groups say it is a vital tool to disrupt drug trafficking and other organized crime.

Civil liberties groups across the political spectrum argue that the process creates perverse profit incentives for police and is unfairly tilted against property owners, who bear the burden of challenging the seizures in court. 

Those criticisms have been echoed in the past by not just the Supreme Court's liberal justices but also Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch, giving forfeiture critics hope that a skeptical majority on the Court would clamp down on civil forfeiture.

However, despite writing in a concurrence that "this case leaves many larger questions unresolved about whether, and to what extent, contemporary civil forfeiture practices can be squared with the Constitution's promise of due process," Gorsuch, joined by Thomas, both agreed with the majority opinion.

Today's ruling is a disappointment, then, for groups such as the Institute for Justice, a libertarian-leaning public-interest law firm that filed an amicus brief on behalf of the petitioners. Kirby Thomas West, an Institute for Justice attorney, calls the ruling "a big loss for private property rights."

"Today's decision will mean many more property owners will never get their day in court when it could do them some good—shortly after the seizure of their vehicle or other property," says West. "Instead, civil forfeiture cases will languish for months or years before they are resolved. Meanwhile owners of seized vehicles will scramble to find a way to get to work, take their kids to school, run errands, and complete other essential life tasks."

The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case—two consolidated cases both involving Alabama women whose cars were seized by police for offenses they were not involved or charged with—last year.

In the first case, Halima Culley's son was pulled over by police in Satsuma, Alabama, while driving Culley's car. He was arrested and charged with possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. The City of Satsuma also seized Culley's car. It took 20 months, during all of which Culley was bereft of her vehicle, before a state court ruled that she was entitled to the return of her car under Alabama's innocent-owner defense.

In the second case, a friend of Lena Sutton took her car to run an errand in 2019. He was pulled over by police in Leesburg, Alabama, who found methamphetamine in the car and seized it. Sutton also eventually was granted summary judgment on an innocent-owner defense, but not until more than a year after the initial seizure of her car.

Culley and Sutton both filed lawsuits claiming that the towns violated their Eighth and 14th Amendment rights by depriving them of their cars for months when a pretrial hearing to establish probable cause for the seizures could have quickly determined that they were innocent owners.

Those long waits are not unusual. Last year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit ruled that Detroit's asset forfeiture scheme violated residents' constitutional rights by making them wait months for court hearings to challenge the validity of seizures. One of the plaintiffs in that lawsuit waited two years for a hearing.

However, the 11th Circuit rejected Culley's claims, finding the state's civil forfeiture process satisfied the requirements for a timely hearing under the speedy trial test, a balancing test created to resolve allegations of Sixth Amendment violations. However, every other circuit that has weighed in on the issue used a different balancing test established in the 1976 Supreme Court case Mathews v. Eldridge to determine due process violations.

The Supreme Court's conservative majority sidestepped the question of which test to use altogether, ruling that the existing requirement for a timely court hearing in forfeiture cases satisfied constitutional requirements.

"A timely forfeiture hearing protects the interests of both the claimant and the government," Kavanaugh wrote. "And an additional preliminary hearing of the kind sought by petitioners would interfere with the government's important law-enforcement activities in the period after the seizure and before the forfeiture hearing."

In a dissent, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson, wrote that the majority opinion's reasoning was "deeply flawed" and, rather than resolve the question of which test lower courts should apply, creates a universal rule that "hamstrings federal courts from conducting a context-specific analysis in civil forfeiture schemes that are less generous than the one here."

The post Supreme Court Rules No Due Process Right to Preliminary Hearings in Civil Asset Forfeiture Cases appeared first on Reason.com.

Very rarely do you see anyone prevail in court when any form of forfeiture is in play. The forfeiture litigation deck is firmly stacked in favor of the government, which rarely needs anything approaching actual proof to walk off with someone’s property.

It’s even more rare to see someone awarded damages in a civil lawsuit against law enforcement officers. In most cases, qualified immunity terminates the lawsuit. If qualified immunity is not awarded, agencies and governments are often swift to offer plaintiffs no-fault settlements that allow the accused to walk away from the lawsuit without having to admit any wrongdoing, much less pay out of their own pockets for their misdeeds.

This case contains both rarities. Not only does it involve regular people securing some sort of justice for their violated rights, but the underlying set of rights violations included officers walking out the home they’d raided without a warrant with all the valuables they could get their hands on, including $4,000 in cash.

Here’s how the raid went down, as recounted by C.J. Ciaramella for Reason back in 2019.

On January 31, 2018, a Randolph County sheriff’s deputy showed up at the home of Greg and Teresa Almond in Woodland, Alabama, to serve Greg court papers in a civil matter.

Greg, 50, wasn’t home, but his wife Teresa told the deputy he would be back before long. About two hours later, after Greg had returned home, he heard loud knocking on the door. He remembers shouting “hang on” and walking toward the door when it suddenly flew open. The next thing he knew he was on the floor—ears ringing, dazed, wondering if he’d just been shot.

Several deputies from the Randolph County Sheriff’s Department had kicked in his front door and thrown a flashbang grenade at his feet. The officers handcuffed and detained the couple at gunpoint, then started searching their house. The deputy from earlier had reportedly smelled marijuana, and so a county drug task force was descending on the Almonds’ home, looking for illegal drugs.

The supposed odor of marijuana eventually led the deputies to a small marijuana plant, a few scattered leaves, and a single prescription pill that was not located in its bottle. The home invasion also led deputies to other stuff they wanted, but had no legitimate reason to take. They took the cash they found in the house, a wedding ring, some guns, a coin collection, and a couple guitars.

To the Sheriff’s Office, the $4,000 probably seemed insignificant. But it was pretty much all they had. They were in the middle of refinancing an agricultural loan to ensure their chicken farm remained solvent. Thanks to being forced to spend most of two days in jail, they missed their refinancing deadline. That ultimately resulted in the couple losing their house. They were residing in an insulated shed by the time the court took up their lawsuit.

More than four years after the raid, the couple has finally secured some form of justice. The $1 million in damages awarded by the jury will likely be appealed by the sheriff’s department, but for now, that’s what a jury has said the couple is entitled to.

The judge overseeing the case issued an order [PDF] along with the directed verdict, stating that the “rarity” of a directed verdict in a civil rights lawsuit necessitates some explanation.

The explanation reveals just how much of a blatant violation of rights this raid was. Deputy Kevin Walker had no excuse for his actions.

During trial, Judge Amy Newsome testified that she never issued a telephonic warrant to Defendant Walker, or to the drug task force, on January 31, 2018, for a search of the Plaintiffs’ home. She also testified that she did not tell Walker that he had a warrant. In addition, Defendant Walker testified that Judge Newsome did not tell him that he had a telephonic search warrant, although she did tell him that he probably had enough for a warrant.

He also acknowledged that the requirements for a telephonic warrant were not satisfied, that he did not have a search warrant, and that it was a warrantless search. Given this undisputed testimony, even when considered in the light most favorable to Defendant Walker, the search of the Plaintiffs’ home was without a warrant, even a defective one, and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. No reasonable jury could have concluded otherwise as there was no question of fact on this issue.

Yeah. That’s inexcusable. And yet, Walker had an excuse: good faith. He attempted to avail himself of the good faith warrant exception. But, as the judge points out, good faith relies on someone believing a valid warrant has actually been issued, not just thinking they could probably obtain one at some point in the future. On top of that, the good faith exception invoked by the deputy only applies in criminal trials, not civil trials. Even if it did apply in this content, Walker would still lose. (Emphasis in the original.)

But even if the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule can apply in the civil context, the good faith exception still would not apply in the circumstances of this case. First, per Judge Newsome and Defendant Walker, there was no warrant, telephonic or written, and thus there was nothing upon which Walker could rely in good faith. In other words, because Defendant Walker knew that he did not have a warrant at the time of the incident, the good faith exception does not apply.

And the cases Walker cites are inapplicable to the facts here: Taylor, Moorehead, Henderson,
and Ganzer all involved situations where written warrants were issued, not situations where a warrant was never issued in the first place. And secondly, as a matter of law, given the undisputed facts concerning the non-existence of a warrant, it was objectively unreasonable for an experienced law enforcement officer to believe that he could search an occupied home when no warrant existed, when no judge told him that he had a warrant, when he was merely told that he had enough for a warrant, and when none of the formalities or requirements associated with a telephonic or written warrant were followed.

As the court notes in this order, it fully expects Walker to raise the other form of good faith in a future motion, indicating that while a jury has already said the couple is owed $1 million in damages, the court has yet to issue an order blessing that payout. Hopefully, if nothing else, this utter failure to salvage a blatantly unconstitutional search will urge Walker’s employers to cut a check, rather than continue to embarrass itself in court.

In this week's The Reason Roundtable, Katherine Mangu-Ward is in the driver's seat, alongside Nick Gillespie and special guests Zach Weissmueller and Eric Boehm. The editors react to the latest plot twists in Donald Trump's various legal proceedings and the death of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny.

00:41—The trials of Donald Trump in Georgia and New York

25:04—Weekly Listener Question

33:23—Sora, a new AI video tool

43:55—The death of Alexei Navalny

49:58—This week's cultural recommendations

Mentioned in this podcast:

"How a New York Judge Arrived at a Staggering 'Disgorgement' Order Against Trump," by Jacob Sullum

"Prosecutor Fani Willis Touts the Value of Cash, but What About the Rest of Us?" by J.D. Tuccille

"Trump Ordered To Pay $364 Million for Inflating His Assets in Civil Fraud Trial," by Joe Lancaster

"Alvin Bragg Is Trying To Punish Trump for Something That Is Not a Crime," by Jacob Sullum

"Alexei Navalny's Death Is a Timely Reminder of How Much Russia Sucks," by Eric Boehm

"Why Is Nike Stomping on Independent Creators?" by Kevin P. Alexander

"Bury My Sneakers at Wounded Knee," by Nick Gillespie

"Creation Myth: Does innovation require intellectual property rights?" by Douglas Clement

"A Private Libertarian City in Honduras," by Zach Weissmueller

"The Real Reasons Africa Is Poor—and Why It Matters," by Nick Gillespie

Bono's Ukraine Speech

"Justice or persecution? The Trump dilemma"

Send your questions to roundtable@reason.com. Be sure to include your social media handle and the correct pronunciation of your name.

Today's sponsor:

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The post Goodbye, Navalny appeared first on Reason.com.

It's quite a turn when a prosecutor defends the use of cash for financial transactions. After years of authorities treating mere possession of physical money as sketchy and grounds for seizure, this week a law enforcement official claimed there's nothing to see in her alleged cash reimbursements to her boyfriend for an enviable lifestyle arguably funded by the taxpayers. Either Fani Willis and company were right in the past and she should be subject to scrutiny for anonymous transactions, or she's right today and she and her colleagues owe the rest of us a pass on our taste for financial anonymity.

If you haven't kept up on the details, Fani Willis is the Fulton County district attorney overseeing the Georgia election interference case, which has been described as potentially the strongest and most consequential case against former (and maybe future) president Donald Trump. At least, it was described that way until defense attorneys revealed that Nathan Wade, a special prosecutor in the case, is unqualified for the job, was romantically involved with Willis, and is being paid much more than any of his colleagues (around $654,000 in all)—money from which Willis seemingly benefited in the form of expensive vacations and other pleasures of life with Wade.

She Reimbursed Everything in Cash. Of Course.

Well, she benefited unless she reimbursed Wade for her share. Whether or not she did is among the issues raised in a hearing investigating her alleged misconduct in the case.

"I didn't ever make him produce receipts to me," Willis said in response to questions about the couple's significant expenses. "Whatever he told me it was, I gave him the money back."

"You gave him cash before you ever went on the trip?" she was asked to clarify about one vacation.

"Mmm-hmm," Willis replied.

But she not only had no receipts, she also had no ATM slips or evidence the cash existed. It supposedly came from a substantial stash she kept at home on her father's urging.

Dad's Advice and 'Printed Freedom'

"I was trained, and most Black folks, they hide cash or they keep cash, and I was trained you always keep some cash," her father, John Floyd, confirmed. "I gave my daughter her first cash box and told her, 'Always keep some cash.'"

That's great advice. Cash is essential in emergencies, useful when electronic payments systems are down, and (importantly for this case) it's private and anonymous. When central-bank types floated the idea of abolishing physical money in favor of digital currency a decade ago, prominent German economist Lars Feld retorted that cash is "printed freedom" which helps people escape state control.

But that anonymity, which Fani Willis cited as the reason she had no evidence that she'd compensated Wade for his expenses, is exactly why government officials so despise its use by mere mortals.

Governments Hate Cash

"It just was not credible," CNN legal analyst Michael Moore, a former United States Attorney, commented of Willis's testimony about "things as nebulous as cash payments so there's no way to track it." He added: "It reminded me of watching a criminal defendant take the stand."

Cash is increasingly assumed by officialdom to be nefarious in and of itself.

"Cash can play a role in criminal activities such as money laundering and allow for tax evasion," notes Investopedia. "Since 2016, global policies have been implemented to thwart the use of cash in favor of digital currency transactions."

The mere presence of physical money triggers official suspicion and the urge to confiscate.

"It's the presence of paper legal tender—U.S. currency—that underlies nearly all of the thousands of police interactions we reviewed," The Greenville News reported in a 2020 story on civil asset forfeiture, under which money and valuables are seized, often with no charges brought against their owners.

Like Fani Willis, CNN's Moore is from Georgia and served there at both the state and federal level, so his attitude is illuminating. Georgia gets a D- grade from the Institute for Justice (I.J.) for its forfeiture laws.

"Across 15 states for which we have reliable property data for 2018,38 currency—primarily cash—predominates, accounting for an average of nearly 70% of forfeited property," I.J. revealed in the 2020 report, Policing for Profit. Georgia was among those states and "between 2015 and 2018, Georgia law enforcement agencies forfeited more than $51 million under state law. Between 2000 and 2019, they generated an additional $388 million from federal equitable sharing, for a total of at least $439 million in forfeiture revenue."

The 2023 budget for Fani Willis's Fulton County government includes Fund 442, Federal Equitable Sharing, for "proceeds of liquidated seized assets from asset forfeitures."

Willis may have taken her father's excellent advice about keeping cash on-hand. But her office is among those putting the screws to members of the public who abide by similar counsel and rely on physical money for its utility and anonymity. To keep large amounts of cash in Fulton County, Georgia, is to risk its seizure by the authorities. Yet Willis (assuming we believe her) does much business in cash.

If Prosecutors Get To Benefit, So Do We

So, which is it? Was the Fani Willis of the past, along with most of her profession, correct in considering cash to be inherently sketchy and evidence of some sort of criminal activity? If so, the court should view her claims of cash transactions as suspicious in themselves, just as she would treat regular people.

Or is the Fani Willis of last week correct that using cash is just good sense and evidence of homey wisdom handed down through the family? If that's the case, her office should have been treating people with the same light touch she hopes to receive.

The powers-that-be should abide by the same policies they inflict on the rest of us. If they want the freedom and privacy inherent in using cash, they can't keep it as a private privilege; we all get to benefit.

My sentiments are with John Floyd and Lars Feld on this. Cash is freedom and we should always keep some on hand. If that applies to Fani Willis, it must apply to everybody.

The post Prosecutor Fani Willis Touts the Value of Cash, but What About the Rest of Us? appeared first on Reason.com.